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Thomas P. Schlosser

Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries, timber, water, energy, cultural
resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of trust. He is a director of
Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he specializes in federal
litigation, natural resources, and Indian tribal property issues. He is also
frequently involved in tribal economic development and environmental
eg a
. I 1970 , T
e e e ed be
he S e e T ea P ge S d
fishing rights proceedings. Tom has a B.A. from the University of Washington
and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law School. Tom is a founding
member of the Indian Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association and
also served on the WSBA Bar Examiners Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE
speaker and moderates an American Indian Law discussion group for lawyers at
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer
at the University of Washington School of Law and Seattle University School of
Law. Case synopses are reprinted or derived from Westlaw and are used with
permission.
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I.
1.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar
Den, Inc.

No. 16-1498, 139 S.Ct. 1000 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019). Wholesale fuel
importer owned by a member of the Yakama Nation, which was
incorporated under Yakama law and designated by the Yakama
Nation as its agent to obtain fuel for members of the tribe, sought
review of the decision of the Washington State Department of
Licensing, which concluded that the Tribe's right under treaty to
travel on highways did not preempt state fuel taxes and assessed
importer $3.6 million in taxes, penalties, and licensing fees. The
Superior Court, Yakima County, No. 14-2-03851-7, Michael G.
McCarthy, J., reversed. The Department appealed. The Supreme
Court of Washington, Johnson, J., 188 Wash.2d 55, 392 P.3d 1014,
affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice
Breyer, held that: (1) Washington's fuel tax burdened the treaty right
of the Yakama Nation to travel upon all public highways in common
hc e
f he U ed S a e , a d (2) Wa h g
a
ca
f f e a
e a ee
ed b ea
ee a
the Yakama Nation of the right to travel upon all public highways.
Affirmed.
2.

Sturgeon v. Frost

No. 17-949, 139 S.Ct. 1066 (Mar. 26, 2019). Hunter, who sought to
use hovercraft to reach moose hunting grounds, brought action
against National Park Service (NPS), challenging NPS's
enforcement of a regulation banning operation of hovercrafts on the
Nation River, which partially fell within a federal preservation area.
State of Alaska intervened as a plaintiff. The United States District
Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, Senior District
Judge, 2013 WL 5888230, entered summary judgment for NPS.
Hunter and State appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 768 F.3d 1066, affirmed
in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts, 136 S.Ct. 1061, 194 L.Ed.2d
108, vacated and remanded. On remand, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 872 F.3d 927, held that
regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed
332

conservation areas applied to the river. Certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Justice Kagan, held that: (1) the Nation River was
b c a d
h he ea g f he A a a Na
a I ee
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA); (2) even if United States held
title to a reserved water right in the Nation River, that right could
not justify applying NPS's hovercraft rule; (3) ANILCA exempts
non-public lands, including waters, located within national park
boundaries in Alaska from NPS's ordinary regulatory authority; (4)
hovercraft rule does not apply to non-public lands in Alaska, even
when those lands lie within national parks; and (5) NPS had no
authority to regulate conduct on navigable waters in Alaskan
national parks. As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has held in three
cases the so-called Katie John trilogy ha he e
b c
a d,
he
ed
ANILCA
b e ce-fishing provisions,
encompasses navigable waters like the Nation River. See Alaska v.
Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (1995); John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032
(2001) (en banc); John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (2013).
Those provisions are not at issue in this case and we therefore do not
d
b he N h C c
h d g ha he Pa Se ce a
regulate subsistence fishing on navigable waters. See generally,
Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae at 29 35 (arguing that
this case does not implicate those decisions); Brief for Ahtna, Inc.,
as Amicus Curiae 30 36 (same). Reversed and remanded. Justice
Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg
joined.
3.

Herrera v. Wyoming

No. 17-532, 139 S.Ct. 1686, 2019 WL 2166394, at *1691-1713
(U.S. May 20, 2019). Defendant, a member of the Crow Tribe, was
convicted of taking elk off-season or without a state hunting license
and with being an accessory to the same. He appealed. The District
Court of Wyoming, Sheridan County, affirmed. Supreme Court of
Wyoming denied defendant's petition for review. Certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that: (1)
defendant was not precluded from arguing the right to hunt under
1868 Treaty between United States and Crow Tribe of Indians
barred his conviction; (2) Wyoming's admission to the Union did
ab ga e he C
T be f I d a
gh
h
de he
treaty; (3) Wyoming's statehood did not render all the lands in the
state occupied within the meaning of the treaty; (4) the Bighorn
333

National Forest did not become categorically occupied, within the
meaning of the treaty, when it was created; and (5) the presence of
exploitative mining and logging operations in the Bighorn National
Forest did not render the forest occupied within the meaning of the
treaty. Vacated and remanded. Justice Alito filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Kavanaugh joined.
II.

OTHER COURTS

Administrative Law
4.

Oneida Indian Nation v. United States Department of
the Interior

No. 5:17-cv-913, 336 F.Supp.3d 37 (N.D. N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018).
New York Native American tribe brought action against Department
of the Interior under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) alleging
abuse of discretion and violation of United States Code. This suit
arose out of Assistant Secretary's decision to publish changed name
of Wisconsin tribe to Oneida Nation, who filed petition to cancel
New York tribe's trademark registration in Federal Register, and
approval of constitutional amendment in Department's regional
office's secretarial election. Department filed motion to dismiss. The
District Court, Mae A. D'Agostino, J., held that: (1) alleged injury
in fact arising out of ongoing trademark action was not redressable
by New York tribe's action against Department; (2) confusion
arising from Department's decisions was not sufficient injury in fact;
and (3) confusion was not traceable to Department of the Interior's
decision. Motion granted.
5.

Kialegee Tribal Town v. Zinke

No. 17-cv-1670, 330 F.Supp.3d 255 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2018).
Federally recognized Indian tribe brought action against Secretary
of the Interior and other federal officials, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief in its favor in connection with its claims that it was
successor to Creek Nation, and as such, had treaty-protected rights
of shared jurisdiction over land within the boundaries of the historic
Creek Nation reservation. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure
to state claim. The District Court, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held
334

that: (1) court had subject-matter jurisdiction, but (2) tribe failed to
adequately allege specific conduct by Secretary of Interior and other
officials that violated Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), as required
to state claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Motion granted.
6.

California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Zinke

No. 17-16321, 745 Fed.Appx. 46 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2018). Plaintiff
Ca f
a Va e M
T be ( T be ), e e e ed b he B e
Council, appealed from summary judgment entered in favor of
Defendants the California Valley Miwok Tribe, represented by the
Dixie Council, and the United States. The district court held that the
2015 Dec
( Dec
) b he A
a Sec e a Indian
Affa ( A
a Sec e a ) d d
ate the Administrative
P ced e Ac ( APA ). The d
c c
c ec he d ha he
Decision did not violate the APA. Tribal membership is a matter to
be determined by the tribe, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 72 n.32, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), but the
Department of the Interior also has the responsibility to ensure that
organized tribes are representative of potential membership, Aguayo
v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1226 (9th Cir. 2016). The Decision
comported with that responsibility. The Assistant Secretary
ec
ed he be
g ga
h
b dd
e
h e
earlier court holdings to reach a decision. Instead, the Assistant
Secretary independently examined the facts and the law, before
determining that: (1) the tribe was not reorganized, (2) its
membership is not limited to five individuals, and (3) the United
States does not recognize leadership of the tribal government. The
Decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law, and therefore, did not
violate the APA. Aguayo at 1226. Affirmed.
7.

Comanche Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke

No. 17-6247, 754 Fed.Appx. 768 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018). Native
American nation brought action against Secretary of Interior under
Administrative Procedure Act and National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), challenging acquisition of land in trust for benefit of
other Native American nation and seeking preliminary injunction
against operation of casino. The United States District Court for the
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Western District of Oklahoma, Joe Heaton, Chief Judge, 2017 WL
6551298, denied motion for preliminary injunction. Nation
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlos F. Lucero, Circuit Judge,
held that: (1) Nation did not have substantial likelihood of success
on merits of challenge to regulations governing trust acquisitions,
and (2) Nation did not have substantial likelihood of success on
merits of NEPA claim. Affirmed.
8.

Tsi Akim Maidu Of Taylorsville Rancheria v. United
States Department of Interior

No. 2:17-cv-01156-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 95511 (E.D. Calif. Jan.
03, 2019). For the reasons set forth below, the Court granted
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff challenged Defendants'
determ a
ha
a
a a fede a
ec g ed I d a
tribe when the United States sold the Taylorsville Rancheria (the
Ra ch)
1966
a
C ge
a
a da e. I 1958,
C g e e ac ed he Ca f
a Ra che a Ac ( CRA ), h ch
authorized the Department of the Interior to distribute forty-one
a che a ' a e
d d a I d a ; see Pub. L. 85-671, 72
Stat. 619 (Aug. 18, 1958), as amended Pub. L. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390
(Aug. 11, 1964). After such distribution under the CRA, the
ec e
d
be e
ed g e
e e ce beca e f
their status as Indians ... [A]ll statutes of the United States which
affect Indians because of their status as Indians [would] be
inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several States [would]
a
he
he a e a e a he a
he c e .
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants sold the Taylorsville Rancheria to
P
a C
1966. I 1998, P a ff a eged f ed a e e of
e
e
f ac
edg e a a I d a
be. P a ff
f he a eged
ae
gh c a f ca
f
he Defe da
ab
a a a fede a
ec g ed I d a
be,
h ch he
then-Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs responded by letter in
June 2015. In the letter, the government allegedly explained that
Plaintiff's relationship with the government terminated upon the
1966 sale of the Taylorsville Rancheria. Plaintiff challenged
Defe da ' c c
ha he a e f he Ranch corresponds with
he e
a
f he a
f he be. P a ff b gh
against the Department of Interior, its Secretary, and the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs. Defendants argued that: (1) general
jurisdiction statutes do not waive sovereign immunity; (2) although
336

he Ad
a e P ced e Ac ( APA ) a e
eeg
immunity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the APA; and (3)
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff
responds that: (1) the action is not barred by the statute of
limitations, and (2) the complaint sufficiently states a claim under
the APA. Because the statute of limitations argument is dispositive,
the Court will not address the parties' other arguments. As a
preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that the six-year statute
of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401 ( section 2401 ) a
e
Plaintiff's APA claims. Under section 2401, e e c
ac
commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first
acc e . 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's
claims stem from one common allegation: that Defendants
misinterpreted the CRA to find that the sale of the Taylorsville
Rancheria had the legal effect of terminating Plaintiff's status as a
federally recognized tribe. Defendants stated in response that
Congress enacted the Federally Recognized Tribe List Act, which
requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish annually a list of all
federally recognized tribes. According to Defendants, Plaintiff has
not been included on the list of federally recognized tribes since its
initial publication in 1979. As such, Defendants argued that
Plaintiff's claims accrued upon the 1979 publication of the list of
federally recognized tribes because Plaintiff could or should have
known it was not a federally recognized tribe at that point.
Defendants alternatively argue that, at the very latest, Plaintiff's
claims accrued in 1998, when Plaintiff allegedly filed a letter of
intent to petition for acknowledgment as an Indian tribe. Thus, the
Court found that Plaintiff's claims as currently alleged are timebarred and should be dismissed.
9.

National Lifeline Association v. Federal
Communications Commission

No. 18-1026, 915 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. Feb 01, 2019), amended by 921
F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. April 10, 2019). Petitions for review were filed
challenging Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order
limiting enhanced tribal telecommunications support to service
provided using tribal facilities, and to low-income consumers living
on rural areas of tribal lands. The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) FCC action in changing its policy to limit
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enhanced tribal telecommunications subsidy to service provided
using tribal facilities was arbitrary and capricious; (2) FCC action in
changing its policy to limit enhanced tribal telecommunications
subsidy to service provided to low-income consumers living on rural
areas of tribal lands was arbitrary and capricious; (3) FCC's notice
was insufficient under Administrative Procedure Act requirements
for notice-and-comment rulemaking; and (4) FCC improperly made
substantive changes to its former policy without commencing new
notice-and-comment-rulemaking proceeding. Petitions granted,
order vacated, and matter remanded.
10. Cayuga Nation v. David Bernhardt
No. 17-1923, 374 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.C. D.C. Mar. 12, 2019). The
Cayuga Nation is a federally recognized Indian nation. This case
dealt with decisions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs of the Department of the
Interior (DOI) that recognized one faction within the Cayuga
Nation, Defendant-Intervenor now referring to itself as the
Ca ga Na
C
c , h gh a e a e efe ed
he
ad
a e ec d a he Ha f
G
as the governing
body of the Cayuga Nation for the purposes of certain contractual
relationships between that Nation and the United States federal
government. These decisions were the product of an adversarial
process between Defendant-Intervenor and Plaintiffs, a rival faction
within the Cayuga Nation who asserted that they represent the
Na
gh f g vernment. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking to
overturn the BIA and DOI decisions. The court denied Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted both Defendants' and
Defendant-I e e
C
-Motions for Summary Judgment.
The court concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
making decisions recognizing Defendant-Intervenor as the
governing body of the Cayuga Nation for purposes of certain
contractual relationships between the Nation and the United States
federal government. The Court further concluded that Plaintiffs
failed to establish that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' due process
gh
a g he e dec
. I 2015, he Ca ga Na
leadership dispute came to a head. The BIA received two requests
to modify existing federal-tribal contracts under the Indian SelfDetermination Act (ISDEAA). One request came from Plaintiffs'
338

group: the BIA determined that the other request came from Mr.
Halftown acting as the federal representative for the last Nation
Council which had been formally recognized by the BIA in 2006.
In response to these competing requests, the BIA declined to address
he e
f he Na
eade h d
e. I ead, he BIA
continued to recognize the last undisputed government of the
Cayuga Nation which had been identified by the BIA in 2006. The
BIA concluded that the 2006 Nation Council, with Mr. Halftown
acting as federal representative, had the authority to draw funds
f
he Na
ISDEAA contract. In recognizing the 2006 Nation
Council for purposes of deciding the 2015 ISDEAA request, the
BIA e ha ed ha [ ]h
e
ec g
dec
e ded
to provide additional time to the members of the Nation to resolve
this dispute using tribal mechanisms and prevent the need for the
BIA to examine Nation law and make a subsequent determination
ba ed
he e
f ha de e
a
. A a
a a e,
Plaintiffs contended that Assistant Secretary Black was required to
use de novo review on questions of Cayuga Nation law when
e e g Reg a D ec Ma bb
dec
.B ,
ead f
using de novo review, Plaintiffs argued that Assistant Secretary
B ac
e
b defe ed
Reg a D ec
Ma bb
analysis of Cayuga law. The court concluded that Assistant
Secretary Black was not required to use de novo review over
Reg a D ec
Ma bb
a a
f Ca ga Na
a .
While it is generally true that the Interior Board of Indian Appeal s
(IBIA) reviews questions of law de novo, that is not the case with
I d a a . I ead,
e ... ba a c ea
d c a e[ ] a
particular outcome, [the IBIA] will afford BIA latitude to exercise
discretion in determining with whom it will deal in carrying on the
government-to-g e
e
ea
h
h he be. Picayune
Rancheria, 62 IBIA at 114; see also LaRocque v. Aberdeen Area
Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 29 IBIA 201, 204 (1996) (deferring
BIA
ea ab e e e a
f ba a ). I
a , he
Court determined that Assistant Secretary Black was not required to
conduct a de novo review of Cayuga law. If he had been so required,
Assistant Secretary Black conducted an independent review of the
parties' arguments concerning Cayuga law and concluded that
Reg a D ec
Ma bb
de e
a
e e a d. The
standard of review used by Assistant Secretary Black was not
contrary to law.
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11. Cross v. United States Department of Interior
No. CIV 18-220-TUC-CKJ, 2019 WL 1425141 (D.C. D. Ariz. Mar.
29, 2019). U ed S a e De a e
f he I e
( he
g e
e ) f ed a M
D
(MTD). C
a e
ed
member of the Three Affiliated Tribes (TAT). The TAT is a
federally recognized Indian tribe and resides on the treatyestablished Fort Berthold Reservation (Reservation) in northwestern
North Dakota. Cross is the spokesman for an ad hoc group of tribal
members who have decided to request a Secretarial Election, via a
Secretarial Petition, that would be administered by the Secretary.
More specifically, this ad hoc group sought to petition the Secretary
f he I e
( he Sec e a ) ca a Sec e a a E ec
f he
purpose of repealing a 1986 constitutional amendment that had
extinguished the pre-existing right of ALL (emphasis added) of the
[Three Affiliated Tribes'] non-resident, but otherwise
constitutionally qualified, tribal voters to vote by absentee ballot in
a
ba e ec
. The C
a a e ed ha a
-resident
tribal voters have found returning to the Reservation to be
economically or physically impracticable and unduly burdensome.
The C
a a eged he b d g f he
d a ge ea hf ed da
he Re e a
e 156,035 f TAT be a d
last remaining agricultural lands. This resulted in the destruction of
nine historic river bottom communities, geographically fragmented
the Reservation, and caused the exodus from the Reservation of
TAT
ge a d
d c e e be . A
a e 75%-80%
f TAT e
ed e be
ea d
ff he Reservation. On
July 14, 2017, Cross provided a Notice of Appeal (NOA) to Danks
pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.9. The NOA referenced both Danks
decisions as to the number of signatures required and the conclusion
that this decision was not appealable. The decision on appeal stated:
...Y c cede
a ea ha he S e e de
e
calculated the number of signatures needed for a valid petition based
on the tribally provided number of tribal members who were 18
ea
f age a d de a f Ma 18, 2017. If he S e e de
basic mathematical calculation is correct as you concede, other than
that unchallenged calculation, the Superintendent made no decision
and merely acted as a pass-through for information provided by the
tribe as required by 25 C.F.R. § 81.57(a)(2)(i) and (ii). The
government asserted that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
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of this matter. As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are
presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden
of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction. The Complaint asserted federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the primary basis for subject matter
jurisdiction. However, the United States has not waived its
sovereign immunity by the enactment of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343. Cuevas v. Department of Homeland Security, 233 F. App'x
642, 643 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing N. Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753
F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985) ); 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. §
3655 (4th ed. Nov. 2018). Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act
did not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petr. Co., 399 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. v. Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 849, 852 (9th
Cir. 2011); 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3655 (4th ed. Nov. 2018).
The Complaint also refers to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The APA c a a ec f c a e f he U ed S a e '
eeg
. Matsuo v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 982,
988 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879,
891 92 (1988) ); see also Navajo Nation v. Dep't of the Interior, 876
F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). While the APA waives the
g e
e
e eg
, he APA a
c de
requirements for judicial review. As a general matter, the APA
e
aga
he U ed S a e b [a] e
ffe g egal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
b age c ac
h he ea g f e e a
a e[.] 5 U.S.C.
§ 702. This portion of the statute constitutes the APA's judicial
review provision. See e.g. Navajo Nation, at 1168. Claims asserted
pursuant to the APA must satisfy section 702' age c ac
requirement and the further requirement under section 704 of the
APA ha a a ff
de f a f a age c ac
obtain
judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA does not permit review
he e a e
ec de d c a e e
a d
he e he age c
ac
c
ed age c d c e
b a . 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
The finality requirement is considered a necessary element of any
APA claim. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994); Wild Fish
Conservancy v. Jewell, 730 F. 3d 791, 800 (9th Cir. 2013) ( T
maintain a cause of action under the APA, a plaintiff must challenge
age c ac
ha
f a . ). A a ff ha he b de f
341

de f g ec f c fede a c d c , e a
g h
f a
age c ac
, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
871, 882 (1990), and identifying a discrete agency action that the
federal agency was legally required to take but failed to do so,
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55,
64 (2004). In considering these factors, the court found no final
agency action occurred in this matter. Rather, the government
provided information to Cross, but did not take any action that
e ee
he c
a
f a age c
dec
-making
process. As the government had not yet reviewed any Secretarial
Petition submitted by Cross, no rights or obligations had been
determined. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S1154 (1997). As
Cross was not challenging a final agency action, his cause of action
could not proceed under the APA. Jewell, 730 F.3d at 800. The court
found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction of this matter and
dismissal was appropriate. To the extent Cross argued the
government acted in excess or its statutory jurisdiction or authority,
the court declined to address these arguments as it had not been
established this court had subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter. This matter was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
12. Agua Caliente Tribe of Cupeño Indians of Pala
Reservation v. Sweeney
No. 17-16838, 932 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. Aug 07, 2019). The Agua
Caliente Tribe of Cupeño Indians (the Cupeño) argued they were a
federally recognized tribe, and as such, the Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs (Assistant Secretary) within the Department of the
Interior (Interior) must place the tribe on a list of federally
recognized tribes published in the Federal Register. The Cupeño
sent a letter to the Assistant Secretary, requesting that they be listed
as a federally recognized tribe. When the Assistant Secretary denied
their request, the Cupeño filed suit to compel such action. Having
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1361, and 5 U.S.C. §
706, the district court refused to compel the listing of the Cupeño
because they had failed to exhaust the administrative process. The
district court further concluded that the Assistant Secretary provided
a rational explanation for refusing to make an exception to the
administrative process for the Cupeño. The court determined that
they had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirmed.
342

The Part 83 process applies to the relief the Cupeño seek, and the
Cupeño failed to exhaust the process. We agree with the district
c
de e
a
ha he C e
e ha ad
a e
remedies, and until they do so, the Cupeño are not entitled to the
relief they seek in this lawsuit. On three occasions since 1979,
Interior has recognized tribes outside of the Part 83 process. To treat
the Cupeño differently from those three tribes, the Cupeño argued,
is arbitrary and capricious, and a violation of the Cupe
e a
protection rights. To prevail on an equal protection claim, the
plaintiff must show the government has treated it differently from a
a
a ed a
a d he g e
e
e a a
f
different treatment does not meet the relevant level of
scrutiny. Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 215
(2013). The c
ha he d, he ec g
f I d a tribes remains
a
ca , a he ha ac a de e
a
, a d he ef e a [ e ]
a
a ba
e e . Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th
Cir. 2004). The three tribes that Interior has recognized outside of
the Part 83 process are: the Ione Band of Miwok Indians (the Ione),
the Lower Lake Rancheria, and the Tejon Indian Tribe (the Tejon).
Because Interior has rationally distinguished the Cupeño from the
other tribes that were listed outside of the administrative process, we
cannot order Interior to add the Cupeño to the list of federally
recognized tribes published in the Federal Register. The court
affirmed the district c
de g a
g
a
dg e f
Interior.
13. Robert Doucette v. United States Department of the
Interior
No. C-18-859 TSZ, 2019 WL 3804118 (W.D. Wash. Aug 13, 2019).
This matter came before the Court on (i) a motion for summary
judgment, brought by plaintiffs Robert Doucette, Bernadine
Roberts, Saturnino Javier, and Tresea Doucette, and (ii) a crossmotion for summary judgment brought by defendants United States
Department of the Interior (Interior), Interior Secretary David
Bernhardt, Assistant Secretary Tara Sweeney, and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary (PDAS) John Tahsuda IIII. Plaintiffs were
unsuccessful candidates for four open positions on the Nooksack
Tribal Council, the governing body of the Nooksack Indian Tribe of
Washington. They allege that, prior to the most recent change in
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presidential administrations, Interior had established a policy of
e e g T ba c
a, a
, a d c
a
determine whether the Tribal Council was validly seated as the
governing body of the tribe f
e of government-togovernment relations. The court concluded that plaintiffs are not, as
a matter of law, entitled to relief because Interior never adopted a
policy of construing Nooksack law with respect to how Nooksack
Tribal Council elections should be conducted, and defendants could
not have behaved inconsistently with a non-existent policy. In
refusing, for a period of time before the 2017 elections, to recognize
actions taken by the Nooksack Tribal Council, Interior did not
purport to interpret Nooksack law concerning the manner in which
elections must be administered, but rather effectuated the
consequences to the Tribe of having failed to even hold an election
before the terms of half of the council members expired. Moreover,
during the course of and subsequent to the 2017 elections, Interior
admirably balanced the deference it owes the tribe, as a sovereign
entity, with its responsibility to ensure that it deals only with a duty
constituted governing body for the tribe. The court determine that
Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to survive summary
judgment, and their Administrative Procedure Act claim and this
action were therefore dismissed with prejudice.
Child Welfare Law and ICWA
14. Matter of P.T.D
No. DA 17-0306, 391 Mont. 376, 424 P.3d 619 (S. Ct. Mont. Aug
22, 2018). Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child
and Family Services Division, filed a petition to terminate putative
father's parental rights to child, who was a member of, or eligible
for, membership in the Fort Peck Indian Tribe. The District Court,
12th Judicial District, Hill County, No. DN-15-010, Daniel A.
Boucher, J., granted the petition. Father appealed. The Supreme
Court, Mike McGrath, C.J., held that: (1) family relationship did not
exist between Indian child and putative father, and therefore,
requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply;
and (2) argument that oral pronouncement, minute entry, and order
differed in the way they define the active efforts requirement was
immaterial. Affirmed.
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15. In re E.H
No. D073635, 26 Cal.App.5th 1058, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 07, 2018). County health and human services agency
brought action against mother to terminate her parental rights. The
Superior Court, San Diego County, No. SJ13241, Michael J.
Popkins, J., entered judgment terminating parental rights. Mother
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Aaron, Acting P.J., held that
agency's failure to provide Tohono O'odham Nation with notice of
information in determining whether child was an Indian child was
prejudicial. Reversed and remanded.
16. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming
No. 17-1135, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. Sept. 14, 2018). Native
American tribes and several tribe members brought 1983 Putative
Class Action against state officials; alleging policies, practices, and
procedures during 48 hour custody hearings relating to the removal
of Native American children from their homes based on abuse and
neglect allegations violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) by
denying parents a meaningful post-deprivation hearing after their
children were taken into temporary state custody. The United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota, Jeffrey L. Viken,
District Judge, 993 F. Supp.2d 1017, denied defendants' motion to
dismiss, 100 F.Supp.3d 749, granted plaintiffs' partial summary
judgment motion, and, 2016 WL 7324077, granted declaratory and
injunctive relief. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Colloton, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Younger abstention was
warranted, and (2) exception to Younger abstention for patently
unconstitutional actions did not apply. Vacated and remanded.
17. In re K.L
No. C079100, 27 Cal.App.5th 332, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 18, 2018). After minor's mother was arrested for child
cruelty and possession of a controlled substance, county health and
human services agency filed petition to establish child, who was an
Indian child, as court dependent. The Superior Court, Alpine
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County, declared child to be dependent and placed child with
presumed father. Noncustodial biological father appealed. The
Court of Appeal, Hull, Acting P.J., held that: (1) placement with
presumed father was not foster care placement and thus did not
trigger Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) placement preference
requirements, and (2) placement with presumed father was not
placement with a guardian and thus also did not trigger ICWA
placement preference requirements. Affirmed.
18. In re N.G
No. E070338, 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 21, 2018). After Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) sent Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notices to the
Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Navajo Nation, the Colorado River
Indian Tribes, and the Colorado River Tribal Council, the Superior
Court, Riverside County, No. RIJ1100389, Jean P. Leonard, Retired
Judge, sitting by assignment, terminated mother's parental rights.
Mother appealed. The Court of Appeal, Fields, J., held that: (1) trial
court, on remand, was required to order DPSS to send ICWA notices
to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes; (2) trial court, on
remand, was required to fully investigate child's paternal lineal
ancestry; and (3) substantial evidence did not show that DPSS
complied with sending ICWA notices. Reversed and remanded.
19. In re A.S
No. D073561, 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 03, 2018). Dependency proceeding was initiated. The
Superior Court, San Diego County entered orders selecting tribal
customary adoption proposed by Mesa Grande Band of Mission
Indians as permanent plan for children. Parents appealed. The Court
of Appeal, Aaron, J., held that: (1) record demonstrated that parents
were afforded sufficient opportunity to present evidence to tribe, in
accordance with due process; (2) All-County Letter issued by
Department of Social services was interpretive, and thus was not
binding; (3) any error in trial court's failure to expressly confirm that
parents were afforded due process opportunity to present evidence
to tribe was harmless under the circumstances; (4) father failed to
demonstrate that his due process rights were violated at selection
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and implementation hearing; (5) mother's testimony about visitation
with children and bond with children was relevant to detriment, and
thus was admissible in selection and implementation hearing; (6)
trial court acted within its discretion in determining that parents'
testimony regarding visitation narratives, visitation scheduling, and
progress with services was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, in
selection and implementation hearing; and (7) any error in admitting
such testimony about visitation and progress with services was
harmless. Affirmed.
20. Brackeen v. Zinke
No. 4:17-cv-00868-O, 338 F.Supp.3d 514 (N.D. Texas Oct 4, 2018).
Foster and adoptive parents and states of Texas, Louisiana, and
Indiana brought action against United States, United States
Department of the Interior and its Secretary, Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and its Director, BIA Principal Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and its Secretary seeking declaration that Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) was unconstitutional. Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation,
Quinalt Indian Nation, and Morengo Band of Mission Indians
intervened as defendants. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.
The District Court, Reed O'Connor, J., held that: (1) ICWA's
mandatory placement preferences violated equal protection; (2)
provision of ICWA granting Indian tribes authority to reorder
congressionally enacted adoption placement preferences violated
non-delegation doctrine; (3) ICWA provision requiring states to
apply federal standards to state-created claims commandeered the
states in violation of the Tenth Amendment; (4) BIA exceeded its
statutory authority in promulgating regulations, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); (5) BIA regulations were not
entitled to Chevron deference; and (6) prospective and adoptive
parents whose adoptions were open to collateral attack under ICWA
had no fundamental right to care, custody, and control of children in
their care. Motions granted in part and denied in part.
21. Matter of L.A.G
DA 18-0119, 393 Mont. 146, 429 P.3d 629 (S.C. Mont. Oct. 16,
2018). Department of Public Health and Human Services filed
petition for termination of mother's parental rights as to her two
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minor children. Following termination hearing, the District Court,
Cascade County, Nos. ADN 16-175 and ADN-16-176, Gregory G.
Pinski, P.J., terminated mother's parental rights. Mother appealed.
The Supreme Court, Beth Baker, J., held that: (1) trial court violated
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) when it terminated mother's
parental rights before having conclusive determination of children's
status in Indian tribe; (2) trial court's oral findings and comments
within written order did not implicitly establish that court agreed,
active efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian family were made, as
required under ICWA; but (3) mother's due process rights were not
violated when Department raised issue of abandonment during
closing argument. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
22. In re L.D.
No. H045544, 32 Cal.App.5th 579, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 (Cal. Ct.
App. 6th Dis. Jan. 24, 2019). County Department of Family and
Children's services filed juvenile dependency petition on behalf of
nine-year-old child who may have Native Alaskan ancestry. The
Superior Court, Santa Clara County, No. 17JD024833, Michael L.
Clark, J., found sufficient notice was sent, pursuant to the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), to Athabascan Indian tribe in Alaska
before declaring child dependent. The court subsequently issued
restraining order protecting child from mother, and mother was later
found to have violated restraining order by possessing or having
access to handgun. Mother appealed to challenge the ICWA notice.
The Court of Appeal, Grover, J., held that mother's challenge to
ICWA notice was untimely. Appeal dismissed.
23. Mitchell v. Preston
No. S-18-0166, 439 P.3d 718, 2019 WL 1614606 (S.Ct. Wyo. Apr.
16, 2019). Following extensive litigation in child custody action,
2018 WY 110, 426 P.3d 830, father, an Indian tribe member who
kept child on reservation, filed motion to establish jurisdiction in
tribal court and motion for change of venue, seeking an order
relinquishing permanent child custody jurisdiction to the tribal
court. Mother, who was not a member of the tribe and who had been
awarded primary custody of child, filed motion to strike. The
District Court, Sheridan County, Norman E. Young, J., granted
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mother's motion, and father appealed. The Supreme Court, Kautz,
J., held that: (1) Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply;
and (2) even assuming ICWA applied, tribal court's emergency
orders under Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) did not
give tribal court jurisdiction to make permanent custody decisions.
Affirmed.
24. Navajo Nation v. Department of Child Safety
No. 1 CA-JV 18-0276, 246 Ariz. 463, 441 P.3d 982 (Ct. App. Ariz.,
Div. 1, Apr. 18, 2019). The Navajo Nation appealed the juvenile
c
de a
g a e a e g a d a f a ch d b ec
he I d a Ch d We fa e Ac ( ICWA )
h
he e
fa
a f ed e e
e
ha he a e
he I d a -relative
custodia
c
ed c
d
d
e
e
e
emotional or physical damage to the child. The court held that
ICWA applies to guardianships and that it requires a qualified expert
witness to provide this testimony. Because such testimony was not
prov ded h ca e, he c
aca ed he e e c
de a d
remand the case for a new hearing. In September 2017, the
Department informed the court and parties that its designated expert
witness was unwilling to provide the requisite testimony for the
guardianship. That same month, Mother proposed Ian Service as her
e e
e . The De a e
Se ce
qualifications as an expert witness, but the Navajo Nation objected.
The court held a voir dire hearing to determine whether Service was
qualified. During that hearing, Service testified that he had been an
attorney for about ten years, mostly as a public defender or
prosecutor in Idaho. He stated that ten to fifteen percent of his cases
involved ICWA in some way and that he had served as an expert
witness in two cases. He admitted, however, that both cases were
before the same judge and involved the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe
not the Navajo Nation. He also acknowledged that he was not a
member of any Indian tribe, was not recognized as an expert witness
by the Navajo Nation, had never been contacted by the Navajo
Nation to testify as an expert witness, and was not familiar with the
Na a Na
ae
gc
. Se ce f he a ed ha he
had only minimally reviewed the record and that he had not talked
to the proposed Indian- e a e ace e , R.Y., he De a e
expert witness who had refused to testify, or the Navajo Nation case
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ec a
a g ed
h ca e. Sec
1912(e)
a a g age
states that no foster care placement, which includes permanent
guardianships, may be ordered without expert-witness testimony on
he he a a e
a I da -ea e c
da
c
ed
custody of a child will likely result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child. Therefore, a court must hear expert-witness
testimony before ordering a permanent guardianship. The record
shows that R.Y. was subject to ICWA and a guardianship
proceeding took place. Thus, ICWA required the juvenile court to
hear expert-witness testim
he he M he
he I d a e a ec
da c
ed c
d f R.Y.
d e e
serious emotional or physical damage to R.Y. Because such
e
a
ded, he c
de
aca ed.
25. In re Marriage of Stockwell and Dees
No. 17CA1482, 446 P.3d 957 (Colo. Ct. App. June 27, 2019). In this
proceeding concerning the Allocation of Parental Responsibilities
(APR) for L.D-S., Je fe L
Dee , he ch d
he , a ea ed
he d
c c
de de
g he
aca e a 2013 de
giving majority parenting time to Joseph Cody Stockwell, the
ch d ega b
b
g ca fa he . Dee c e ded ha he c rt
erred because it issued the APR order without first inquiring into the
ch d
b e Indian heritage as required by the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (2018).
Dees is right. In agreeing with her, the court clarified that: (1) a legal
fa he
de C
ad a
ece a
a ae f
e
of ICWA and, (2) an APR to a legal father who does not qualify as
a ae
de ICWA
a ch d c
d
ceed g
de
ICWA. Because the APR to Stockwell here constituted a child
custody proceeding and the court did not comply with ICWA, the
c
e e ed he de de
g Dee
a d e a ded f
further proceedings. According to ICWA an Indian child who is the
subject of an action for foster care placement or termination of
parental rights; any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody
such child was removed; and the Indian ch d tribe may petition a
court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a
showing that the action violated ICWA provisions. 25 U.S.C. § 1914
(2018). ICWA places no time limit on such a petition. Moreover,
ba g a a e
ICWA c a a
e
a ed de a e
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a
dc
ad c
S e eC
ec g
ha ICWA
is also intended to protect the tribe, which was not at fault for the
timing of the ICWA claim and whose interest may have been
harmed. See B.H., 138 P.3d at 304 ( Beca e he
ec
f a
separate tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, otherwise
sufficiently reliable information cannot be overcome by the
statements, actions, or waiver of a parent, or disregarded as
e . ) (c a
ed); see also Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104
L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). The court reversed the order denying the ICWA
motion and remand for further proceedings as discussed below.
Dees argued that the district court failed to comply with ICWA
before issuing the October 2013 APR order. Stockwell responded
that ICWA is inapplicable because he and Dees are parents of L.DS. Stockwell is correct that ICWA does not apply to an award of
custody to one of the parents, including in a divorce proceeding. 25
C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3) (2018); see also In re J.B., 178 Cal. App. 4th
751, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 682 (2009) (a child custody proceeding
does not include a proceeding in which a child is removed from one
parent and placed with the other because placement with a parent is
not foster care). But whether Stockwell qualifies as a parent for
purposes of ICWA requires a closer look. As noted, Stockwell is
L.D-S. ega fa he . Ba ed
h
a , he e
a he gh
and responsibilities of legal fatherhood under state law. But
Stockwell is neither L.D-S. b
g ca a e ,
a Indian person
who has adopted the child. So, Stockwell is not a parent as defined
by ICWA. Because Stockwell is not L.D-S.
ae
de ICWA,
we consider whether the APR
S c e
a a f e ca e
ace e , h ch def ed a a ac
e
g a I d a child
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a
foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator
where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned
upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated[.]
A foster care placement, which here takes the form of an APR to a
person who is not a parent under ICWA, is a child custody
proceeding under ICWA because the parent cannot have the child
returned upon demand but must instead overcome procedural and
substantive barriers to regain custody and control of the child. See
also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 ( U
de a d ea
ha he a e
or Indian custodian can regain custody simply upon verbal request,
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h
a f
a e
c
ge c e . ). I
, he APR
Stockwell was a child custody proceeding for purposes of ICWA.
The District Court, however, did not inquire into whether L.D-S.
was an Indian child. That was error requiring a remand for further
proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
26. Oliver N. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office
f Child e
Se ice
No. S-17067, 444 P.3d 171, 2019 WL 2896647 (Ak. S. Ct. July 5,
2019). The issue was whether new federal regulations have
materially changed the qualifications required of an expert testifying
in a child in need of aid (CINA) case involving children subject to
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The court concluded that
they had. To support the termination of parental rights, ICWA
e
e he e
f a f ed expert witnesses ... that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
ch d. Under the new federal regulations, experts who formerly
could be presumptively qualified
based on their ability to testify
ab
e a gc
a a d c a a da d
he ch d tribe, for
example
a be a f ed
e f ab
he ca a
relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the
likelihood that continued custody of the child will result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the particular child who is the
subject of the child-c
d
ceed g. The c
c c ded ha
in these two cases the challenged expert witnesses failed to satisfy
this higher standard imposed by controlling federal law. For this
ea , he c
e e ed he de
e
a g he a e
parental rights and remand for further proceedings. In December
2016 the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued formal regulations
accompanied by new guidelines discussing their implementation.
The introduction to the new regulations notes they were enacted
beca e he De a e
f he I e
f
d ha
e e a
and interpretation of [ICWA] has been inconsistent across state
a d ha [ ]h d a a e a
ca
f ICWA ... c
a
he
f
[f]ede a a da d
e ded b C g e . The
regulations set out relevant expert witness requirements and the
a da d f he
e h d f ha
f d g: Wh
ay serve as a
a f ed e e
e ?
e a ed a 25 C.F.R. 23.122 (a): A
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qualified expert witness must be qualified to testify regarding
he he
he ch d
c
ed c
d
b
he
ae
or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child and should be qualified to testify as to
the prevailing social and cultural standards of the
Indian ch d Tribe. (Emphasis added). Regarding the likelihood of
harm finding, 25 C.F.R. § 23.121 states: (c) For ... termination of
parental rights, the evidence must show a causal relationship
between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood that
continued custody of the child will result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the particular child who is the subject of the
child-custody proceeding; (d) Without a causal relationship
identified in paragraph (c) of this section, evidence that shows only
the existence of community or family poverty, isolation, single
parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing,
substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not by
itself constitute clear and convincing evidence or evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that continued custody is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child. In these two
a e a gh e
a
a ea , e c
de he
e
c
reliance on experts whose expertise is primarily rooted in their
knowledge of tribal customs rather than professional training; the
question before us is whether, based on their tribal expertise alone,
he ha e ha he
ha e
be a f ed
e f
de he
new regulations. Oliver N. and Lisa B. argue on appeal that in their
respective trials, the witnesses were not qualified under ICWA to
testify as experts ab
he he e
g
he a e
ca e
d
likely result in serious harm to the child. The court concluded that
under the new BIA regulations, neither Encelewski nor Dale were
shown to be qualified expert witnesses under ICWA for this type of
testimony. The court recognized that this represented a departure
from our precedent but found conclusion was compelled by the
ece cha ge
fede a a . I b h ca e , he S e
C
order terminating parental rights was reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
27. Watso v. Lourey
No. 18-1723, 929 F.3d 1024, 2019 WL 3114047 (8th Cir. July 16,
2019). Mother, individually and for her children, and grandmother
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brought action against county human services commissioner, tribal
courts, and tribal judges contesting tribal courts' jurisdiction over
her children's child custody proceedings. The United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, 2018 WL 1512059, Ann D.
Montgomery, J., adopted report and recommendation of Katherine
M. Menendez, United States Magistrate Judge, 2017 WL 9672393,
and dismissed complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Benton, Circuit Judge, held that: 1) Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) did not preclude commissioner from referring tribalmember children's child protection proceedings to tribal courts; 2)
federal statute giving Minnesota jurisdiction over civil causes of
action to which Indians were party did not require that state court
hearing be held before tribal court could exercise jurisdiction; and
3) absence of state court proceeding did not violate Plaintiffs' due
process rights. Affirmed. Petition for Certiorari docketed October
28, 2019.
28. Brackeen v. Bernhardt
No. 18-11479, 2019 WL 3759491(5th Cir. Aug 9, 2019). This case
presented facial constitutional challenges to the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and statutory and constitutional
challenges to the 2016 administrative rule (the Final Rule) that was
promulgated by the Department of the Interior to clarify provisions
of ICWA. Plaintiffs are the states of Texas, Indiana, and Louisiana,
and seven individuals seeking to adopt Indian children. Defendants
were the United States of America, several federal agencies and
officials
in
their
official
capacities,
and
five
intervening Indian tribes. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, ruling that provisions of ICWA and
the Final Rule violated equal protection, the Tenth Amendment, the
nondelegation doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Defendants appealed. Although the court affirmed the district
c
g ha P a ff had a d g, e e e e he d
c
c
ga
f
a
judgment to Plaintiffs and render
judgment in favor of Defendants. The district court concluded that
ICWA
Indian Ch d def
a a ace-based classification.
We conclude that this was error. Congress has exercised plenary
e
e he ba elations of the Indians ... from the beginning,
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject
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to be controlled by the Judicial Department of the
g e
e . Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
The S e e C
dec
ea e
d b ha fede a
legislation with respect to Indian tribes ... is not based upon
e
b e ac a c a f ca
. United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 645 (1977). L e a e e
ece f eg a
dea g
with Indian tribes and reservations ... single[s] out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near
ee a
. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). The
district court concluded that ICWA sections 1901 2312 and 1951
5213 violated the anticommandeering doctrine by requiring state
courts and executive agencies to apply federal standards to statecreated claims. The district court also considered whether ICWA
preempts conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause and
concluded that preemption did not apply because the law
directly eg a ed
ae .
Defe da
ag e
ha
he
anticommandeering doctrine does not prevent Congress from
requiring state courts to enforce substantive and procedural
standards and precepts, and that ICWA sets minimum procedural
standards that preempt conflicting state law. We examine the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of ICWA below and
conclude that they preempt conflicting state law and do not violate
the anticommandeering doctrine. The Tenth Amendment provides
ha [ ]he
e
de ega ed
he U ed S a e b he
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
S a e e ec e ,
he e e. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
C ge
eg a e
e ae
ed h e e umerated under
the Constitution. Murphy v. Na l Collegiate Athletic Ass n, 138 S.
Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). [C]
c
ab e f
he
f
powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the
g e
e
f he S a e . Id. The anticommandeering doctrine, an
expression of this limitation on Congress, prohibits federal laws
commanding the executive or legislative branch of a state
government to act or refrain from acting. Federal statutes
enforceable in state court do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce
he , b h
f fede a d ec
f a e dge
a da ed
b he e f he S e ac C a e. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 178179 (1992). The district court determined that ICWA provisions
violated the nondelegation doctrine, reasoning that section 1915(c)
grants Indian tribes the power to change legislative preferences with
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binding effect on the states, and Indian tribes, like private entities,
are not part of the federal government of the United States and
cannot exercise federal legislative or executive regulatory power
over non-Indians on non-tribal lands. However, the Supreme Court
has long recognized that Congress may incorporate the laws of
another sovereign into federal law without violating the
nondelegation doctrine. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
95 S.Ct. 710 (1975). ( [I] de e de
ba a h
e
ff c e
ec C g e dec
e
ba c c h
f
a h
eg a e C
e ce ...
h he
Indian tribes. ). The B ea
f I d a Affa
e ea
of section 1915 is also entitled to Chevron deference. Plaintiffs had
Article III standing, but this court rendered judgment in favor of
Defendants on all claims.
29. In re. A.W.
No. C086160, 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (Cal. Ct. App.
3d Dist. Aug. 12, 2019). Having reason to know the minor may be
an Indian child, the juvenile court ordered the County to provide
notice to the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in
accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The County
knew that the maternal grandfather was a member of that tribe and
ha he ed
he be e e a
.I a
e ,
h d ha e
known, that mother was found to be an Indian child when she was a
dependent of the court and that the Picayune Rancheria of the
Chukchansi Indians tribe had intervened in that case. The court
concluded that the County was required to send ICWA notice to the
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians tribe in this case.
Here the County only gave the tribe notice of a hearing which had
already passed. Less than 60 days after that notice, the juvenile court
held an unnoticed ICWA compliance hearing and found the ICWA
did not apply, although it is well established that a non-Indian parent
has standing to assert an ICWA notice violation on appeal. In re
Jonathon S., 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 339 (2005). Nonetheless, the
County argued that this court does not have jurisdiction and parents
do not have standing because they did not first bring a petition for
invalidation in the juvenile court. The County argued that because a
specific remedy [25 U.S.C. 1914] for ICWA violations exists,
appeal is an improper remedy. It argued that a petition for
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invalidation is the exclusive remedy available for ICWA notice and
inquiry violations and, as such, parents were required to
unsuccessfully pursue such a petition in the juvenile court prior to
seeking relief on appeal. Yet despite arguing that a petition for
invalidation is the exclusive remedy for an ICWA violation, the
County also argued parents do not have standing to file such a
petition for invalidation. It argued the petition is only available to
parents of Indian children not parents of a potential Indian child
for whom ICWA inquiry and notice was not effectuated. The Court
dec ed he C
a
ee a
e he
-forfeiture
d c e or, more accurately described as the principle that a
parent is not foreclosed from raising an ICWA inquiry or notice
violation even if the issue could have been more timely raised by
appeal from an earlier order.
Contracting
30. Fort McDermitt Paiute and Shoshone Tribe v. Price
No. 17-837, 2018 WL 4637009 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018). This case,
brought under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
A
a ce Ac ( ISDEAA ), 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., concerned a
medical clinic in McDermitt, Nevada, a small hamlet located in a
remote area of the state near the Oregon border. In February 2016,
he F
McDe
Pa e a d Sh h e T be ( he T be )
informed the Indian Health Service ( IHS ) an agency within the
De a e f Hea h a d H a Se ce ( HHS ) that it wished
to take over operation of the clinic. In March 2016, IHS announced
that it intended to close the clinic. The Tribe and IHS began
eg a g a e f-governance compac a d f d g ag ee e
pursuant to Title V of ISDEAA, under which the Tribe would
operate the clinic. The parties were able to reach agreement in some
areas, but not all. On October 13, 2016, the Tribe set forth its
position on five remaining sticking p
a f a ffe
submitted pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 5387(b). IHS responded on
N e be 23, 2016,
h a e e ( he Dec a
Le e )
e ec g he T be
a
a f e
. The a e
subsequently resolved three of the five issues through further
negotiations. The parties still disagreed whether IHS properly
e ec ed
f he T be
a
de IDSEAA, h ch e
limited grounds on which IHS may do so. First, the parties disputed
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he he IHS e ec
f he T be e ested funding level was
proper. IHS asserts that it properly rejected the request, because the
amount of funds the Tribe proposed exceeded the funding level to
h ch he T be a e
ed. The T be f a ffe e e ed
$1,106,453.00 in funding. IHS claimed in its Declination Letter that
the Tribe was entitled to no more than $375,533.00. Second, the
a e d
ed he he IHS
e
e ec ed he T be
a
to include a provision related to housing for clinic employees in the
funding agreement. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment
on these issues. The court denied both motions without prejudice as
they relate to the funding issue, and order further proceedings. The
court did, however, enter summary judgment for the Tribe on the
employee-housing issue.
31. Cook Inlet Tribal Council v. Mandregan
No. 14-cv-1835, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2018 WL 5817350 (D. D.C.
Nov. 07, 2018). Non-profit corporation that provided services to
Alaskan Native people brought action against Indian Health Service
(IHS), Department of Health and Human Services, and agency
officials, challenging decision declining proposed amendment to
self-determination contract pursuant to the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) seeking
increased funding for substance abuse programs to account for
increased facility support costs. Parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The District Court, Emmet G. Sullivan, J., held
that: (1) funding provision in ISDEAA was ambiguous regarding
whether facility support costs needed to be funded exclusively from
the Secretarial amount; (2) facility support costs were eligible as
contract support costs; and (3) remand to IHS was warranted to
determine amount of increased funding non-profit corporation was
entitled to under ISDEAA. Plaintiff's motion granted in part;
defendants' motion denied.
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Employment
32. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan
No. 17-1932, 748 Fed.Appx. 12, 2018 WL 4183717 (6th Cir. Aug.
30, 2018). Indian tribe that maintained separate health insurance
group policies for its members and its employees brought action
against plan administrator, alleging that administrator breached its
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Ac (ERISA) b
f a g be
ed ca b
h d c ed
administrative fees, failing to authorize payment of Medicare-like
rates for certain health services obtained by tribe's members, and
charging hidden fees in connection with its physician group
incentive program. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Thomas L. Ludington, J., 200 F. Supp. 3d 697,
dismissed tribe's claim related to administrator's failure to pay
Medicare-like rates, and, 2017 WL 3007074, granted in part and
denied in part parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment
as to remaining claims. Tribe appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Boggs, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) presumption that employee
health benefits offered by employer constituted single ERISA plan
was not applicable; (2) tribe's health insurance group policies for its
members and its employees were separate plans; (3) tribe's policy
for its members was not governed by ERISA; (4) tribe stated breach
of fiduciary duty claim relating to Medicare-like rates; but (5)
administrator did not violate its fiduciary duties under ERISA
through its operation of incentive program; and (6) tribe forfeited
any claim to prejudgment interest as component of its damages.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
33. Luiz v. Northern Circle Indian Housing Authority
No. 18-cv-04712-RMI, 2018 WL 5733652 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2018). This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on August
6, 2018. Respondents moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. The court will grant Respondents' motion. In his petition,
Pe
e
a e ha he
cha e g g he de a f
e
compensation benefits by the Northern Circle Indian Housing
Authority (NCIHA) and AMERIND Risk Tribal WC Program
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(AMERIND), as administered by the Berkeley Risk Administrators.
Petitioner further alleges the following: (1) NCIHA is a tribal
housing authority on Indian land in Ukiah, California, which
provides assistance for native Americans in Northern California; (2)
AMERIND a fede a cha e ed c
a
d g
e
c
e a
; (3) h gh c
ac , AMERIND
de
e
c
e a
f NCIHA h gh he AMERIND T ba W e
C
e a
P g a ; (4) Pe
e ca
administered by
Berkeley Risk Administration in Scottsdale, Arizona. Petitioner was
a non-native employee of NCIHA, where he worked as an IT
professional for eighteen years before his claimed injury. On
January 22, 2018, and on February 14, 2018, Petitioner filed a claim
f
e c
e a
be ef
h NCIHA f a
h
neck and shoulder. The claim was denied by Berkeley Risk
Administrators as falling outside the coverage plan because the plan
d e
e d ahc
e a
gf
an obscure cause or
ca e. Re
de
e d
he g
d ha
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign
. T ba
eeg
a a e f b ec a e
jurisdiction, which may be challenged by a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. C . P. 12(b)(1). Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek)
Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting E.F.W. v. St
S e he
I d a H gh Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th Cir.
2001)). As a court of limited jurisdiction, the federal courts are
presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the party
asserting jurisdiction establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of America., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a
defendant moves to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of providing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction.
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally,
a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an Indian tribe
because of tribal sovereign immunity. Alvarado v. Table Mountain
Rancheria, 509 F. 3d 1008, 1015-16 (9 h C . 2007). A be
sovereign immunity will extend to both tribal governing bodies and
tribal agencies which act as arms of the tribe. Allen v. Gold County
Casino, 464 F. 3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (tribal casino held
e
ed
eeg
). I e e d
age c e a d
subdivisions of the tribe and has generally been held to apply to
h
ga h
e f
ed b
be . Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous.
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Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacated in part on other
g
d ). Th , [ ]
aga
I da
be a e ... ba ed b
sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or
c ge
a ab ga
. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).
Petitioner provides no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction
over this action in his petition. To the contrary, he admits in his
petition that NCIHA and its insurer AMERIND enjoy sovereign
immunity. Petitioner claims a violation of the Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1303, on the ground that he was not fully
informed of his rights, duties, and obligations before his claim was
denied by the claims administrator and a final order issued by a
hearing examiner denying his benefits. The ICRA does not establish
or imply a federal civil cause of action except that it provides for a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Snow v. Quinault Indian
Nation, 709 F. 2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983); Pink v. Modoc Indian
Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9 h C . 1998). The e
de e
he a e
be e e ed
a
he
c
d
e
e e
he habea c e . Jeffredo v.
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9 h C . 2010). H e e , [a] he
e
C g e e ac ed he ICRA, de e
a ge e a
de
d
as having a meaning distinct from and, indeed, narrower than
c
d . Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir.
2017). S ec f ca , de e
a c
def ed
e
e
h ca c f e e . I h ca e, Pe
e d e
a ege ha
he was ever in tribal custody or was detained by the tribe in any way.
Thus, the court finds as a matter of law that Petitioner cannot state a
claim under the ICRA and his reference to the ICRA provides no
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing,
this case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
34. Stathis v. Marty Indian School
No. 28738, 930 N.W.2d. 653, 2019 WL 2528032 (S. Ct. S. Dakota
June 19, 2019). High school principal at Indian reservation school
brought action against the school, school employees, and members
of school board, asserting claims for wrongful termination, breach
of contract, breach of settlement agreement, libel, and slander; and
requesting punitive damages arising from termination of his
employment. The Circuit Court, First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix
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County, Bruce V. Anderson, J., granted defendants' motion to
dismiss. Principal appealed. The Supreme Court, Gilbertson, C.J.,
held that federal law preempted the principal's action. Affirmed.

Environmental Regulations
35. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
No. 16-35742, 905 F.3d 565, 2018 WL 4372973 (9th Cir Sept. 14,
2018). Confederated tribes of Colville Reservation brought
CERCLA action against the State of Washington and Canadian
company, seeking to hold them liable for dumping several million
tons of industrial waste into the Columbia River. After phase one of
a trifurcated bench trial, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, No. 2:04-cv-00256-LRS, Lonny R.
Suko, J., found the company was a liable party under CERCLA and,
in phase two of trial, found the company liable for more than $8.25
million of plaintiffs' response costs. After partial judgment was
entered, the company appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gould,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) The district court did not abuse its
discretion by directing entry of judgment on company's liability
under CERCLA for response costs; (2) company expressly aimed
waste it dumped into River at the State of Washington, thereby
establishing requisite effects in Washington for exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction; (3) tribes were entitled to recover investigation
costs, as recoverable costs of removal; (4) tribes were entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees for prevailing in their action; (5)
company was not entitled to divisibility defense. Affirmed.
36. Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio
No. 15-15754, 906 F.3d 1155, 2018 WL 5289028 (9 th Cir. Oct. 25,
2018). Environmental groups and Indian tribes brought an action
challenging United States Forest Service's approval of the
resumption of the uranium mining operation on federal land. Mining
companies intervened. Grand Canyon Trust v. Williams, 98 F.
Supp.3d 1044 (D. Ariz. 2015) entered summary judgment in
government's favor, and plaintiffs appealed. The court of
appeals, Block, District Judge, sitting by designation, held that: (1)
plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert claims under National
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA); (2) Forest Service's conclusion that
mining company had valid existing rights to mine uranium ore on
public lands that were established prior to mineral withdrawal was
final agency decision; (3) Forest Service's mineral report was not a
major federal action requiring preparation of environmental impact
statement (EIS); (4) Forest Service's mineral report was not an
undertaking that triggered NHPA's consultation process; (5) groups'
claim that Forest Service improperly determined that mining
company had valid existing rights to mine uranium ore on public
lands fell outside the zone of interests protected by General Mining
Act; and (6) groups' claim that Forest Service improperly
determined that company had valid existing rights to mine uranium
ore on public lands fell within zone of interests protected by Federal
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). Affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.
37. Spokane County v. Department of Fish and Wildlife
No. 95029-6, 192 Wash.2d 453, 430 P.3d 655 (Wash. Dec. 06,
2018). Counties brought action against the Department of Fish and
Wildlife, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
Department's authority to regulate construction or performance of
work that would occur exclusively above ordinary high-water line.
The Superior Court, Thurston County, No. 16-2-04334-5, John C.
Skinder, J., entered judgment for Department. Counties sought
direct review. The Supreme Court, Owens, J., held that upland
projects that are entirely landward of the ordinary high-water line
may be subject to the Hydraulic Code, and thus subject to regulation
by the Department. Affirmed.
38. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
No. 18-C-108, 360 F.Supp.3d 847, 2018 WL 6681397 (E.D. Wis.
Dec. 19, 2018). Tribe brought action against Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under Clean Water Act (CWA) and
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in substantive challenge to
refusal of EPA and Corps to exercise jurisdiction over CWA permit
from state of Michigan for discharge of dredged or fill material into
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certain navigable waters. Tribe moved to amend the complaint to
add APA claims challenging EPA's withdrawal of its objections to
permit and alleging that EPA and Corps had violated National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) section, and EPA and Corps
moved to dismiss. The district court, William C. Griesbach, and the
Chief Judge, held that: (1) EPA's withdrawal of its objections to
permit was not reviewable under APA; (2) allegedly violated NHPA
section did not apply because no federally funded or federally
licensed project was involved; (3) a matter of apparent first
impression, CWA citizen suit provision did not waive sovereign
immunity for suits against Army Corps of Engineers; (4) CWA
could not be used for substantive challenge to EPA's refusal to
exercise jurisdiction; and (5) letters from EPA and Corps to tribe
explaining refusal to exercise jurisdiction were not final agency
actions subject to APA review. Plaintiff's motion denied;
defendants' motion granted.
39. Dine Citizens Against Ruining our Environment v.
Bernhardt
No. 18-2089, 923 F.3d 831, 2019 WL 1999298 (10th Cir. May 07,
2019). Environmental advocacy groups brought an action alleging
that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) violated National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) in granting applications for permits to drill
(APD) horizontal, multi-stage hydraulically fracked wells on public
lands. Dine Ci i ens Agains R ining O r En
. Je ell, 312 F.
Supp. 3d 1031 (D. N.M. 2018), entered judgment in BLM's favor,
and the groups appealed. The court of appeals, Briscoe, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) the groups had standing to bring action; (2)
environmental assessments (EA) did not arbitrarily define area of
potential effects (APE) for each APD in way that excluded cultural
sites; (3) EAs adequately analyzed cumulative effects of developing
new APDs; (4) BLM did not abuse its discretion under National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) when it failed to consult with
state historic preservation office (SHPO); (5) EAs were properly
tiered to its previous environmental impact statement (EIS); (6)
NEPA required BLM to consider cumulative impacts of reasonably
foreseeable wells in EAs; (7) groups failed to carry their burden to
show that BLM acted arbitrarily or capriciously in analyzing air
pollution impacts; and 8) BLM abused its discretion by failing to
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consider cumulative water impacts. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.
40. Dine Citizens Agai

R i i gO E
Indian Affairs

. B ea

f

No. 17-17320, 932 F.3d 843, 2019 WL 3404210 (9th Cir. July 29,
2019). A coalition of tribal, regional, and national conservation
ga a
( P a ff ) ed he U.S. De a ment of the Interior,
its Secretary, and several bureaus within the agency, challenging a
variety of agency actions that reauthorized coal mining activities on
land reserved to the Navajo Nation. Plaintiffs alleged that these
actions violated the Endangered S ec e Ac ( ESA ), Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973). et seq., and the National
E
e a P c Ac ( NEPA ), National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969). et seq. The Navajo
Ta
a E eg C
a
( NTEC ), a c oration wholly
owned by the Navajo Nation that owns the mine in question,
intervened in the action for the limited purpose of moving to dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19and 12(b)(7). NTEC
argued that it was a required party but that it could not be joined due
to tribal sovereign immunity, and that the lawsuit could not proceed
without it. The district court agreed with NTEC and dismissed the
action. Aff ed. The Na a M e ( M e ) a 33,000-acre strip
mine. It produces coal from which the Four Corners Power Plant
( P e P a ) ge e a e e ec c . The M e a d P e P a a e
both on tribal land of the Navajo Nation within New Mexico. The
Mine operates pursuant to a surface mining permit issued by the
Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
a d E f ce e ( OSMRE ), de he S face M
gC
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(1977). et seq. This lawsuit
stems from changes and renewals to the lease agreements, rights-ofway, and government-issued permits under which the Mine and
Power Plant operate. In 2011, APS and the Navajo Nation amended
the lease governing Power Plant operations, including by extending
the term of the lease through 2041. BHP Billiton (which at the time
still owned the Mine) then sought a renewal of the existing surface
mining permit for the Mine and a new surface mining permit that
would allow operations to move to an additional area within the
Mine lease area. The lease amendment and accompanying rights-of365

way could not go into effect, and the surface mining permits could
not be granted, without approvals from several bureaus within the
Department of the Interior. NTEC asserted that it was a required
party, because of its economic interest in the Mine, that it could not
be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity, and that the action could
not proceed in its absence. Even though dismissal would have left
their decisions intact, Federal Defendants opposed NTEC's motion
to dismiss, arguing that the federal government was the only party
required to defend an action seeking to enforce compliance with
NEPA and the ESA. The district court granted NTEC's motion to
dismiss. The court concluded that NTEC had a legally protected
ee
he b ec a e f h
, beca e he e ef Plaintiffs
seek could directly affect the Navajo Nation (acting through its
corporation, Intervenor-Defendant NTEC) by disrupting its
ee
[ ] ea e ag ee e
a d he ab
ba
he
bargained-f
a e a d b . The c
he d hat Federal
Defendants could not adequately represent NTEC's interest in the
litigation, because although the agencies had an interest in defending
he a a e a d dec
, NTEC'
ee
he
c e f
h ca e fa e ceed h e f he age c e . We agree with the district
court that Federal Defendants cannot be counted on to adequately
represent NTEC's interests. Although, Federal Defendants have an
interest in defending their decisions, their overriding interest, as it
was in Manygoats, must be in compliance with environmental laws
such as NEPA and the ESA. This interest differs in a meaningful
e ef
NTEC' a d he Na a Na
eeg
ee
ensuring that the Mine and Power Plant continues to operate and
provide profits to the Navajo Nation. Finally, Plaintiffs and the
U ed S a e ge
a
he
b c gh e ce
h d
that this litigation can continue in NTEC's absence. The public
gh e ce
a
ed e ce
ad
a
de
e
under which a party, although necessary, will not be deemed
d e ab e, a d he ga
a c
e
he ab e ce f
that party. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988).
The court held that the exception does not apply here, reasoning that
the public rights exception is reserved for litigation that
a ce d[ ] he
ae ee
f he
ga
a d ee [ ]
d ca e a b c gh . Kescoli v Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1996). The public rights exception may apply in a case that
c d ad e e affect he ab e
a e'
ee , b
he
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ga
de
the legal entitlements of the absent
a e
f
he e ce
a
. (e ha
added)
(quoting Conner, 848 F.2d at 1459). Here, although Plaintiffs
nominally seek only a renewed NEPA and ESA process, the
implication of their claims is that Federal Defendants should not
have approved the mining activities in their exact form. The result
Plaintiffs seek, therefore, certainly threatens NTEC's legal
entitlements. We also recognize, as the Tenth Circuit has pointed
out, that refusing to apply the public rights exception arguably
d ce[ ] a a
a
e
ha [ ]
e, e ce [a] Tribe,
could seek review of an environmental impact statement covering
significant federal action relating to leases or agreements for
development
of
natural
resources
on
[that tribe's]
a d . Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. Or, at least, no one could obtain
such review unless the tribe were willing to waive its immunity and
participate in the lawsuit. This result, however, is for Congress to
address, should it see fit, as only Congress may abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572
U.S. 782, 790, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). It is
undisputed that Congress has not done so here. The public rights
exception, therefore, does not apply. Affirmed.
41. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v.
Federal Communications Commission
No. 18-1129, 933 F.3d 728, 2019 WL 3756373 (D.C. Cir. Aug 09,
2019). Cellular wireless services, including telephone and other
forms of wireless data transmission, depending on facilities that
transmit their radio signals on bands of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) has exclusive control over the spectrum, and wireless
providers must obtain licenses from the FCC to transmit. As part of
an effort to expedite the rollout of 5G service, the Commission has
removed some regulatory requirements for the construction of
e e fac e . The e e
cha e ged e f he FCC
orders paring back such regulations, In re Accelerating Wireless
Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure
Investment (Order), FCC 18-30, 2018 WL 1559856 (F.C.C.) (Mar.
30, 2018). The Order exempted most small cell construction from
two kinds of previously required review historic-preservation
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review under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and
environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). Together, these reviews assess the effects of new
construction on, among other things, sites of religious and cultural
importance to federally recognized Indian Tribes. We grant in part
the petitions for review, because the Order does not justify the
C
de e
a
ha
a
he b c e e
require a review of small cell deployments. In particular, the
Commission failed to justify its confidence that small cell
deployments pose little to no cognizable religious, cultural, or
environmental risk, particularly given the vast number of proposed
deployments and the reality that the Order will principally affect
small cells that require new construction. The Commission
accordingly did not, pursuant to its public interest authority,
Construction Permits, 47 U.S.C. § 319(d), adequately address
possible harms of deregulation and benefits of environmental and
historic preservation review. The Order s deregulation of small cells
is thus arbitrary and capricious. As for the Tribes c e
ha
the Order is invalid because the Commission did not meet its
obligations to consult with Tribes, the Commission responds that it
extensively consulted with Tribes, and that in any event, its
consultation obligation is not judicially enforceable. We conclude
that the Commission fulfilled its obligation to consult. The
Commission
presented
abundant
evidence
that
it
c
ed Tribes in the ordinary sense of the word, and
the Tribes have offered no other concrete standard by which to
dge he C
eff
. O h ec d, e ca
a ha
the Commission failed to consult with Tribes in its meetings and
other communications, which began in 2016 and continued through
early 2018. The Commission documented extensive meetings it
held with Tribes before it issued the Order. Under Advisory
C
c eg a
, [c]
a
ea he
ce
f ee g,
discussing, and considering the views of other participants, and,
where feasible, seeking agreement with them regarding matters
a
g
he ec
106
ce . 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f); see also
National Park Service and Related Programs, 54 U.S.C. §
302706(b). The dictionary definition of cons
g
ee [ g]
ad ce
f
a
f. Consult, American Heritage Dict. (5th
ed. 2019). Kee
ah c
a
ha he FCC eff
ee
e g e
, b ef g , c fe e ce ca , a d de e
f
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e a
b a C
e
a he ha
c
a
, a d
presents evidence that Tribes did not view these meetings as
consultations. But it offers no standard by which to judge which
c
a
ee
e g e
,
he he a
e g
e
a c fe e ce ca
a fe a ac
ltation. We grant
the petitions to vacate the Order e
a f a ce f
limited approval authority and remand to the FCC. We deny the
petitions to vacate the Order cha ge
T ba
e e
Section 106 review and to vacate the Order in its entirety.
Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR
42. Robbins v. Mason County Title Insurance Company
No. 50376-0-II, 5 Wash. App.2d 68, 425 P.3d 885 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 2018). Insureds filed action against title insurance
company, alleging that terms of title insurance policy obligated
insurer to defend them against a claim by Squaxin Island Tribe that
the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek gave Tribe the right to take
shellfish on the insureds' tidelands. The Superior Court, Mason
County No: 16-2-00686-1, Toni A Sheldon, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of the insurer and denied insureds' cross-motion
for partial summary judgment. Insureds appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Bjorgen, J., held that: (1) Tribe's notification to insureds of
plan to harvest shellfish in accordance with tribal shellfish rights
constituted demand, as required for coverage under policy; (2)
Tribe's demand to insureds was not founded upon a claim of title, as
required for coverage under policy; (3) Tribe's demand to insureds
was founded upon an encumbrance, as required for coverage under
policy; (4) Tribe's right to harvest shellfish existed or was claimed
to have existed prior to date of title insurance, as required for
coverage under policy; (5) Tribe's right to harvest shellfish
resembled profit prendre, not easement, and thus did not fall within
policy exclusion for easements; and (6) insurer acted in bad faith in
denying defense to insureds. Reversed and remanded.
43. United States v. Uintah Valley Shoshone Tribe
No. 2:17-cv-1140-BSJ, 2018 WL 4222398 (D. Utah Sept. 05, 2018).
P a ff
M
f
S
a
J dg e
a d Defe da
competing Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court
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on June 1, 2018. Plaintiff United States of America seeks, among
other things, to permanently enjoin Defendants from selling and
issuing hunting and fishing permits for use on state, federal, or tribal
lands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
( U e T be ). The a e f ch ce e a eged
a e 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, a criminal statute, which provides the following: Whoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both. The UVST, the Defendant, is not a tribe
currently recognized by the United States. It is currently an
ga a
c
ed f M ed-B d 4 (a d he de ce da )
who were formerly members of the Ute Tribe, but whose
membership therein and relationship to the federal government was
terminated under the Ute Partition and Termination Act of 1954
( UPTA ). Th ee UVST
ba eade a e a ed a Defe da .
The United States argued that Defendants are engaged in a scheme
to obtain money by false representations and promises. Based on the
agreed factual stipulations it is difficult for the Court to find such a
scheme to obtain money by false representations and promises
through the sale of licenses. The question presented to the Court by
the United States was more in the nature of a declaration as to the
absence of sovereign power in Defendants to issue hunting and
fishing licenses. Thus, it appeared to the Court the United States as
trustee is entitled to a ruling so declaring but denied relief by way of
an injunction because of the absence of evidence dealing with a
criminal statute. It was clear to the court from the history, since
L c
ea a e
fc ge
a a d ba ac
, ha
Defendants have no power to issue licenses to hunt and fish on trust
or Tribal lands. None. They should not do so, not because they have
concocted a scheme to defraud purchasers of such licenses, but
because they simply lack the power to issue such licenses. That
resides elsewhere as determined above. It did not reside in
Defendants.
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44. Silva v. Farrish
No. 18-CV-3648 (SJF)(SIL), 2019 WL 117602 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 07,
2019). Me be
f he Sh ec c I d a Na
( he T be ),
commenced this action alleging violations of their aboriginal
usufructuary fishing rights under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and a
continuing pattern of race discrimination in violation of Sections
1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, b Defe da B a Fa h ( Fa h ), the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
( NYDEC ), a d he S ff
C
D
c A
e
Off ce
( SCDA ) (Fa h, Lac , Segg a d he NYDEC c ec e , he
S a e Defe da
). The C
e ec f
ec
e d ha he
Complaint be dismissed in its entirety. However, the Court further
recommends that Plaintiffs be granted leave to replead, but only as
to their statutory claims for monetary damages against Farrish,
Laczi, and Seggos in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs are
members of the Shinnecock Indian Nation, a federally-recognized
Indian tribe, who reside on the Shinnecock Indian Reservation (the
Re e a
) ca ed S ff C
, Ne Y . A a e e a
times, Plaintiffs have fished in the waters of Shinnecock Bay and its
e a . Acc d g
P a ff , C
a Deed a d e a ed
d c e
he ab g a gh
f h
ch a e
without interference. There was a pending state criminal action
aga
h
ha
ca ed he S a e
e e t in enforcing its
generally applicable fishing regulations, and which provided an
adequate opportunity for judicial review of his federal constitutional
claim. The State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint
on the grounds that: (i) all claims against the NYDEC, as well as
those against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in their official capacities,
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and principles of sovereign
immunity. The claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as to
Silva are precluded under the Younger abstention doctrine. It is
undisputed by Plaintiffs that the Eleventh Amendment precludes
jurisdiction over their claims for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982 against the NYDEC. Plaintiffs maintain, however,
that the Young exception to sovereign immunity applies to their
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Farrish, Laczi,
and Seggos in their official capacities. Plaintiffs also seem to
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suggest that state regulation of Indian fishing rights is necessarily
preempted by federal law. The Court disagrees. Initially, the Court
acknowledges that Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief, as pled in the Complaint, facially satisfy both components of
he
a gh f
ad
de Verizon for determining
whether Young should apply. The Court concludes that this case is
governed by Coeur d'Alene. Accordingly, the Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not apply to
Plaintiffs' claims against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in their official
capacities. The Court recommended that Plaintiffs' claims against
the NYDEC, along with those against Farrish, Laczi, and Seggos in
their official capacities, be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
45. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
No. 14-1271, 913 F.3d 1099, 2019 WL 321025 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
2019).Indian tribe filed petition for review of Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission orders denying its petition for order
declaring that licensee for hydroelectric project failed to diligently
pursue relicensing of project or that states had waived their authority
to issue water quality certification for project, 147 FERC 61216,
2014 WL 2794387, and denying its motion for rehearing, 149 FERC
61038, 2014 WL 5293211. The court of appeals, Sentelle, Senior
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) California and Oregon were not
indispensable parties, and (2) states waived their authority under
Clean Water Act (CWA) to issue water quality certification for the
project. Petition granted.
46. United States v. Turtle
No. 2:18-cr-88-FtM-38MRM, 365 F.Supp.3d 1242, 2019 WL
423346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Feb. 04, 2019) Defendant, a member of
the Seminole Tribe of Florida, who lived on a Seminole Indian
reservation, was charged with selling American alligator eggs in
violation of Lacey Act, predicated on the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Defendant moved to dismiss. The District Court, Sheri
Polster Chappell, J., held that: (1) the Tribe's usufructuary rights
included the right to sell alligator eggs gathered from the
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reservation; (2) ESA did not abrogate the Tribe's usufructuary right
to sell alligator eggs; but (3) Congress could regulate the Tribe's
usufructuary rights with reasonable and necessary conservation
measures. Motion denied.
47. Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Cent. Arizona Water
Conservation Dist.
No. CV-17-00918-PHX-DGC, 378 F. Supp.3d 797, 2019 WL
1356310 (D. Ariz. R. Mar. 26, 2019). Plaintiff Ak Chin Indian
C
( he C
) ed Defe da Ce a A
a
Wa e C e a
D
c ( CAWCD ) f dec a a
dg e
and a permanent injunction regarding delivery of Central Arizona
P ec
( CAP )
ae
he C
. CAWCD
counterclaimed, seeking the opposite result. The Court joined the
United States as a party under Rule 19, and the United States filed a
crossclaim against CAWCD seeking declaratory relief regarding the
interpretation of relevant statutes and contracts as they relate to the
C
a e gh . CAWCD a e ed c a
aga
he
United States, but the Court dismissed them on sovereign immunity
grounds. The Court granted the United States' motion for summary
judgment on its claims against CAWCD. The Community is a
federally recognized Indian tribe. CAWCD is a multi-county water
conservation district and a municipal corporation authorized to
operate and maintain the CAP, a system of canals, aqueducts, and
related structures that deliver Colorado River water throughout
centra a d
he A
a. The U ed S a e
h ca e
includes a number of federal officials and agencies that oversee
reclamation matters. This case concerns the Ak Chin Water Rights
Ac f 1984, efe ed a d c ed
h
de a he 1984 Ac .
See 1984 Act, Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (Oct. 19, 1984).
The 1984 Act addressed water the Community is entitled to receive
from the Colorado River. Section 2(a) of the Act required the
Secretary to deliver a permanent water supply to the Community of
e
ha e e -five thousand acre-feet of surface water
suitable for agricultural use except as otherwise provided under
b ec
(b) a d (c). 1984 Ac , 2(a). Sec
2(b), h ch he
section in dispute, in this case, concerns an additional 10,000 acrefee ( AF ) f a e he C
a ece e de ce a
c d
.I
de ha [ ] a
ea
h ch ff c e
face
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water is available, the Secretary shall deliver such additional
quantity of water as is requested by the Community not to exceed
ten thousand acre-fee . 1984 Ac , 2(b). The ec
f he a e
ha [ ]he Sec e a
ha be e
ed ca
h
b ga
referred to in this subsection only if he determines that there is
sufficient capacity available in the main project works of the Central
A
a P ec
de e
ch add
a
a
. I
de ed:
The c
g a ed he U ed S a e
f
a
dg e
on its claims against CAWCD.
48. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella
Valley Water Dist., et al.
No. EDCV 13-00883 JGB, 162 F.Supp.3d 1053 ( C.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2019). The Tribe utilizes water supplied by CVWD and DWA. In
2016, CVWD a d DWA
b c ae
e
c e g he
Reservation served a total population of 340,000 people. Today, the
Tribe does not pump groundwater from the Reservation. The Tribe
currently does not use water for agricultural purposes to any
significant degree. For standing purposes, the Tribe must show an
a
ega
ec ed e e . U de he S e e C
decision in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, the creation of
an I d a Re e a
c a a gh
ae
he e e eeded
acc
h he
e f he e e a
. Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). This right is referred to as a
Winters gh . The S e e C
he d h Winters right
ee e
ha a
f a e ece a
f f he
e
f he e e a
,
e. (c g Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 600-01 (1963) (emphasis added)). In this case, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged limitations on a Winters right and noted that
a Winters gh
e e e ae
he e e
ece a
acc
h he
e f he e e a
[.] Agua Caliente, 849
F.3d at 1268. The Federal Circuit, considering a similar issue,
reached the same conclusion. See Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 900 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The tribe in Crow Creek
argued any action affecting the water source at issue constitutes an
injury to its Winters right, even if the action does not affect the
be ab
da
ff c ent water to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that
a Winters right only entitled a tribe to enough water to fulfill the
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e f
ee a
,
e. I e ab a ed ha he be
property right was usufructuary in nature in that the tribe did not
own particular molecules of water but the advantage of its use.
(citation omitted). The federal circuit held that the tribe cannot be
ed b ac
ha d e
affec [ ] ab
e ufficient
ae
f f he
e f he [ ]e e a
. Th C
ag eed
h he fede a c c
a a
a d f d ha he T be
provide evidence of injury to its ability to use sufficient water to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
49. United States v. Washington
No. 17-35760, 928 F.3d 783, 2019 WL 2608834 (9th Cir. June 26,
2019). The United States, on its own behalf and as trustee for a
number of Western Washington Indian tribes, brought action
against the State of Washington, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief concerning off-reservation treaty rights fishing. After entry of
injunction granting tribal fishing rights, U.S. v. State of Wash., 384
F. Supp. 312, (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 1974), and adjudication
of tribes' off-reservation rights, U.S. v. State of Wash., 626 F. Supp.
1405, (W.D. Wash. Jan. 1, 1985). Skokomish tribe commenced sub
proceeding asserting its claim to usual and accustomed fishing rights
in Satsop River. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Nos. 2:17-sp-01-RSM, 2:70-cv-09213RSM, Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, 2017 WL 3726774,
entered summary judgment in favor of state and other tribes, and
Skokomish tribe appealed. The court of appeals, Bea, Circuit Judge,
held that tribe failed to properly invoke district court's continuing
jurisdiction. Affirmed.
Gaming
50. Forest County Potawatomi Community v. United States
No. 15-105 (CKK), 330 F.Supp.3d 269, 2018 WL 4308570 (D. D.C.
Sept. 10, 2018). Indian tribe brought this action under
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the United States,
challenging Department of Interior's (DOI) decision not to approve
an amendment to a gaming compact between the tribe and State of
Wisconsin under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). After the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen
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Kollar-Kotelly, J., 317 F.R.D. 6, granted leave to intervene to nearby
tribe that sought to develop competing gaming facility, tribe moved
for summary judgment, while United States and nearby tribe crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court held that: (1)
IGRA provision permitting tribal-state compact on any subjects
directly related to operation of gaming activities was ambiguous, as
would support Chevron deference; (2) interpretation of IGRA by
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs was based upon a permissible
construction of statute, as would entitle decision to Chevron
deference; (3) Secretary's determination that exclusivity provision
transferring responsibility for tribe's revenues onto another tribe
violated IGRA was reasonable, entitling decision to Chevron
deference; (4) Secretary's determination that proposed compact
would have required another tribe to take responsibility for tribe's
revenues was not arbitrary and capricious, as required to support
tribe's APA claim; (5) Secretary's determination that compact's
inclusion of loss of revenue from class II gaming and ancillary
businesses violated IGRA was reasonable, and thus was entitled to
Chevron deference; and (6) Secretary's determination that proposed
compact calculated loss mitigation payments based on revenue from
class II gaming and ancillary businesses was not arbitrary and
capricious, as required to support tribe's APA claim. Tribe's motion
denied; United States and nearby tribe's motions granted.
51. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma
and Yuima Reservation v. Unite Here International
Union
No. 16-cv-2660-BAS-AGS, 346 F.Supp.3d 1365 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
28, 2018). Federally-recognized Indian tribe that operated casino on
its reservation brought action alleging that union which represented
service and manufacturing employees skirted binding dispute
resolution process by filing series of unfair labor practice charges
directly with National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and that
State of California failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that
union would comply with dispute resolution process. Union and
State moved to dismiss. The District Court, Cynthia Bashant, J., held
that: (1) tribe had colorable basis for District Court to have federal
question jurisdiction over action against State; (2) dispute between
tribe and union over enforceability of alternative dispute mechanism
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in tribal labor ordinance was not justiciable controversy with State
of California; (3) claim by tribe against State for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for not enforcing alternative
dispute mechanism against union in tribal labor ordinance as
implemented into Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) gaming
compact with State was not justiciable; and (4) court did not have
federal question jurisdiction over dispute between tribe against
union for opting to pursue its unfair labor charges against tribe with
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) instead of dispute
resolution process in tribe's IGRA gaming contract with State of
California. Motions granted.
52. Brownstone, LLC. v. Big Sandy Rancheria of Western
Mono Indians et al.
No. 2:16-cv-04170-CAS(AGRx), 2018 WL 6697175 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 2018). Brownstone, LLC filed this action against
defendants Big Sandy Rancheria of Western Mono Indians (the
T be ) a d he B g Sa d Ra che a E e a
e A h
( he
A h
). P a ff a ege he f
g c a : (1) c a
f
the breaches of two contract; (2) money had and received; (3)
conversion; (4) Open Book Account; and (5) declaratory relief.
Defendants moved to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that it was selected
by the Tribe to provide expertise in developing a large, Class III
gaming facility. The parties entered into contracts aligned with
different phases of the Project. Following the initial Memorandum
f U de a d g ( MOU ), e ec ed
Ja a 16, 2007, he
parties first entered into a Credit Agreement. The parties also
entered into the Development Agreement on or about the same date
as the Credit Agreement. Under the Development Agreement,
plaintiff was to help the Tribe obtain either bridge financing or
permanent financing for the Project. Plaintiff claimed that the
plaintiff and the Tribal Parties continued to negotiate a third
agreement, the Consulting Agreement, whereby plaintiff would
provide services for the operations of the casino once completed.
However, after the Tribe elected new leadership in September 2008,
the Tribal Parties ultimately declined to execute the Agreement.
Still, plaintiff claimed that it continued to seek financing sources to
assist the Tribe with pursuing the Project, if without the complete
cooperation of the Tribal Parties. Plaintiff alleged that the parties
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agreed that licensing was unnecessary for the Credit Agreement and
the Development Agreement, because those agreements only
contracted plaintiff to perform certain services before any gaming
operations occurred. On June 10, 2016, plaintiff filed this action.
The T ba Pa e
ed
d
a ff c
a
he
grounds that (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter; (2) that venue is improper; and (3) that plaintiff fails to state
a claim for which relief is available. Plaintiff argues that the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
c
efe ed
a fede a
e
dc
. P a ff
contends that this case requires resolution of a substantial question
of federal law under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et seq. ( IGRA ), a
e a he T ba -State Compact
between Big Sandy Rancheria and the State of California.
Defendants responded that federal question jurisdiction does not
provide this Court subject matter jurisdiction because a federal issue
a ae
he face f a ff c
a ,
a e
f fede a a
a ece a e e e
f e f e f [ a ff ]
well- eaded a e c a . The C
f
d ha fede a
e
jurisdiction did not confer jurisdiction over this matter because
a ff ca e d e
a f he e -plead complaint rule. For
he f eg g ea
, he C
g a ed defe da
dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
53. Koi Nation of Northern California v. United States
De
fI e i
No. 17-1718 (BAH), 361 F.Supp.3d 14, 2019 WL 250670 (D.C.
D.C. Jan. 16, 2019). The Koi Nation of Northern California, which
was a landless federally recognized Indian tribe, brought action
alleging that United States Department of the Interior's (DOI)
decision concluding that the tribe was not eligible to game on lands
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) restored lands
exception violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), IGRA,
and Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), and challenging the
subsection of the regulation on which the DOI's decision relied,
seeking declaration that tribe qualified as an Indian tribe restored to
federal recognition under IGRA, and injunction invalidating
subsection of implementing regulation to extent it excluded from
eligibility for IGRA's restored lands exception tribes
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administratively determined to be recognized outside the formal Part
83 Federal acknowledgement process. Koi Nation and DOI crossmoved for summary judgment. The District Court, Beryl A. Howell,
Chief Judge, held that: (1) tribe's claim was ripe for judicial review;
(2) statutory six-year limitations period for challenging agency
regulation did not apply to tribe's claim challenging DOI regulation;
(3) be a e ed Fede a ec g
,
h
ea g f
IGRA's restored lands exception; (4) even if IGRA's restored lands
exception was ambiguous, Indian canon of construction would
resolve the ambiguity in tribe's favor; (5) DOI decision violated
statute prohibiting classifying, enhancing, or diminishing privileges
and immunities available to Indian tribe relative to other federally
recognized tribes; and (6) DOI failed to adequately explain its
change in policy. Koi Nation's motion granted; DOI's motion
denied.
54. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo
No. EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 367 F.Supp.3d 596, 2019 WL 542036
(W.D. Tex., Feb. 11, 2019). In litigation between State of Texas and
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe regarding gaming activities on Pueblo
tribal land, Tribe asserted counterclaim seeking declaration that
Texas Constitution and Bingo Enabling Act, which enabled
charitable bingo in Texas and defined which types of organizations
were allowed to conduct charitable bingo, violated the Equal
Protection Clause by allowing certain organizations the right to
conduct bingo, but omitting Indian nations and their members from
that list, and asserting that the state Attorney General enforced
Texas's gaming laws in a discriminatory manner. Attorney General
moved for summary judgment, asserting that §1983 was appropriate
vehicle for alleging a constitutional claim and that the Tribe was not
a proper claimant pursuant to §1983, and contending that the Tribe's
claims failed on the merits because the Bingo Enabling Act was not
unconstitutionally written or enforced. The District Court, Philip R.
Martinez, J., held that: (1) Section 1983 was appropriate method for
Tribe to assert claims; (2) Tribe could assert §1983 Equal Protection
claim alleging that State unlawfully discriminated against Indians
when it drafted Bingo Enabling Act; (3) Tribe could assert §1983
Equal Protection claim alleging that enforcement of Bingo Enabling
Act discriminated against Tribe; (4) Tribe was barred from asserting
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§1983 claim that its Equal Protection rights were violated because
Congress had plenary power to deal with unique issues concerning
Indian nations, and because Texas sought to unlawfully expand its
regulatory reach; (5) district court would apply rational basis
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny; (6) under rational basis review,
Bingo Enabling Act did not violate Tribe's equal protection rights;
(7) Tribe could not prevail on §1983 claim alleging that enforcement
of the Bingo Enabling Act violated Tribe's equal protection rights;
and (8) under rational basis review, Texas's decision to have
Attorney General, rather than local prosecutors, prosecute Tribe for
alleged violations of gaming laws did not violate Tribe's equal
protection rights. Motion granted.
55. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo
No. EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 2019 WL 639971 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 14,
2019). Plaintiff State of Texas moved for Summary Judgment and
Permanent Injunction. In 1968, the United States Congress
simultaneously recognized the Pueblo as a tribe and transferred any
trust responsibilities regarding the Tribe to the State of Texas. S.
Rep. No. 100-90S. Rep. No. 100-90 (1987), at 7. After the trust
relationship was created, Texas held a 100-acre reservation in trust
for the Tribe. However, in 1983, Texas Attorney General Jim
Mattox issued an opinion in which he concluded that the State may
not maintain a trust relationship with an Indian Tribe. Jim Mattox,
Opinion Re: Enforcement of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code
within the Confines of the Alabama-Coushatta Indian Reservation,
No. JM-17 (March 22, 1983). Mattox opined that a trust agreement
with Indian tribes discriminates between members of a tribe and
other Texas citizens on the basis of national origin in violation of
the Texas Constitution. Therefore, Mattox determined that no proper
public purpose existed for the trust. Accordingly, the Pueblo,
alongside the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe in East Texas, sought to
establish a federal trust relationship with the United States
government. See S. Rep. No. 100-90S. Rep. No. 100-90 (1987), at
7. In 1999, the State sued the Tribe, and sought to enjoin gaming
activities on the Pueblo reservation. On September 27, 2001,
a
dg e
a g a ed he S a e fa . Texas v. del Sur
Pueblo ( Ysleta II ), 220 F. S
. 2d 668, 687 (W.D. Te . 2001)
(internal citations omitted), modified (May 17, 2002), aff d, 31 F.
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Ap
835 (5 h C . 2002), and aff d s b nom. State of Texas v.
Pueblo, 69 F. A
659 (5 h C . 2003), and order clarified sub
nom. Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, No. EP-99-CA-320-H, 2009
WL 10679419 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009). In his Memorandum
Opinion, Judge Eisele de e
ed ha he T be ca
e gage
eg a ed ga
g ac
e
e
c
e
h he e e
eg a
. The c
de e
ed ha he T be ac
e dd
c
h Te a
a
a d eg a
. M e e , he c
considered e
ab e fac
a d c c ded ha [ ]he f
f [ he
T be ]
a f e e
e a e a ed b he ega ea b
h ch h e be ef ha e bee b a ed. Acc d g , he T be
was permanently enjoined from continuing its operations. The Fifth
C c
a
aff ed J dge E e e
. State v. del sur
Pueblo, 31 Fed. Appx. 835 (5th Cir. 2002). The facts in this case are
undisputed. The a
ce e a
d he T be ac
e a
Speaking Rock Entertainment Center, which is the primary location
f he T be ga
g ac
e . The T be ga
g ea
ae
a significant source of employment for the Pueblo people, and it uses
the money raised at their casino to fund several important
governmental initiatives, including education, healthcare, and
c
a
ee a
. The P eb
ea
ae
c d c ed
pursuant to any license from the Texas Lottery Commission. The
Court joined the refrain of Judges who have urged the Tribes bound
by the Restoration Act to petition Congress to modify or replace the
Restoration Act if they would like to conduct gaming on the
reservation. The S a e f Te a M
f S
a J dgment
and Permanent Injunction was granted.
56. C

ec ic

. U i ed S a e De

fI e i

No. 17-2564 (RC), 363 F.Supp.3d 45, 2019 WL 652321 (D.C. Feb.
15, 2019). State and Indian tribe brought action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against defendant, including
United States Department of the Interior (DOI), alleging that
Secretary of the Interior unlawfully declined to approve amendment
to secretarial procedures under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) that would have allowed them to begin constructing
commercial casino on state land. State and tribe moved to amend the
complaint. The district court, Rudolph Contreras, J., held that: (1)
defendants failed to show that they would be prejudiced by alleged
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undue delay in moving to amend complaint; (2) Secretary's letter
was final agency action, and thus subject to judicial review; (3) tribe
and state sufficiently alleged that Secretary's letter was arbitrary and
capricious on its face; (4) tribe and state sufficiently alleged that
political pressure was brought to bear on officials responsible for
approving proposed amendments; (5) tribe and state sufficiently
alleged that political pressure caused Secretary to make decision that
was not dictated by IGRA; and (6) proposed amendments to
secretarial procedures plainly fell outside of DOI's definition of a
tribal-state compact. Motion granted in part and denied in part. See
also 344 F.Supp.3d 279.
57. Frank's Landing Indian Community v. National
Indian Gaming Commission
No. 17-35368, 918 F.3d 610, 2019 WL 1119912 (9th Cir. Mar. 12,
2019). Indian community brought action against Department of
Interior and National Indian Gaming Commission, challenging
Interior's determination that tribe was ineligible for gaming for
purposes of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Benjamin H. Settle, J., 242 F.Supp.3d 1156, granted summary
judgment in favor of Department of Interior. Tribe appealed. The
court of appeals, Morgan Christen, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) a
tribe must appear on the Secretary's annual list of federally
recognized tribes in order to be eligible to engage in class II gaming,
and (2) Franks Landing Act did not grant Community permission to
engage in class II gaming. Affirmed.
58. Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas
No. 18-40116, 918 F.3d 440, 2019 WL 1199564 (5th Cir. Mar. 14,
2019). Tribe brought action against state seeking declaratory
judgment that its gaming activities on tribal lands were permitted
under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). State filed
counterclaim to enjoin tribe from conducting gaming activities
based on Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, Alabama, and Coushatta Indian
Tribes of Texas Restoration Act. After state's motion for permanent
injunction was granted, state moved to realign parties, moved for
contempt, and sought declaration that IGRA did not apply, and tribe
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moved for relief from injunction. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, Keith F. Giblin, United States
Magistrate Judge, entered summary judgment in state's favor, 208
F.Supp.2d 670, and denied tribe's motion for relief from injunction,
298 F.Supp.3d 909. Tribe appealed. The court of appeals, Jerry E.
Smith, Circuit Judge, held that National Indian Gaming
Commission's (NIGC) determination that IGRA governed question
of whether tribe could conduct class II gaming on tribal lands was
not entitled to Chevron deference. Affirmed.
59. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom
No. 17-55604, 919 F.3d 1148, 2019 WL 1285060 (9th Cir. Mar. 21,
2019). Indian tribes brought action against state seeking declaratory
judgment that duration provision of tribal-state gaming compacts
violated Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The United States
District Court for the Central District of California, No. 5:16-cv01347-JFW-MRW, John F. Walter, J., 2017 WL 2971864, entered
summary judgment in state's favor, and tribes appealed. The court
of appeals, Gilliam, District Judge, sitting by designation, held that
as matter of first impression, duration provisions were permitted by
IGRA. Affirmed.
60. Ci

fC

cil Bl ff , I a . U i ed S a e De
Interior

f

No. 1:17-CV-00033-SMR-CFB, 368 F.Supp.3d 1276, 2019 WL
1368561 (S.D. Iowa, Mar. 26, 2019). City in Iowa filed suit against
Department of Interior and National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC), asserting claims under Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and seeking declaratory judgment invalidating NIGC's
amended final order approving site-specific gaming ordinance
enacted by Ponca Tribe of Nebraska. The Order allowed tribe to
conduct Class II gaming, under Indian Gaming Regulation Act
(IGRA), on 4.8-acre tract of land in Iowa that was within tribe's
service area, designated pursuant to Ponca Restoration Act (PRA).
The PRA restored tribe's government-to-government relationship
with United States, and it was subsequently placed into trust by
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), as authorized by Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA). State of Nebraska and State of Iowa
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intervened as intervenor-plaintiffs. Parties cross-moved for
summary judgment. The District Court, Stephanie M. Rose, J., held
that: (1) NIGC appropriately found tribe was not estopped from
asserting that parcel qualified for IGRA's restored lands exception;
(2) NIGC reasonably interpreted PRA; (3) NIGC was not required
to consider new IGRA regulations in interpreting PRA; (4) NIGC
reasonably determined that new IGRA regulations did not apply; but
(5) NIGC unreasonably failed to consider purported verbal
agreement between tribe and Iowa. Plaintiffs' motion granted in part
and denied in part; defendants' motion denied.
61. Pueblo of Isleta v. Grisham
No. 17-654 KG/KK, 2019 WL 1429586 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2019).
Defe da
a d P a ff
ed f
a
dg e t. The
C
f
d ha : (1) Defe da
S
a J dg e M
h d be de ed; (2) he P eb
S
a J dg e M
should be granted. Plaintiffs the Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and
Tesuque, and Plaintiffs-in-Intervention the Pueblos of Santa Ana,
Sa a C a a, a d Sa Fe e (c ec e , he P eb
), a e
(6)
federally recognized Indian tribes that operate casinos in New
Mexico pursuant to identical gaming compacts with the State of
Ne Me c ( he S a e ). Defe da a e he S a e G e
, the
State Gaming Representative, and the Chair and members of the
S a e Ga
g C
B a d ( NMGCB )
he
ff c a
capacities. The Pueblos and the State entered into gaming compacts
2007 ( 2007 C
ac ), a d aga
2015, a d 2016 ( 2015
Compac ). Inter alia, the compacts require the Pueblos to make
quarterly revenue sharing payments to the State, in exchange for the
P eb
ea e c
e gh
c d c ce a
d f ga
g
in New Mexico. In 2017, Defendants sent the Pueblos notices of
non-compliance and notices to cease conduct, asserting that the
Pueblos had miscalculated their revenue sharing obligations under
the 2007 Compacts beginning as early as April 2011. Specifically,
Defendants claimed that, in calculating their revenue sharing
payments, the Pueblos had improperly excluded the face value of
free play and deducted the value of prizes won by patrons as a result
f f ee a
age f
he C a III ga
g ach e
Ne
W . P
a
he 2015 C
ac , h ch e e ed Defe da
claims, Defendants instructed the Pueblos to make additional
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revenue sharing payments to the State under the 2007 Compacts.
The Pueblos of Isleta, Sandia, and Tesuque filed this civil action. In
their complaints, the Pueblos ask the Court for a judgment declaring
ha : (1) Defe da
ca
a
he 2015 C
ac f
additional revenue sharing payments under the 2007 Compacts
violate federal law, and the 2015 Compacts are therefore invalid and
effec e
e e e Defe da
a f claims; (2) neither the
P eb
ca
h a
Defe da
ca
f add
a
revenue sharing payments are subject to arbitration under the 2015
Compacts, and, (3) Defendants have no authority as a matter of
federal law to pursue their claims for additional revenue sharing
a e
aga
he P eb . P a ff
f
a
judgement was granted.
62. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty v. Wisconsin
No. 18-1449, 922 F.3d 818, 2019 WL 1923403 (7th Cir. Apr. 30,
2019). Indian tribe brought action under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) against second tribe and State, seeking
injunctive relief from proposed expansion of second tribe's casino,
located in the same county. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin, James D. Peterson, J., 299 F.Supp.3d
1026 and 2018 WL 708389, dismissed as untimely. First tribe
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, held
that Indian tribe's lawsuit seeking injunctive relief from proposed
expansion of second tribe's casino was barred by Wisconsin's sixyear statute of limitations for contract actions. Affirmed.
63. Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. Newsom
No. 2:19-cv-00025-JAM-AC, 2019 WL 2513788 (E.D. Cal. June
18, 2019). On January 3, 2019, the Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation,
Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, and Viejas Band of
Kumeyaay Indians (collec e
P a ff
T be ) f ed a
complaint against the State of California and Governor Gavin
Ne
(c ec e Defe da
). P a ff c e d Defe da
ae
e f c g he a e ba
ba
g a d e ce age ca d
ga e aga
ca d
Ca f
a
-tribal casinos. This,
they argued, amounted to a breach of their Tribal-State Compacts
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein. For
385

he ea
d c ed be
, he C
g a ed Defe da
to dismiss with prejudice. In September 2015, June 2016, and
August 2016, the State of California entered into Tribal-State
Compacts with the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, the
Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, and the Yocha Dehe
Wintun Nation, respectively. These agreements amended and
superseded the 1999 Tribal-State Compacts between the parties.
Yocha Dehe Wintun Compact, Viejas Band Compact, and Sycuan
Ba d C
ac (c ec e
T ba C
ac ) a
18.2. Each
Compact included a Preamble. See Tribal Compacts at 1-2. In
relevant part, the Preambles acknowledged that the be e c
e
gh
e ae
ach e a d ba ed ca d ga e c ea e[d] a
unique opportunity to operate a Gaming Facility in an economic
environment free of competition...and that this unique economic
environment is of great value to the T be. Th
e
a b
f a
he Ca f
a
constitution exempting Indian tribes f
he
ae
ge e a
hb
ba
g a d e ce age ca d ga e . CAL. CONST.
art. IV, § 19(e) (1966). Over the years, Defendants have taken
various positions on what type of gaming is allowed in light of the
S a e ba
ba
g a d e ce age ca d ga e . C
.
3337, 42, 48, 74, 107, 118. See also Cal. Penal Code §§
330.11, 337j(f); Oliver v. Los Angeles County, 66 Cal. App. 4th
1397 (1997); Huntington Park Club v. Los Angeles County, 206 Cal.
App. 3d 241 (1988). P a ff c e ded he S a e c e
interpretation effectively results in non-enforcement of its claimed
prohibit . I deed, P a ff a eged Defe da
ha e bee
complicit in permitting, and at times even encouraging the
ca d
a f
c d c , ab dg g he Tribes right of
exclusivity. Plaintiffs failed to state a breach of Compact claim,
because the Tribal Compacts do not contain a right of exclusivity
independent of the one provided by the state constitution. The
Ca f
a c
de : N
h a d g [Ca f
a
prohibition on Nevada-style casinos]...the Governor is authorized to
negotiate and conclude compacts...for the conduct of lottery games,
banking, and percentage card games
by federally
recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance
with federal law. CAL. CONST. Art. IV, § 19(f) (2000). The question
of whether a federally-recognized tribe has negotiated an agreement
with the state to conduct otherwise prohibited gaming is a matter of
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Compact interpretation. But the question of whether federallyrecognized tribes are the only entities who may lawfully conduct
otherwise pr h b ed ga
g
. P a ff e c
gh
flow solely from the California constitution. This is the unavoidable
barrier that prevents Plaintiffs from successfully maintaining their
breach of Compact claims. Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs
negotiated Compacts with the State in 1999. These negotiations
culminated in Tribal-State Compacts that would only take effect if
California voters enacted an amendment to the State Constitution
that exempted tribes f
Ca f
a
hb
Ne Je eyand Nevada-style gaming. The referendum passed, and the
Compacts took effect. With the 1999 Compacts, Plaintiffs bargained
for an economic opportunity, codified in state law, that they did not
previously have: the exclusive right to conduct otherwise prohibited
gaming. There is no doubt that the 1999 exclusivity provisions
imposed an affirmative obligation on the State. But the 1999
compacts do not govern this suit. In 2015 and 2016, Plaintiffs
renegotiated their Compacts with the State. See generally Tribal
C
ac . Each P a ff C
ac
c de a e ge c a e,
g ha he e C
ac
e f h he f
a d c
ee
agreement of the parties and supersede[s] any prior agreements or
de a d g
h e ec
he b ec a e [ ]he e f. Tribal
Compacts at § 18.2. Plaintiffs argue the most-recently entered
Compacts guarantee the same right of exclusivity that was bargained
f
he 1999 ag ee e . O
a 4. The C
d ag eed. The
Compacts, although recognizing the right of exclusivity provided by
the California Constitution, do not include any express terms
ega d g Defe da
b ga
e e e ha gh . I fac , he
Compacts contemplate the abrogation of that right, providing
the Tribes limited recourse in the event their rights of exclusivity
lapse. For the reasons set forth above, the Court granted with
e d ce Defe da
M
D
.
64. Kalispel Tribe of Indians and Spokane County v. U.S.
De
f he I e i
No. 2:17-CV-0138-WFN, 2019 WL 3037048 (E.D. Wash. July 11,
2019). For the reasons detailed below, the Court granted Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment. Located a few miles west of
Spokane in Spokane County, Airway Heights is home to Fairchild
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Air Force Base, Northern Quest Casino, and, more recently, the
Spokane Tribe's casino. Though Airway Heights falls within
Spokane Tribe's aboriginal land, the Kalispel Tribe obtained trust
land within Airway Heights and successfully obtained permission to
build the Northern Quest Casino twenty years ago. Northern Quest
Casino has proved lucrative for the Kalispel, bringing in profits that
benefited the Kalispel tribal members by funding local governmental
interests as well as providing direct payments to tribal members. In
2001, the United States acquired land in trust for the
Spokane Tribe nearby the Northern Quest Casino. Five years later,
the Spokane Tribe sought Department of the Interior [Department]
approval for gaming on the trust land with a proposed casino within
two miles of the Northern Quest Casino. Permission for gaming on
the property required a two-part determination by the Department of
the Interior. Over the course of the next ten years the Department
examined the Spokane Tribe's request. The Department consulted an
expert to assess how an additional gaming facility would affect the
surrounding community including the Kalispel. Local officials
engaged with the Department to address concerns about the proposed
casino. The Department initiated the processes required under the
National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] to assess the
environmental impact. On June 15, 2015, the Department found in
favor of Spokane Tribe; Governor Jay Inslee concurred, marking the
conclusion of the approval process. In 2018, twelve years after the
Spokane Tribe first requested a two-part determination, the casino
opened for business with plans for further development into the
f
e. Ga
g
h b ed
a d
e
he Sec e a af e
consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local
officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines
that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the
best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be
de
e a
he
d g c
Gaming on Lands
Acquired after October 17, 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (1988).
Bureau of Indian Affa
[BIA] eg a
def e
d g
c
a
ca g e
e a d ea b Indian tribes located
within a twenty-five-mile radius of the site of the proposed gaming
e ab h e . 25 C.F.R. § 292.2. Though the Kalispel tribe likely
will suffer some detrimental impacts through loss of revenue, the
Department's determination that the new casino would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community was not arbitrary and
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capricious. After exhaustive review, the Secretary permissibly
weighed the benefits and detriments to the community concluding
that approval of the new casino would not be a detriment to the
surrounding community. The BIA spent ten years investigating the
application, seeking expert review, and working with local officials
and governments prior to issuing a decision. The BIA squarely
addressed Kalispel's concerns regarding lost profits at the Northern
Quest Casino. The Department's expert concluded that while the
Kalispel may suffer in the short term, eventually the profits would
rebound and both tribes would benefit. Id. Though this conclusion
differs from the Kalispel's own expert, reliance on the agency expert
was not arbitrary and capricious. In weighing detriment to
the community, the Department need not find that the casino has no
unmitigated negative impacts whatsoever, but instead the Secretary
must weigh the benefits and possible detrimental impacts as a
whole, e en if those benefits do not directly mitigate a specific cost
ed b he ca
. Stand Up for California! v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied
sub nom. Stand Up for California! v. Dep't of the Interior, 139 S. Ct.
786, 202 L. Ed. 2d 629 (2019). The Department met its statutory
obligations for consultation. The parties did not dispute that the
Secretary followed the applicable regulations regarding consultation.
Lastly, Kalispel argued that the Department violated the trust
relationship with the Kalispel tribe. The Federal Government owes a
duty of trust to all tribes; however, the scope of that duty must be
established by statute and that trust duty necessarily equally applies
to all tribes so the Government may not favor one tribe over another.
Lawrence v. Department of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir.
2008), see also Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1981).
In this situation, the Spokane and Kalispel's interests are not aligned.
Consequently, since the Department fulfilled its statutory duty to
examine the benefits and harm to all effected parties, the Department
did not violate the trust relationship. Upon review of the record, the
Court concludes that the Secretary's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Further, the Environmental Impact Statement
e a
e
e e . Fede a Defe da
C
M
f
Summary Judgment filed March 6, 2019, ECF No. 98, was granted.
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Jurisdiction, Federal
65. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Think
Finance, LLC
No. CV-17-127-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 3707911 (D. Mont. Aug. 03,
2018). P a ff C
e F a c a P ec
B ea ( CFPB )
commenced this action on November 15, 2017. CFPB filed an
Amended Complaint on March 28, 2018. The Amended Complaint
alleges four violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act.
Defe da
Th
F a ce, LLC ( Th
F a ce ) a d
S b d a e f ed he
a M
D iss on April 24, 2018.
Think Finance operates a lending business that extends credit,
services loans, and collects debt throughout the United States. CFPB
operates as an independent agency of the United States Government
created under the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010
(CFPA), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). The Amended Complaint alleged that
Think Finance, through the Tribal Lenders, collected loan payments
that customers did not owe, as the loans issued to those customers
were void ab initio due to violations of state law. CFPB alleged that
Think Finance used unfair and abusive practices to collect on these
void loans. Finally, CFPB alleged that Think Finance provided
substantial assistance to Tribal Lenders and other entities who, in
turn, committed deceptive, unfair, and abuse acts or practices by
demanding payment for and collecting void debts. Defendants
raised multiple grounds for dismissal, including: (1) that the
c e f he CFPB
c
a ; (2) ha he CFPB c a
are not permitted by the CFPA; (3) that the Complaint fails to, and
cannot, join indispensable parties; (4) that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Think SPV; (5) that the Complaint fails to state
cognizable claims under the CFPA; and (6) that certain claims
against the Subsidiaries are time-ba ed. Defe da
M
Dismiss is denied.
66. Chi e a C ee T ibe f R ck B
Re e a i
Montana v. U.S. Department of Interior

,

No. 15-71772, 900 F.3d 1152, 2018 WL 3978542 (9 th Cir. Aug 21,
2018). Tribe petitioned for review of order of Department of the
Interior (DOI) requiring Tribe to provide back pay and other relief
to former chairman of Tribe's governing committee after finding that
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chairman was removed from committee in retaliation for
whistleblowing. The court of appeals, Friedland, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) chairman performed services on behalf of Tribe, as required
for whistleblower protections of American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to apply to chairman; (2) DOI's order
did not infringe Tribe's sovereignty and powers of self-governance;
(3) Congress acted within its spending power in conditioning the
receipt by Tribe of ARRA funds on the waiver of the right to a
hearing with cross-examination before the Tribe could be found to
have violated ARRA's whistleblower protections; (4) six months
between chairman's disclosure of misuse of federal funds and his
removal from board was within time frame that could have led
reasonable person to conclude that chairman's whistleblowing was
a contributing factor in his removal; and (5) DOI's finding that
Tribe's removal of chairman was retaliatory was not arbitrary or
capricious. Petition denied.
67. Coriz v. Rodriguez
No. CIV 17-1258 JB/KBM, 347 F.Supp.3d 707, 2018 WL 4179460
(D. N.M. Aug. 31, 2018). Tribal inmate filed petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioner moved for immediate release. The District
Court, James O. Browning, J., held that: (1) petitioner was entitled
to protections provided in Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); (2)
petitioner's failure to exhaust his tribal court remedies precluded his
immediate release; and (3) petitioner failed to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances warranting his immediate release.
Motion denied.
68. Na aga e I dia

. Rh de I la d De

fT a

.

No. 17-1951, 903 F.3d 26, 2018 WL 4140270 (1st Cir. Aug. 30,
2018). Indian tribe brought action against federal and Rhode Island
agencies, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief regarding highway bridge reconstruction over
historic tribal land. The United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island, William E. Smith, Chief District Judge, 2017 WL
4011149, granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Tribe appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals,
Kayatta, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) National Historic Preservation
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Act (NHPA) did not expressly or implicitly waive federal
government's sovereign immunity, and (2) tribe's breach of contract
claim did not have any substantive basis in NHPA, and thus the
federal court lacked federal question jurisdiction over the breach of
contract claim against state agencies. Affirmed.
69. In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation
No. 17-md-2804, 327 F.Supp.3d 1064, 2018 WL 4203535 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 04, 2018). Cherokee tribe of American Indians brought
state court action against drug companies, alleging that defendants
allowed opioid diversion to occur in the Cherokee Nation via alleged
actions and omissions in violation of state law. Defendant company
removed case, which was then transferred into multidistrict
litigation (MDL) involving various plaintiffs, asserting that the
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of prescription opiate
drugs were liable for costs related to opioid public health crisis.
Band of Chippewa American Indians brought state court action
against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies asserting
state law claims, which the same defendant company removed, and
which was also transferred into MDL. Both tribes moved to remand,
defendant drug company moved to stay execution of any remand
order pending in Chippewa tribe's action, and Cherokee tribe moved
for oral argument pending in that case. The District Court, Dan
Aaron Polster, J., held that: (1) company was acting under direction
of federal officer, as required for removal under federal officer
removal statute; (2) causal nexus existed between company's action
under direction of federal officer and company's actions that gave
rose to tribes' allegations, as required for removal under federal
officer removal statute; and (3) company had colorable federal
defense, as required for removal under federal officer removal
statute. Motions denied.
70. Navajo Nation v. Wells Fargo & Co.
No. 17-CV-1219-JAP-SCY, 344 F.Supp.3d 1292, 2018 WL
4608245 (D. N.M. Sept. 25, 2018). Indian tribe filed suit on its own
behalf and as parens patriae on behalf of its members against
financial services company and national banking association that
was company's primary subsidiary, asserting claims under federal,
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state, and tribal law arising out of unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, and
illegal banking practices that allegedly harmed the tribe's sovereign
and quasi-sovereign interests. Company and association moved to
dismiss. The district court, James A. Parker, Senior District Judge,
held that: (1) consent order between Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) and association finding that association violated the
Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) operated as final
judgment on the merits of CFPA claims against the association, as
required for the order to bar under the res judicata doctrine tribe's
CFPA claims; (2) company was in privity with association, as
required for consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine
tribe's CFPA claims; (3) tribe's CFPA claims formed same cause of
action as claims resolved by consent order, as required for the
consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine the tribe's claims;
(4) tribe was in privity with CFPB for its CFPA claims, as required
for consent order to bar under the res judicata doctrine tribe's CFPA
claims; and (5) tribe did not allege injury to quasi-sovereign interest
that was sufficiently concrete to create actual controversy, and thus,
tribe lacked standing in its parens patriae capacity to maintain claims
for violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Motion granted.
71. Cheykaychi v. Geisen
No. 17-cv-01657-PAB, 2018 WL 6065492 (D. Colo. Nov. 19,
2018). Petitioner Harrison Cheykaychi filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner asserted that his tribal court convictions were obtained in
a
fh
gh
de he I d a C
R gh Ac ( ICRA ),
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Petitioner is a member of the Pueblo of Kewa
(f
e
a he P eb
f Sa
D
g ) ( T be ), a
federally recognized Indian Tribe in New Mexico. See Land
Acquisitions; Craig Tribal Association, Craig, Alaska, 82 Fed. Reg.
4915 (17, 2017). Petitioner alleged that he was arrested on
September 17, 2016, within the external boundaries of the
reservation, and charged with five separate offenses arising from his
exchange with the Tribal Police that morning. Petitioner alleged that
during a September 19, 2016 hearing, he was coerced by threats
from the Tribal Court to plead guilty to criminal trespass, assault on
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a ba ff ce , a d e
c h ea , e cha ge f he T be
promise that it would drop the charges of eluding, intoxication, and
disorderly conduct; and that he would receive a two and one-half
year sentence. Petitioner stated that he was not appointed counsel at
the hearing or afforded the opportunity to retain counsel. He was
taken into custody immediately after the sentencing and was
eventually transferred to the San Ignacio Detention Center in
Colorado. On May 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, asserting that the tribal court convictions were
obtained in violation of the ICRA. Petitioner asks the Court to deem
his tribal court conviction(s) invalid and to order Respondent to
release him from custody. On May 9, 2017, the District of New
Mexico issued an order dismissing the Kewa Pueblo based on
sovereign immunity. On August 22, 2017, the Court issued an order
directing Respondent Geisen to show cause why the § 1303 Petition
should not be granted. Docket No. 13. On September 21, 2017,
Respondent filed a Response in which he represented that, as the
mere physical custodian of Petitioner, he was unable to address the
e
f Pe
e ICRA c a
cha e g g he a d
fh
ba c
c
c
aff d a
e ef be
d Pe
e
release from custody. Respondent maintained that one or more tribal
officials are necessary parties to this action. On December 28, 2017,
a
he a e
, Pe
e a e ea ed f
custody, under terms of supervision, pending final disposition of the
Petition. On September 6, 2018, the Court issued an order directing
Respondent to contact the proper tribal official(s) to obtain their
position as to the merits of the ICRA. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S.at 58. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85
F.3d 874, 899-900 (2nd Cir. 1996) (concluding that tribal officials
are appropriate respondents to a § 1303 petition because they have
an interest in opposing the petition or granting the requested relief).
Respondent filed a status report on October 5, 2018, in which he
states that no one from the Santo Domingo Tribe would be entering
a a ea a ce c e g he c a
M . Che a ch Pe
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Cheykaychi remains subject to the
T be 2011 Ba h e O de , h ch a
cha e ged M .
Che a ch Pe
,
he h d
be e ea ed a he Pueblo,
or allowed to enter the Pueblo without the prior consent of the Tribe.
The Kewa Pueblo officials have informed Respondent that they do
not intend to contest the merits of the ICRA claims. Respondent
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indicates that he is without authority to address the merits of the
Pe
e c a . Beca e he 1303 Pe
ed, he
Petition was granted, and the tribal court convictions vacated.
72. Napoles v. Rogers
No. 17-16620, 743 Fed.Appx. 136, 2018 WL 6130279 (9th Cir.
Nov. 21, 2018). Plaintiffs-Appellants, seven members of the Bishop
Paiute Indian Tribe (c ec e
P a ff ), a fede a
recognized Indian tribe, a ea ed f
he d
c c
d
a
of their petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303,
he I d a C
R gh Ac ( ICRA ). The c
e ab hed
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, reviewed de novo, Jeffredo v.
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2010), and affirmed on any
ground supported by the record, Bd. of Trustees of the Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal. . M.M. S nd Cons r. Co., 37 F.3d
1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of rehearing
(Nov. 23, 1994). The court affirmed. The district court may not
exercise jurisdiction over a habeas petition arising under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 unless Plaintiffs have exhausted their tribal remedies. See
Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2016). This
e
e e
ed
he
c
f
g ba e fg e
e , a d h a fede a c
a
ha d
he
a
ha e ha ed a a a ab e ba e ed e . Jeffredo v.
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 at 918, (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiffs have not exhausted the available tribal
remedies. Plaintiffs argued they were detained within the meaning
of § 1303, because they have been evicted from property in which
they claim a possessory right, and because the tribal police issued
trespass citations against them. Plaintiffs conceded, both in their
motion for a stay before the district court and at oral argument,
however, that a tribal court decision considering the validity of the
trespass citations and their claim to the property is currently on
appeal before the recently reinstated tribal appellate court. Because
an appeal is pending in tribal court regarding the subject of
P a ff
1303 habea c a , P a ff ha e
e ha ed he r
tribal remedies and the district court did not have jurisdiction.
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918. The d
c c
de d
g he
petition was affirmed.
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73. United States v. Cleveland
No. CR 17-0965 JB, 2018 WL 4759889 (D.N.M. Nov. 21, 2018).
Defendant moved to dismiss indictment charging him under statute
punishing murder of certain federal officers or persons assisting
those officers, arising from killing of Navajo Nation Department of
Public Safety (NDPS) officer, alleging that NDPS officer was not
federal employee and that statute thus did not apply. The District
Court, James O. Browning, J., held that under the SelfDetermination Contract, which granted Navajo Nation authority to
enforce United States and Tribal Law, a Tribal officer without a
Special Law Enforcement Commission (SLEC) does not have
authority from the Secretary of the Interior to enforce federal laws,
and so is not a federal employee for purposes of the Indian Law
Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA), and thus statute punishing
murder of certain federal officers or persons assisting those officers
does not apply.
74.

Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners L.P.

No. 17-6088, 913 F.3d 959, 2019 WL 150627 (10th Cir. Jan. 10,
2019).Native American landowners brought trespass action against
owner and operator of network of natural gas transmission pipelines.
Granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and entered permanent
injunction requiring removal of pipeline. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Tymkovich, Chief Judge, held that: (1) consent of
minority of allottees did not form complete defense to remaining
allottees' federal trespass claim; (2) expiration of easement
permitting natural gas pipeline across allotted tribal land created
duty on part of pipeline's owner to remove pipeline; and (3) district
court was required to apply federal courts' traditional equity
jurisprudence, rather than simplified injunction rule from Oklahoma
law, in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
75. United States v. Denezpi
No. 18-cr-00267-REB-JMC, 2019 WL 295670 (D. Colo. Jan. 23,
2019). Mr. Denezpi maintained indictment in this case was
duplicative of his prior conviction by the Court of Indian Offenses
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of the Ute Mountain Ute Agency and thus constitutes double
jeopardy. On July 17, 2017, Mr. Denezpi and V.Y. traveled from
Teec N P , A
a,
M . De e
g f e d h e
Towaoc, Colorado. Once inside the house, Mr. Denezpi allegedly
barricaded the door and, by physical force and threats, forced V.Y.
to engage in a nonconsensual sexual act. Tribal authorities arrested
Mr. Denezpi the following day and charged him with one count of
assault and battery in violation of Title 6, Ute Mountain Ute Code,
Section 2; one count of making terroristic threats in violation of 25
C.F.R. § 11.402; and one count of false imprisonment in violation
of 25 C.F.R. § 11.404. On December 6, 2017, Mr. Denezpi entered
an Alford plea to the assault and battery count and was sentenced to
time served. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Mr.
Denezpi on one count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian Country.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1)-(2) (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2013).
Mr. Denezpi claimed this prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment
proscription against double jeopardy, because it was imposed not by
a tribal court but by a so-ca ed CFR c
, h ch, M . De e
argues, is an arm of the federal government and not a separate
sovereign. This argument misunderstands the source and nature of
he CFR c
a h
. The D b e Je a d C a e f he F f h
A e d e
de ha
e
ha ... be b ec f he a e
offence to be twice put i e a d f fe
b. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This motion implicated the dual sovereignty doctrine, an
e ce
he ge e a
c e f d b e e a d , he eb a
single act gives rise to distinct offenses and thus may subject a
person to successive prosecutions if it violates the laws of separate
e e g . Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867,
195 L. Ed. 2d 179 (U.S. 2016). See also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 88, 106 S. Ct. 433, 88 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1985) ( [W]he he a e
act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, it cannot be truly
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offe ce . )
(internal quotation marks omitted). The determination, whether two
e
e ae e a ae
eeg , d e
, a he e
eeg
e e
gge ,
he deg ee
h ch he
second entity is autonomous from the first or sets its own political
c
e. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. C at 1867. Instead, the
de e
a
e
he a
e
a a
,h
ca f c ed
question.... whether the prosecutorial powers of the two jurisdictions
397

have independent origins
or, said conversely, whether those
e de e f
he a e
ae
ce. (c g United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 55 L. Ed. 2d
303 (1978) ). The
iry is thus historical, not functional looking
at the deepest wellsprings, not the current exercise, of prosecutorial
a h
. The CFR c
e e c ea ed b he I d a De a e
Appropriations Act of 1888. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (U.S. 1978).
At first, all tribal courts were CFR courts. Along with a reduced BIA
role and increased authority delegated to the tribes, the IRA paved
the way for tribes to develop tribal courts and phase out the C.F.R.
c
. T da ,
be ha e e ab hed ba c
. See 25
C.F.R. § 11.104 (2019) (setting forth criteria for creation of tribal
court). Only seven CFR courts including those administered by the
Ute Mountain Ute Agency remain in operation. Although the CFR
c
ea
e cha ac e
c f a age c
f he fede a
g e
e , Tillett, 931 F.2d at 640, the logic of Wheeler and its
ge c ea
d ca e ha he CFR c
e
h
crimes occurring on tribal lands derives from their original
sovereignty, not from a grant of authority by the federal government.
When Indian courts were first established in the 19 th century, all
such courts were CFR courts. Therefore, the CFR court which
convicted Mr. Denezpi was exercising the sovereign powers of the
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and is not an arm of the federal government.
The charges brought in the present federal indictment thus are not
d
ca e f M . De e
c
c
ha de e de a d
sovereign court, and therefore his prosecution in this jurisdiction
does not violate the Fifth Amend e
D b e Je a d C a e.
M . De e
d
a he ef e de ed.
76. People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber
No. A144214, 32 Cal.App.5th 524, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 79 (9th Cir. Feb.
25, 2019). State brought enforcement action against owner of
tobacco smoke shop, who was a member of the Wiyot Band of
Indians, alleging violation of Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The
Superior Court, Humboldt County, No. DR110232, W. Bruce
Watson, J., granted summary adjudication to State and entered
permanent injunction. Owner appealed. The Court of Appeal,
Streeter, Acting P.J., held that: (1) exercise of state court jurisdiction
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over enforcement action did not infringe tribal sovereignty,
supporting application of default rule of existence of general
jurisdiction
a f ae c
, a d (2) S a e e f ce e
f
UCL was not preempted under doctrine of Indian preemption.
Affirmed.
77. Outliers Collective v. The Santa Ysabel Tribal
Development Corporation
No. 3:18-cv-00834-JAH-KSC, 2019 WL 1200232 (D.S.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2019). Defendants The Santa Ysabel Tribal Development
C
a
( SYTDC ) a d Da d Che e e
( Che e e )
(c ec e efe ed a T ba Defe da
)
ed d
plaintiff O e C ec e ( O c
P a ff ) C
a
pursuant to Fede a R e f C
P ced e ( Fed. R. C . P. )
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7). F he ea
e f h be
, Defe da
motions to dismiss was granted and the action was dismissed in its
entirety as to all Defendants with prejudice. This action arises out of
a La d U e Ag ee e ( Ag ee e ) e e ed
b a ba
chartered corporation, wholly owned by the Iipay Nation of Santa
Ysabel, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, and a Nonprofit Mutual
Benefit Corporation, organized under the laws of the State of
California. In pertinent part, the Agreement set forth the terms by
which Plaintiff would lease from SYTDC interior and exterior space
on tribal lands for the cultivation, harvesting, and processing of
medical cannabis pursuant to the Santa Ysabel Tribal Medicinal
Cannabis Enterprise Act. In early 2017, a dispute arose regarding
P a ff
b ga
a he T be Med ca Ca ab Ta .
Negotiations were unsuccessful and the Agreement was eventually
terminated. The Tribal Cannabis Regulatory Agency revoked
P a ff
ce e a d
h b ed P a ff a d
aff a e f
acce
g he fac
, a h gh
e f P a ff
e
remained. On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against
Tribal Defendants for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Conversion; (4) Unjust
Enrichment; and (5) Declaratory Relief. Tribal Defendants each
timely filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
P ced e ( Fed. R. C . P. ) 12(b)(1) a d 12(b)(7). The motions
have been fully briefed and are now before the Court. The
Complaint alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331. Plaintiff cites
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to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251
(1959) to support jurisdiction over a matter brought by a non-tribal
plaintiff against a tribal defendant when the cause of action arises
on Indian territory. The Complaint further alleges that SYTDC
agreed to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in favor of
Plaintiff. In response to Defendants' motions to dismiss 1, Plaintiff
contends that the subject matter of the agreement is sufficient to
invoke federal- e
dc
. F , P a ff
e a ce
Willams is misplaced. The Williams Court reversed the Arizona
S e eC
dec
aff
g dg e f
a ff, a
tribal member, in an action against a tribal member. The Court held
that state courts did not have authority to exercise jurisdiction over
civil suits against tribal members where the cause of action arose on
an Indian reservation. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. The Court
reasoned that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state would
de
e he a h
f he ba c
e Re e a
affa
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
he e e . The ac
f a h
b
ae c
e ec e
jurisdiction, however, cannot be interpreted to mean jurisdiction
automatically vests in District Courts. To be certain, the Supreme
Court notes in Williams that Congress has acknowledged the
authority of Indian governments over their reservations and the
Cou ha c
e
ec ed . Sec d, SYTCD
ed
waiver of sovereign immunity has no bearing on whether this Court
has subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot
be forfeited or waived. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S. Ct. 1235,
163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002) ); See also
Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 671
(8th Cir. 1986) (waiver of sovereign immunity by tribal housing
authority did not by fiat confer jurisdiction on the federal courts).
Even if the parties agreed, as Plaintiff contends, that a dispute arising
out of the Agreement may be submitted to any federal court of
competent jurisdiction within this District, this Court has an
de e de
b ga
de e
e he he
b ec -matter
dc
e
.
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78. United States v. Cooley
No. 17-30022, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2019). Motorist
charged with narcotics offenses, as result of evidence discovered by
tribal officer after seizing motorist on public highway that ran across
reservation, filed motion to suppress this evidence. The United
States District Court for the District of Montana, No. 1:16-cr-00042SPW-1, Susan P. Watters, J., 2017 WL 499896, granted motion, and
government appealed. The Court of Appeals, Berzon, Circuit Judge,
held that: (1) as matter of first impression, the exclusionary rule
applies in federal court prosecutions to evidence obtained in
violation, not of the Fourth Amendment itself, but of the Indian Civil
Rights Act's (ICRAs) Fourth Amendment counterpart, and (2) tribal
officer's extra-jurisdictional acts violated the ICRAs Fourth
Amendment counterpart and required suppression of evidence.
Affirmed.
79. United States v. Aysheh
No. 1:17-cr-00370-JCH, 2019 WL 1877178 (D.N.M. Apr. 26,
2019). M . I ad Ed A heh a d h h ee b he
e e cha ged
in an 18- age d c e
h c
g
e I d a -s e
e e
a
f he I d a A a d C af Ac ( IACA ), 18
U.S.C. § 1159. That statute criminalizes offering or selling a good
a a e ha fa e
gge
... a I d a
d c . 18
U.S.C. § 1159(a). According to the indictment, in 2014, Mr.
A heh b he I ad e ab hed a b
e
he Ph
e
ca ed I ad Je e
a fac e I d a -style jewelry using
F
ab . I ad
ed he e e IJ
he e e , b
a country of origin stamp. After importing the jewelry into the
United States, the other Aysheh brothers supposedly sold it to
retailers and customers throughout the country, including New
Mexico, misrepresenting it as Indian made. The indictment accused
the Defendants of criminal misrepresentation of Indian produced
goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1159. It alleged that the
Defendants conspiring to knowingly display and offer for sale for $
1,000 and more, jewelry manufactured in the Philippines, in a
manner that suggested the jewelry was Indian produced ... when in
truth and in fact, ... the good was not Indian produced ... in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1159. As noted earlier, 18 U.S.C. § 1159 criminalizes
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ffe g
e gag d
a a e ha fa e
gge
...
a I da
d c . 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a). In his motion to dismiss,
Mr. Aysheh explains that the criminal penalty provision of § 1159
has been challenged for vagueness and overbreadth under the First
Amendment. Mr. Aysheh especially relies on a federal district
c
e a
a
United States v. Pourhassan, 148 F. Supp. 2d
1185 (D. Utah 2001) f he he he h a e I d a
d ced a d
fa e
gge
de § 1159 were unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. The Pourhassan court held that, e e a
ga
c
vagueness test, he h a e
I da
d ced a d fa e
gge
ee
c
a
ag e a d c e e
,
de ed he defe da
d
he
dc e .
Defe da
O
ed M
D
a C
he
Indictment denied.
80. Taguma v. Benton
No. 19-cv-199-bbc, 2019 WL 1877171 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 2019).
In this civil action for monetary relief, plaintiff Lori Taguma, a
member of the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe, contended that fellow
members of the tribe, defendants Edward and Danielle Benton,
violated her rights by threatening her and her family members with
violence, shooting at her and her family members, using their
influence within the tribe to encourage others to terminate her job
a d d c
e he
he
B ea
f I d a Affa
ea e,
da ag g he a d he fa
eh c e a d he
e
a d
otherwise harassing her. After reviewing the complaint, the court
concluded that plaintiff may not proceed on any claim because her
complaint does not involve any federal claim over which this court
ha
dc
. P a ff c a
a ee
e a e o matters
involving state tort or criminal law, and therefore, they must be
brought in state court. Bresette v. Buffalo-Reyes, No. 06-C-338-C,
2006 WL 3017256, at *1 (W.D. W . A g. 7, 2006) ( Fede a
jurisdiction is not present just because the alleged [violation of state
a ] cc ed
a I da e e a
. ). P a ff d d
a ege
any facts that suggest that defendants were public officials or acting
de he c
f a e a . The
de -color-of-state-law element
of § 1983 e c de f
each e e
ivate conduct, no matter
h d c
a
gf . Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky et
al., 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982)).
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Although plaintiff has made it clear that defendants have strong ties
to members of the tribal council and are powerful within the
c
, fede a c
ha e f
d ha [a] § 1983 action is
a a ab e f
e
a eg g de
a
fc
a gh
de c
f ba a . Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174
(10th Cir. 2006) (quoting R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous.
Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983)). Similarly, plaintiff may
not sue defendants as tribal actors under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.
Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), which provides relief for alleged
constitutional violations by federal officials. Evans v. Little Bird,
656 F. Supp. 872, 874 (D. Mont. 1987), aff'd in part, Evans v.
McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, this case
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff must
bring her claims in state court or in the tribal court that has
jurisdiction over the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe.
81. United States v. Santistevan
No. 3:19-CR-30017-RAL, 2019 WL 1915791 (D.S.D. Apr. 30,
2019). The Government charged Aaron Santistevan (Santistevan)
with possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. Santistevan
moved to suppress from use at trial the evidence seized from him
and the vehicle he was driving on December 28, 2018, on the basis
that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Magistrate Judge Mark A. Moreno held a suppression hearing,
during which he received seven exhibits and heard testimony from
five Rosebud Sioux Tribe Law Enforcement officers. The tribal
ff ce de e
f Sa
e a
a ea ab e de he F
h
Amendment. Officers conducted a traffic stop for speeding and
discovered Santistevan was driving
h a
e ded d e
license. When Officer Antman learned that Santistevan was a nonI d a , he c ac ed he T dd C
She ff Off ce
ed a e .
Before Officer Antman was able to secure Santistevan, Santistevan
led officers on a high-speed chase. The officers had probable cause
ea ch he eh c e ba ed Off ce A
a
be a
d
g
he aff c
, Sa
e a
f gh , a d he f e
he bac ea f
the vehicle that appeared to destroy evidence. Santistevan argues,
a e de ce obtained following the issuance of the search warrant
must be suppressed as the illegal fruit of the unreasonable stop and
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ea ch f he ca
Dece be 28, 2018. Beca e h C
f
d
that the stop and search were reasonable and constitutional, there is
ega f
e . Sa
e a M
S
e de ed.
82. Wolf v. Alutiiq Education and Training, LLC
No. 2:19-cv-41-GMB, 2019 WL 1966642 (M.D. Ala. May 02,
2019). Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Altuiiq Education &
Ta
g, LLC ( AET ). P a ff M
ha W f b gh c a
against AET denominated as race discrimination, gender
discrimination, mental suffering, and emotional distress. After
careful consideration of the parties' submissions and the applicable
law, the Motion to Dismiss was granted, but Wolf was allowed to
re-plead the claims over which this court had subject-matter
jurisdiction. Wolf is a black woman who began her employment
with AET's predecessor, Career Education Services. AET took over
the contract and asked Wolf to reapply for her position. AET did not
retain Wolf, and she alleged that Adam Bennett, a white man, was
retained over her. AET is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alutiiq,
which is a wholly-owned direct subsidiary of Afognak Native
Corporation, which was formed in 1977 under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601. AET argues that Counts
I and II must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because these claims are asserted pursuant to Title VII, which does
not apply to AET, an Alaskan Native Corporation. Pursuant to 43
U.S.C. § 1626(g), [f]or the purposes of implementation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.], a Native
Corporation and corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, or
affiliates in which the Native Corporation owns not less than 25 per
centum of the equity shall be within the class of entities excluded
f
he def
f e
e b 701(b)(1) f Public Law 88352 (78 Stat. 253), as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1)], or
successor statutes. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g). If Title VII does not apply,
the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.
See Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 578 F. Appx. 801, 802 (11th
Cir. 2014). The court found that AET was not subject to suit under
Title VII, and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Wolf's gender and race claims asserted pursuant to Title VII in
Counts I and II. See Jones v. Chugach Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11cv-1217-J-34MCR, 2012 WL 472722, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10,
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2012), adopted, 2012 WL 473503 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2012). Wolf
argued that she can proceed on race discrimination claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. AET did not dispute that this court had subjectmatter jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race claims. See also
Jones, 2012 WL 472722, at *1 ( Defe da
a e e
f
employer liability under Title VII, as Defendant is an Alaskan
Native Corporation ... however ... several cases have held that ANCs
may be sued for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ). AET a g ed,
however, that the § 1981 claim was due to be dismissed because
Wolf has not sufficiently alleged a § 1981 race claim in Count I.
AET correctly points out that Count I expressly invokes the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and not 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because the Amended
Complaint expressly refers to Title VII within the paragraphs of
Count I but not to § 1981, the court concluded that the claim in
Count I was due to be dismissed, but the court allowed Wolf an
additional opportunity to plead her race discrimination claim
pursuant to § 1981.
83. United States v. Washington
No. C70-9213RSMSUB-PROCEEDING NO. 17-03, 2019 WL
1989645 (W.D. Wash. May 06, 2019). This matter came before the
C
he S ag a h T be f I d a ( S ag a h )
motion seeking an order of the court to permit it to take a
perpetuation deposition of its expert witness, Doctor C. Jill Grady,
d e
he e e
age a d he
f f he memory loss. Finding
the Motion moot, the court denied the motion. Dr. Grady is a
Cultural Anthropologist and an expert in the field of Native
American Anthropology. She has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in
A h
g , a d a Ma e deg ee a d Ph.D.
S c ocultural
Anthropology from the University of Washington. Stillaguamish
first retained Dr. Grady to conduct research related to the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 2002.
Beginning in 2007, Dr. Grady began assembling evidence of
St ag a h
a e f h g ea
gh
the capacity of an
expert witness and researcher. In order to provide her expert
opinions, Dr. Grady developed a comprehensive understanding of
he e h h
f he S ag a h
e e a
e a ha f
other neighboring tribes and non-Indian settlers in the Puget Sound
and their interactions with territorial, state and federal government.
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D . G ad
e e
e
he
edge f he a a
ecosystem that supports Stillaguamish fishing, hunting and
gathering. Dr. Grady is about to turn seventy-seven years old. Dr.
Grady currently experiences certain challenges typically associated
with her age, some of which impact her memory recall. While Dr.
G ad
ca ac
e a
fa
d da , he has expressed
uncertainty regarding her memory, physical health and stamina six
months from now, much less over more than a year from now when
her testimony may be required. The Swinomish Indian Tribal
C
( S
h )
e S ag a h motion partly
on the basis that the procedural posture of this case has changed
while this motion was pending before the Court. Swinomish argued
that case deadlines have been reset, that the case and discovery will
proceed in the normal course, and that the motion is therefore moot.
Stillaguamish recognizes that discovery may now proceed but feels
that the concerns initially leading it to file its motion persists. The
court agreed that its prior order moots the Stillaguamish motion.
Stillaguamish no longer needs leave from the court to proceed with
discovery under Rule 26(d)(1). Accordingly, having reviewed the
motion and the remainder of the record, the court found and ordered
that Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians' Motion is denied as moot.
84. United States v. Smith
No. 17-30248, 925 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. May 28, 2019). Defendant
Indian member of Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs was
convicted in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon, Anna J. Brown, J., of fleeing or attempting to elude a police
officer under Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) and Indian Country
Crimes Act (ICCA). The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Callahan, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) ACA applied to Indian
country; (2) Indian-on-Indian exception in ICCA did not preclude
application of ACA to all victimless crimes, and certainly not to
offense of fleeing and eluding police; and (3) federal prosecution of
defendant was not unlawful intrusion into tribal sovereignty. The
case was affirmed.
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85. Jim v. Shiprock Associated Schools, Inc.
No. CIV 17-1114 RB/JHR, 2019 WL 2285918 (D.N.M. May 29,
2019). Th
a e ca e bef e he C
Defe da
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court found the
motion should be granted and this case dismissed. Plaintiff Kim R.
Jim is a former employee of defendant Shiprock Associated
Schools, Inc. (SASI). SASI was incorporated as a nonprofit
corporation under the laws of New Mexico in 1979 and is registered
to conduct business within the Navajo Nation. At the time of the
allegations in the complaint, SASI was (and still is) authorized by
the Navajo Nation Board of Education to operate Navajo
community schools on the Navajo reservation in Shiprock, New
Mexico, pursuant to the Navajo Nation Code, see 10 N.N.C. § 201,
and the Tribally Controlled Schools Act (TCSA), 25 U.S.C. § 2501.
SASI is the grantee of Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) funds
received for operation of educational programs on the Navajo
Nation for the benefit of Indian students. Ms. Jim alleged that SASI
discriminated against her and terminated her because of her
pregnancy and maternity leave. She brought suit for pregnancy
discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). For the
C
ha e b ec a e
dc
e M . J
ca ,
SASI must be a covered employer under both statutes. SASI
c e d ha
a
ba
ga a
e e
ed f
he
definition of an employer under both Title VII and the ADA and
disagrees that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
a
. Re
g
he Te h C c
ea
g
Dille, the
Giedosh court found that the Little Wound School Board, Inc. (the
B a d) a f ed a a I d a
be f
e f T e VII a d
the ADA. See 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 59. The Giedosh court found
the following factors significant: (1) the Board was a nonprofit
corporation incorporated under state law, id. at 1054; (2) he
B ad
e be h [ a ] c
ed
e
f e be
f he
Og a a S
T be[,] a d b a d e be
e e de c a ca e ec ed
[]
f he
he T be
c
f c
a c a
[,] id. at 1055 (citations omitted); (3) the school was
required to adhere to tribal resolutions and ordinances and was
tribally chartered, meaning the Tribe had the authority to e
a
any time, for good reason, and assume the control and operation of
407

he ch [,] d. (c a
ed); (4) [ ] e Dille, the purpose
of establishing the organization [was] to further the development, in
this case the educational development, of the children living in
Indian country, and to involve the Indian community in the
education of the Indian children[,] id. at 1057; (5) [ ]he B a d
made up of members of the Tribe, and those members are
de c a ca
e ec ed[,] d.; a d (6) [ ]he ch , h ch
operated by the Board, services tribally enrolled members in the
Kyle community and the surrounding area of the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation. Id. The record before the Court supports the same
conclusion in this case.
86. People ex rel. Becerra v. Native Wholesale Supply Co.
No. C084031, 37 Cal.App.5th 73, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 2, 2019). Attorney General brought action against Indianchartered corporation headquartered on out-of-state reservation for
sale of contraband cigarettes to the general public. The Superior
Court, Sacramento County, No. 34200800014593CUCLGDS,
David I. Brown, J., granted summary judgment in Attorney
General's favor. The corporation appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Robie, J., held that: (1) corporation was subject to personal
jurisdiction; (2) corporation was considered a non-Indian for
purposes of the Indian Commerce Clause analysis; (3)
Indian Commerce Clause did not preempt Directory Statute or the
California Cigarette Fire Safety and Firefighter Protection Act; and
(4) Directory Statute did not violate the equal protection clause.
Affirmed.
87. Cedar Band of Paiutes v. U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development
No. 4:19-cv-30-DN-PK, 2019 WL 3305919 (D. Utah July 23, 2019).
O A
22, 2019, a ff Ceda Ba d f Pa e ( he Ceda
Ba d ), Ceda Ba d C
a
( CBC ), a d CBC M gage
Age c
( CBCMA ) (c ec e ,
P a ff ) f ed a
complaint against defendants United States Department of Housing
a d U ba De e
e ( HUD ). The ce a a
f a ff
complaint was to have the Mortgagee Letter 19-06 ( he 2019
M gagee Le e ) that defendants issued on April 18, 2019, set
408

a de de he Ad
a e P ced e Ac ( APA ). O he
same day plaintiffs filed their complaint, plaintiffs also filed the
Motion For Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
I
c
( M
). CBCMA
eg e ed a a G vernmental
Mortgagee with HUD. Through its program, the Chenoa Fund,
CBCMA
de d
a e a
a ce ( DPA ) f
gage
loans insured by the FHA that are originated by other lenders, as
well as a small number of conventional loans. The FHA insures the
vast majority of loans for which CBCMA provides DPA. CBCMA
then purchases the first mortgages and sells them on a secondary
market. Provisions related to FHA insurance, including provisions
e a ed
he
e
ed
e e ( MRI ) f FHA
insured loans, are codified at 12 U.S.C § 1709. In 2007, HUD
b hed a f a
e ( he 2007 R e ) ha
h b ed e e
f
d g DPA
he
h e a e a ac
h gh
a a a ge e
he e a -called charitable organization provides
a so-called gift to a homebuyer from funds that it receives, directly
d ec , f
he e e . The 2007 Rule exempted
governmental entities from this prohibition. The rule expressly
ec f ed ha DPA
e
ed ... f
... g e
e . The 2007
R e a
ec f ca
ded ha a ba g e
e ...
a
e
be
ce f d
a e a
a ce. C g e e ac ed
changes to 12 U.S.C § 1709, formally incorporating some of the
guidance of the 2007 Rule into statute. Specifically, 12 U.S.C. §
1709 was amended to provide that the MRI for a FHA insured loan
could not consist, in whole or in part, of funds provided by any of
the following parties before, during, or after closing of the property
sale: i) The seller or any other person or entity that financially
benefits from the transaction; and ii) Any third party or entity that is
reimbursed, directly or indirectly, by any of the parties described in
clause i). Notably, the 2008 amendments did not address the
provision of DPA towards FHA insured loans by governmental
entities. In 2012, HUD addressed that issue in an interpretive rule
b hed
he Fede a Reg e ( he 2012 R e ). According to
he 2012 R e,
a HUD
e ea
ha 12 U.S.C. §
1709 d d
h b FHA f m insuring mortgages originated as
part of the homeownership programs of Federal, State, or local
governments or their agencies or instrumentalities when such
agencies or instrumentalities also directly provide funds toward the
required minimum cash invest e . The a h
g f
he
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statute 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(9) through the 2012 Interpretive
Rule and HUD Handbook and finally to the 2019 Mortgagee Letter
does not clearly show how Defendants arrived at its new interpretive
jurisdictional limitations. Furthermore, apart from the 2019
Mortgagee Letter, it does not appear that Defendants would readily
have an adequate basis to enforce jurisdictional limitations on
governmental entities providing DPA. Instead, the 2019 Mortgagee
Letter imposes unprecedented, new duties on mortgagees to obtain
letters showing that the governmental entity is providing DPA to
someone within its own jurisdictional boundaries (and in the case
of tribes, to a tribal member) or the DPA will be used toward an
FHA insured loan to purchase property within that governmental
e
dc
. The 2019 M gagee Le e
e eg a e
in character than interpretive because it articulates new duties that
were immediately imposed on mortgagees for the first time.
The ef e, HUD action in the 2019 Mortgagee Letter should likely
have been preceded by notice and comment. Motion was granted.
Defendants were enjoined from any enforcement of Mortgagee
Letter 19-06 until further order of this court. Specifically,
Defendants shall not deny insurance nor cause insurance to be
denied based on noncompliance with Mortgagee Letter 19-06 and
shall provide public notice that the effective date of Mortgagee
Letter 19-06 was suspended until after a final determination on the
merits of the case.
88. Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr
Nos. 18-1824, 18-1856, 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. Aug 5, 2019). Oil
and gas company brought declaratory judgment action against four
members of an Indian tribe and the Chief Judge of a tribal court,
seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a
breach of contract action filed by the four individual defendants
which sought to recover royalties pursuant to an oil and gas mining
lease. Similarly, a resources company which was a defendant in the
same tribal court lawsuit also filed a declaratory judgment action
against the same defendants, as well as against the Court
Clerk/Consultant of the tribal court. Both federal court actions were
stayed pending resolution of the tribal court action, but after tribal
supreme court ruled that the tribal district court had jurisdiction over
the matter, the federal plaintiffs filed motions for preliminary
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injunction preventing defendants from proceeding further with the
underlying tribal court action. The Tribal court judge and clerk
moved to dismiss. Thereafter, the first two federal lawsuits were
consolidated, and the United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota, Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, 303 F.Supp.3d 964,
issued a preliminary injunction. Tribal court officials appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Grasz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) oil and gas
companies claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against tribal
court officials were not barred by tribal sovereign immunity; (2) oil
and gas companies properly exhausted their tribal court remedies
before filing suit in federal court; and (3) factors weighed in favor
of issuance of a preliminary injunction against any tribal court
exercise of jurisdiction in the case. The case was affirmed.
89. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. McMahon
No. 17-56791, 934 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Aug 19, 2019). An action
was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe and four of its enrolled members alleging violations of various
federal statutory and constitutional rights in connection with
citations by San Bernardino County She ff Deputies of four Tribe
members for violating California regulatory traffic laws within the
Reservation. The Court analyzed the history and establishment of
the Chemehuevi Reservation and concluded that the area where the
Tribe members were cited was within the boundaries of the
Reservation and hence was I d a c
under 18 U.S.C. §
1151(a). Accordingly, the court held that San Bernadino County did
not have jurisdiction to enforce California regulatory traffic laws
within that area. The Court held that the individual plaintiffs, but not
the Tribe, could challenge the citations under § 1983. The Court held
that because § 1983 was designed to secure private rights against
government encroachment, tribal members could use it to vindicate
their individual rights, but not the be communal rights. The
Court therefore vacated the district c
judgment dismissing the
complaint as to the individuals but affirmed the judgment as to the
Tribe.
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Religious Freedom
90. Priest v. Holbrook
No. 18-35018, 2018 WL 5733098, 741 Fed.Appx. 510 (9th Cir. Oct.
31, 2018). David R. Priest, a Washington State prisoner and member
f he C
eI da
be, a ea ed
ef
he d
c c
judgment dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Re g
La d U e a d I
a ed Pe
Ac ( RLUIPA )
alleging that defendan c f ca
f h g de eag e fea he
violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of his Native
American religion and his rights under RLUIPA. The court reversed
a d e a ded. The d
c c
d
ed P e
f ee e e c e
claim on the ground that Priest failed to allege a substantial burden
to the practice of his religion. However, Priest alleged that the prison
confiscated his sacred golden eagle feathers, he was unable to secure
any additional feathers while incarcerated, and as a result, he was
unable to participate in Native American religious ceremonies in
accordance with his religious beliefs. Liberally construed, these
a ega
ee
ff c e
a a
de g [defe da ] f e
a a
e . Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.
2012); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015)
(elements of a free exercise claim). Furthermore, contrary to the
d
c c
h d g, P e
f ee e e c e c a
a
ba ed
even if state remedies exist for the loss of property. See Wood v.
Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9 h C . 1988) ( [T]he e e ce
of state remedies is irrelevant ... where the plaintiff alleges a
a
fa b a
e gh
de ... he B
f R gh .... ). The
court reversed and remanded P e
f ee e e c e c a f f he
proceedings consistent with this disposition. The district court
d
ed P e
RLUIPA c a
he g
d ha
e
damages are not available as a remedy for RLUIPA violations.
However, in addition to monetary relief, plaintiff also requested
ch he e ef a
a a ea a ff e
ed . Beca e
the relief Priest seeks is not limited to monetary relief, the court
e e ed d
a fP e
RLUIPA c a a d e a ded f he
district court to consider the merits of this claim in the first instance.
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91. Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited
Partnership
No. CV-18-0057-PR, 245 Ariz. 397, 430 P.3d 362 (S.Ct. Ariz. Nov.
29, 2018). Hopi Tribe brought an action against Flagstaff for public
nuisance after the city moved forward with sale to ski resort of
reclaimed wastewater for artificial snowmaking on public land. City
filed a third-party indemnification claim against the resort. The
Superior Court, Coconino County, No. CV2011-00701, Mark R.
Moran, J., dismissed action against resort. The Tribe appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 244 Ariz. 259, 418 P.3d 1032, reversed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. A petition for review was granted.
The Supreme Court, Pelander, J., held that Tribe's alleged injury
from environmental damage to land, which had religious and
cultural significance to Tribe, was different in degree but not in kind
or quality suffered by the public, and thus Tribe did not sufficiently
allege the required special injury to maintain claim. The Court of
Appeals' opinion vacated and remanded; the trial court's judgment
affirmed.
Sovereign Immunity
92. Romero v. Wounded Knee, LLC
No. 16-5024-JLV, 2018 WL 4279446 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2018).
Plaintiff Leslie Romero initiated this action against defendant
Wounded Knee LLC. Plaintiff claims she was sexually assaulted
and harassed while employed by defendants. She alleges torts and
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the South
Dakota Human Relations Act of 1972. Plaintiff is an enrolled
e be f he Og a a S
T be ( T be ) a d he c de
alleged in the complaint occurred within the exterior boundaries of
the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation at Manderson, South Dakota.
Defe da
fa ed
f e a
e
a ff c
a ,
he
clerk entered default against them. Plaintiff filed a motion for
default judgment, and the court entered an order finding she was
entitled to default judgment. The court later acknowledged it will
e e f a dg e
a ff fa
he c
a e
findings regarding the specific claims in the complaint on which it
would enter judgment and the appropriate amount of damages
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supported by evidence. To prevent an adverse final judgment,
WKCDC raised the issues of tribal court exhaustion and tribal
sovereign immunity in a motion to set aside default judgment.
WKCDC indicates that nearly two decades ago the Oglala Oyata
W a ca ( OOW ) a e ab hed
c d a
h he
federal government. The OOW was a geographic designation
covering primarily Pine Ridge. An emphasis of the OOW was
facilitating infrastructure development funds from the federal
g e
e
P e R dge. The T be C
c ea ed
community governments called Districts that represent local
interests, and each District could choose whether to participate in
the OOW. WKCDC claims there was an OOW Board with a
member who was also a member of an entity WKCDC refers to as
the Wounded Knee District Task Force. According to WKCDC,
once the OOW expired, the District Task Force became WKCDC
a d he D
c Ta F ce a e a d
e
e e a fe ed
WKCDC. WKCDC alleges its articles of incorporation demonstrate
aff a
h he T be a d WKCDC tribal sovereign
immunity. The court ordered that the case was stayed pending tribal
court exhaustion and a further order from the court. The court further
ordered that WKCDC, as the party asserting there is tribal court
jurisdiction and tribal court exhaustion must occur, must file within
thirty (30) days of the date of this order a declaratory judgment
action in the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court naming the plaintiff Leslie
Romero to address to that court at least the issues of tribal court
jurisdiction and WKCDC
ba
eeg
defe e. I
the tribal court case, Ms. Romero may contest tribal court
dc
a d a e he a g e
ega d g WKCDC
ba
sovereign immunity without waiving her assertion in this court that
there is no tribal court jurisdiction.
93. JW Gaming Development, LLC v. James
No. 3:18-cv-02669-WHO, 2018 WL 4853222 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
2018). F
2008
2011, P a ff JW Ga
g, LLC ( JW
Ga
g )
e ed $5,380,000
he P
e e P
Na
casino project, believing that it was matching an investment in the
same amount from the Canales Gr
, LLC ( he Ca a e G
).
JW Gaming now alleges that leaders and members of both
P
e eP
Na
( he T be ) a d he Ca a e G
ee
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part of a years-long scheme to fraudulently induce its investment
and to conceal that fraud. It brings suit alleging breach of contract,
fraud, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
O ga a
Ac ( RICO ), 18 U.S.C.
1961 68. Motion to
dismiss brought by the Tribal Defendants. Because the Tribal
Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity and the other
claims are properly pleaded, the motions were denied. From
December 2011 to April 2012, JW Gaming, tribal leadership, and
the Canales Group engaged in negotiations, mostly via email,
regarding the future of the Casino Project. In a promissory note
da ed J
10, 2012 ( he N e ), The T be a d/ he Ga
g
A h
ed
e a JW Ga
g
$5,380,000.00
investment plus interest. Tribal Defendants Leona Williams and
Angela James signed the note, which included a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity. The Tribal Defendants and the Canales Group
e e e ed ha he
eee e g
a e aae
e ( he 2012
Ca a e
e ) ega d g he Ca a e
e e . Af e ea
g
about the alleged fraud, JW Gaming brought suit in Mendocino
County Superior Court on March 1, 2018. Defendants removed it to
federal court on May 7, 2018. The Tribal Defendants argue that JW
Ga
g
a
f c e
c
ac a ec e f a eged
breach of the Note. Because the Tribe, not its representatives, was
party to the contract, it is the real party in interest. JW Gaming
counters that it is suing the tribal employees in their individual
capacities for their own fraudulent conduct and that it asserts no
claims of vicarious liability. The Supreme Court allowed a personal
capacity suit against a tribal employee who was acting within the
scope of his employment. The court reasoned a judgment would not
e a e aga
he [ ] be b
a
a
aga
[ he
employee] to recover for h e
a ac
. Lewis v. Clarke, 137
S. Ct. 1285, 1291, 197 L. Ed. 2d 631 (2017). The Court rejected the
be a g e ha he de
f ca
ca e
he e
e
contract should permit the application of sovereign immunity.
I ead, [ ]he critical inquiry [was] who may be legally bound by
he c
ad e e dg e ,
h [
d]
ae
c
he ab. A
g Lewis to the facts alleged here, this suit was
against the Tribal Defendants in their individual capacities and the
Tribe was not the real party in interest. JW Gaming alleged that the
individuals themselves engaged in fraud and that it suffered
damages as a result. In the event of an adverse judgment, the
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individual defendants, not the Tribe, were bound. See Lewis, 137 S.
Ct. at 1192 93.
94. Wil

.H

T

i g

No. 16-35320, 906 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018). Truck owner
brought action against tribal police officer and towing company
alleging that towing company converted his truck by impounding it
on reservation at state patrol's direction, towing it off of reservation,
and releasing it to tribal police officer pursuant to tribal court order
of forfeiture. The United States substituted for officer. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 2016
WL 1221655, entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, and
owner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Pregerson, District Judge,
sitting by designation, held that: (1) owner was required to exhaust
his remedies before tribal court before filing suit against company
in federal court, and (2) officer was entitled under the Westfall Act
to immunity from the truck owner's conversion claim. Affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded.
95. Wilhite v. Awe Kualawaache Care Center
No. CV 18-80-BLG-SPW, 2018 WL 5255181 (D. Mont. Oct. 22,
2018). In the late 1990s, the Crow Tribe (Tribe) determined that a
significant number of its tribal members were in need of an onreservation nursing facility. On April 11, 1998, by tribal resolution,
the Tribe established the Awe Kualawaache Care Center (Care
Center), a forty bed, long-term nursing facility located in Crow
Agency, Montana. The Care Center provides twenty-four-hour
medical services exclusively to members of the Crow and Northern
Cheyenne Tribes. The resolution stated the Care Center was an
e a
f he C
T be, c ea ed
ee he ed ca
needs of its members. Pursuant to tribal law, the Care Center gives
hiring preference to Indians living in or near the reservation.
Attached to the resolution was an ordinance that governed operation
f he Ca e Ce e . The
d a ce
a ed ha , [a] a
instrumentality of the Tribe, the Care Center, its officers,
employees, agents and attorneys shall be clothed by federal and
tribal law with all the privileges and immunities of the Tribe ...
including sovereign immunity from suit in any state, federal, or
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ba c
. The d a ce f her stated sovereign immunity may
only be waived in accordance with the specific procedure provided
in the ordinance. The Care Center operates under what is known as
a 638 contract, which is a contract between a tribe and the federal
government that provides for tribal administration of federal
programs. Demontiney v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Interior,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 255 F.3d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2001).
Tammy Wilhite was employed as a registered nurse at the Care
Center. One day, a patient at the Care Center informed Wilhite that
he had been molested during transport. Wilhite reported the
conversation to her supervisor. When nothing was done, Wilhite
reported the incident to law enforcement. Allegedly, Wilhite was
subsequently harassed by her supervisor and terminated from
e
e b he Ca e Ce e b a d f d ec
. W h e f ed
suit in federal district court, alleging solely that she was entitled to
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., (RICO). Wilhite named the Care
Center and its board and administrator as defendants. The
individually named defendants are all members of the Tribe. Wilhite
d e
d
e he be
eeg
e e d
he Ca e
Center. Instead, Wilhite argues (A) the Defendants may not assert
sovereign immunity because the Court already determined it has
subject matter jurisdiction, (B) an insurance company is precluded
de 25 U.S.C. 5321(c)(3) f
a e g he T be
eeg
immunity as a defense, and (C) the individual defendants are not
protected under sovereign immunity. Here, the Court determined it
had subject matter jurisdiction over civil RICO claims in its prior
de de
g he Defe da
d
ha ba . I d d
not address sovereign immunity because the issue was not raised at
that time. However, the Defendants notified Wilhite that they would
raise a sovereign immunity defense in the event the Court denied
their initial motion to dismiss. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(c)(1) obligates the
United States to obtain or provide liability insurance for tribes
operating under a 638 contract. Such insurance policies must
c a a
ha he
a ce ca e ha
a ea
gh
it may have to raise as a defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian
be f
. 25 U.S.C.
5321(c)(3). W h e a e ed
5321(c)(3) operated as a waiver of sovereign immunity because she
sought nothing more than policy limits, and thus it was really the
insurance company that was asserting sovereign immunity, not the
417

Defendants. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in Evans
v. McKay, where it held § 5321(c)(3) exclusively applies to insurers,
be , a d he ef e d d
e e a a a e f he be
sovereign immunity. 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989). Wilhite argued
Evans is distinguishable because it dealt with a § 1983 claim rather
than a civil RICO claim. However, Wilhite did not articulate how or
why the type of claim changes the meaning of the statute. The Court
rejected W h e a g e a
ec ded
de Evans. If the
plaintiff sought to recover from the tribe, tribal sovereign immunity
would extend to tribal officials and tribal employees who act in their
official capacity and within the scope of their authority. Cook v. AVI
Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2008). Cook plainly
ba ed W h e c a aga
he d d a defe da beca e he
acts complained of consist of official action taken by the Care
Ce e b a d a d ad
a a d W h e e ressly sought to
recover from the tribe. Wilhite argued Cook did not apply because
he
gh ec e f
he be
a ce
c ,
ba
assets. Wilhite cited no authority for the proposition that she may
circumvent sovereign immunity by limiting her claim to policy
limits and the Court was aware of none. Carried to its conclusion,
the argument would mean tribes effectively waive their sovereign
immunity by purchasing insurance, so long as a claim was limited
to policy limits. Such a conclusion is at odds with Supreme Court
precedent, which states sovereign immunity is not waived absent
e e a h
a
b C ge
c ea a e b he be.
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754,
118 S. Ct. 1700, L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998). The purchase of insurance
ha d c
e a c ea a e
f
,a
ed b
he
courts faced with similar arguments. See Seminole Tribe of Florida.
v. McCor, 903 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Atkinson v.
Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 167-70 (Alaska 1977). The Court found it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Defendants were
ef
. The Defe da
d
a g a ed.
96. Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington
No. 17-35959, 740 Fed.Appx. 600, 2018 WL 5307748 (9th Cir. Oct.
25, 2018). Thomas Mitchell, his wife, and two other married couples
are non-tribal property owners in fee simple of residences within the
historical boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservation in
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Snohomish County, Washington. They appealed dismissal of their
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to quiet title
aga
he T a T be f Wa h g
( he T be ) ega d g
tribal ordinances that they alleged create a cloud on their title. The
district court dismissed the claims as unripe and did not address the
T be a e a e g
d f d
a c d g e d ca a a d
tribal sovereign immunity. The court affirms the dismissal on
grounds of tribal sovereign immunity. When the district court
dismissed on grounds of ripeness, it did not address Washington law
that recognizes cloud on title as a hardship fit for judicial
determination. See, e.g., Robinson v. Khan, 89 Wn. App. 418, 419,
948 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1998); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.010.
Nevertheless, the court affirmed because this case must be dismissed
under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, which protects
Indian tribes from suit absent congressional abrogation or explicit
waiver. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct.
1670, 56 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1978). Indian tribes
e
he c
a
f
ad
a e
ed b
e eg
e ;
See McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1989)
( Beca e he a e
eeg e
e ,I d a
be a e
ef
c e ed
ae
fede a c
. ). Th c
-law
immunity from suit applies to actions for injunctive and declaratory
relief. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940
F.2d 1269, 1271 (9 h C . 1991). C g e
e
ca
e e
e
ab ga e
. Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031, 188 L. Ed. 2d
1071 (2014) (inter a
a
ed). The be
defea ed b a a ega
ha
ac ed be
d
e .
Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1271. The claims here are not
brought under any federal law that abrogates tribal immunity and
the Tribes have not waived their immunity. The Tribes, therefore,
cannot be sued in federal court. Affirmed.
97. Laake v. Turning Stone Resort Casino
No. 17-3588, 740 Fed.Appx. 744, 2018 WL 5344936 (2nd Cir. Oct.
29, 2018). A e a J h Laa e ( Laa e ),
ceed g pro se,
a ea ed f
he d
c c
dg e d
gh c
a
again T
g S e Re
Ca
( T
g S e ) f ac f
subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign immunity.
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Laake had purchased a vendor booth for a multi-day event hosted
by Turning Stone and attempted to use the booth to conduct tarot
card readings, occult readings, and other paranormal
demonstrations. Turning Stone employees, finding this conduct
improper, informed Laake that he would have to stop, or he would
be forced to leave the casino. Laake later sued Turning Stone for
alleged violations of his First Amendment and equal protection
rights, as well as for infliction of emotional distress and defamation
under New York common law. The district court dismissed the
complaint. Here, the district court properly concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint against Turning
Stone. Indian tribes have sovereign immunity from suit unless
C g e ha a h
ed he
he be ha
a ed
. C&L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 416, 121 S. Ct. 1589, 149 L. Ed. 2d
623 (2001) (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523
U.S. at 754.). Tribal immunity extends to tribal commercial
enterprises, such as gambling venues. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at
754 55. Turning Stone is a commercial enterprise, owned and
operated by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, a federally
recognized Indian tribe. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible
to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,
82 Fed. Reg. 4915, 4917 (Jan. 17, 2017). Neither congressional
abrogation of immunity nor waiver has occurred here. Therefore,
Turning Stone, as a commercial enterprise of the Oneida Indian
Nation of New York, was entitled to sovereign immunity. Laake
argued ha he I d a C
R gh Ac f 1968 ( ICRA )
e ede T
gS e
.H e e,
e ed a
that suits like this against a tribe under ICRA are also barred by
sovereign immunity. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
at 59. ICRA provides no private right of action against a tribe and
may be enforced only in tribal court or by a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court. 98 S.Ct. 1670; Shenandoah v. U.S. Dept. of
Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 713 14 (2nd Cir. 1998). The court affirmed
the judgment of the district court.
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98. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County,
New York
No. 11-CV-6004 CJS, 354 F.Supp.3d 281 (W.D. N.Y. Dec. 11,
2018). Indian tribe brought action challenging county's ability to
impose and collect ad valorem property taxes on parcels of real
estate it owned. Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court, Charles J. Siragusa, J., held that tribal sovereign
immunity barred the county from bringing suit against the tribe. The
tribe's motion was granted.
99. Barron v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
No. 3:18-cv-00118-SLG, 373 F.Supp.3d 1232 (D. Alaska Jan. 2,
2019). Former employee brought §1981 action in state court against
employer, an Alaska Native tribal health consortium, alleging
disparate treatment and retaliation on the basis of race. After
removal, employer moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The District Court, Sharon L. Gleason, J., held that: (1)
employer was an arm of Alaska's tribes with tribal sovereign
immunity, and (2) as a matter of first impression, Congress did not
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity as to §1981 claims. Motion
granted.
100. Alaska Logistics, LLC v. Newtok Village Council
No. 3:18-cv-00108-SLG, 357 F.Supp.3d 916 (D. Alaska Jan. 11,
2019). Logistics company brought action against the governing
body of Newtok Village tribe and contractor, asserting claims for
breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, quantum
meruit, misrepresentation, and unfair trade practices, arising out of
an agreement to transport construction materials and cargo.
Governing body brought counterclaims, alleging fraud,
misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive practices, and breach of
contract. Company filed counterclaims to counterclaims, which
were identical to company's original causes of action. Governing
body moved to dismiss and to strike company's counterclaims to
counterclaims. The District Court, Sharon L. Gleason, J., held that:
(1) governing body did not waive its tribal sovereign immunity by
asserting counterclaims; (2) company failed to establish that
governing body agreed to a forum selection clause that manifested
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the tribe's intent to surrender tribal sovereign immunity in clear and
unmistakable terms; (3) company failed to show that jurisdictional
discovery was warranted on the issue of tribal sovereign immunity;
and (4) company's counterclaims to counterclaims, were redundant,
and thus, could be stricken. Motions granted.
101. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington
No. 17-35722, 913 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2019). Stillaguamish
Tribe of Indians brought action against State of Washington and the
Attorney General of Washington, seeking a declaration that its tribal
sovereign immunity barred any lawsuit for indemnification arising
from a contract with the State of Washington concerning
construction of a revetment to protect salmon populations in a river
on tribal lands following a landslide near the river. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Robert J.
Bryan, Senior District Judge, 2017 WL 3424942, granted the tribe's
summary judgment motion. Defendants appealed. The Court of
Appeals, McKeown, Circuit Judge, held that under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction
over declaratory judgment action that was based on existence of a
tribal immunity defense. Vacated and remanded.
102. Edwards v. Foxwoods Resort Casino
No. 17-CV-05869 (JMA) (SIL), 2019 WL 486077 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
7, 2019). On October 6, 2016, Plaintiff Curtis Edwards and Victoria
Edwards visited the Foxwoods Resort Casino. Plaintiffs are both
New York residents. While inside the Casino, they were confronted
and detained by Casino security on suspicion of credit card fraud at
the neighboring Mohegan Sun Casino. Curtis was informed that he
was being arrested and that the police were on their way. Upon the
arrival of tribal police, Curtis was advised again that he was under
arrest and would be transported to police headquarters. Victoria
insisted the officers examine a photo of the suspect. Once the police
confirmed that Curtis did not match the appearance of the suspect,
he was released from custody. When Plaintiffs returned to their hotel
room, an unidentified employee of the hotel opened Plaintiffs' room,
saw them, and abruptly left. Defendant Foxwoods Resort Casino is
a b
e
ca ed
he S a e f C
ec c [.] P a ff '
complaint alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment based on: (1)
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false imprisonment; (2) false arrest; and (3) unlawful detention.
Plaintiffs also allege that the actions of the Tribal police officers
underlying these violations were motivated by Plaintiffs' race.
Additionally, Plaintiffs bring state law claims of (1) assault and
battery; (2) negligent hiring; and (3) trespass. Defendants have
moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because:
(1) Plaintiffs fail to a raise a federal question; (2) Indian tribes are
not citizens of a state and therefore destroy complete diversity; (3)
28 U.S.C. § 1343 is not an independent source of jurisdiction; and
(4) T ba S e e g I
ec de P a ff c a . I
response, Plaintiffs' motion papers argue that: (1) the allegations of
racial profiling and constitutional violations are sufficiently pled and
raise federal questions; and (2) any claim of sovereign immunity has
bee
a ed b S e e g I
Wa e O d a ce N be
011092-01, h ch he T be e ac ed. He e, he e e e c
ab e
federal claims. To the extent Plaintiffs sought to invoke federal
question jurisdiction by claiming the Defendants violated their
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, such an
argument is unavailing. These constitutional protections did not
apply to Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiffs could not sue Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ( Section 1983 ) beca e
e f he
Defendants were acting under the color of state law. Defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was granted.
103. Long v. Snoqualmie Gaming Commission
No. 77007-1-I, 435 P.3d 339, 2019 WL 912132 (Wash Ct. App.
Div.1, Feb. 25, 2019). Former chief executive officer (CEO) of
Native American tribe's casino brought action against tribe's gaming
commission, alleging commission violated terms of a settlement
agreement by refusing to rescind revocation of former CEO's
gaming license. The Superior Court, King County, No. 17-2-018538, Jeffrey M. Ramsdell, J., dismissed action. Former CEO appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Leach, J., held that: (1) any waiver by tribe
of its own sovereign immunity, without more, did not also
necessarily waive commission's sovereign immunity in matters
falling within exclusive purview of commission, and (2) settlement
agreement executed between tribe and former CEO, waiving tribe's
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sovereign immunity for purposes of resolving any dispute arising
under agreement, did not constitute waiver of immunity of
commission. Affirmed.
104. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC
No. 18-116518-1166, 917 F.3d 451, 2019 WL 92265866 (6th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2019). Litigation trustee brought strong-arm proceeding to
avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers, and Indian tribe named as
defendant moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Walter Shapero, J., 516 B.R. 462, denied the motion, and
the Indian tribe appealed. The District Court, Paul D. Borman, J.,
532 B.R. 680, reversed and remanded. On remand, the Bankruptcy
Court, Shapero, J., 559 B.R. 842, granted motion to dismiss, and
litigation trustee appealed. The District Court, Borman, J., 584 B.R.
706, affirmed. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Clay,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Congress did not unequivocally express
intent to abrogate Indian tribe's sovereign immunity from cause of
action by litigation trustee in strong-arm capacity to set aside
allegedly fraudulent prepetition transfers made by Chapter 11 debtor
to tribe; (2) while tribal sovereign immunity could be waived by
litigation conduct, it could not be waived by the litigation conduct,
f be, b f be a eged a e eg
age ; a d (3) ga
conduct of filing bankruptcy petition does not waive tribal sovereign
immunity as to a separate, adversarial fraudulent transfer avoidance
claim. Affirmed.
105. Solomon v. American Web Loan
No. 4:17cv145, 375 F.Supp.3d 638 (E.D. Va. 2019). These motions
arose out of complicated lending scheme that involving tribal
immunity, forced arbitration, and several layers of corporate entities
in an attempt to avoid liability for allegedly usurious interest rates.
At its core, this case involves a lending scheme envisioned by Mark
C
( C
), he eb he a d h c
aee
es attempt to
use the sovereign immunity of the Otoe-Missouria Indian Tribe (the
T be ) e ade h a
. M df
f he
g fede a
c
favoring tribal immunity, self-governance, and a safe treasury, the
court rejected his arguments. Plaintiffs produced enough evidence
to show that Curry shifted all of the risk of his scheme to the Tribe
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and kept the lion's share of the revenue for himself, through a
scheme that infringed upon the Tribe's self-governance and placed
the Tribe's treasury at risk. In other words, Plaintiffs made a
sufficient showing that Curry was acting for himself, not for the
T be. Defe da
de ed.
106. Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc.
No. 16-2019-cv, 922 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2019). The federal
government and many states have laws designed to protect
consumers against predatory lending practices. In this case, the court
considered what happens when those laws conflict with the offreservation commercial activities of Indian tribes. The court held
that, notwithstanding tribal sovereign immunity, federal courts may
entertain suits against tribal officers in their official capacities
seeking prospective, injunctive relief prohibiting off-reservation
conduct that violates state and substantive federal law. The court
also considered the specific lending agreements between these
Plaintiffs and these Defe da
a d he d ha he ag ee e
arbitration clauses were unenforceable and unconscionable. Payday
loans are ostensibly short-term cash advances for people who face
unexpected obligations or emergencies. The loans are typically for
small sums that are to be repaid quickly in anywhere from several
ee
a ea . T ca ,
e e de cha ge fee a d e e
that, when annualized, result in interest rates far in excess of legal
limits or typical borrowing rates, often exceeding 300%, 500%, or
e e 1,000%. Th
ed a da
a
ade b P a
Green, LLC, an online lending operation, which holds itself out as a
tribal lending entity wholly owned by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of
he R c B
I d a Re e a
, M a a. J. A . 150. The
borrowers were Plaintiffs-Appellees Jessica Gingras and Angela
Given, who are Vermont residents. In July 2011, Gingras borrowed
$1,050 at an interest rate of 198.17% per annum. She repaid that
loan and borrowed an additional $2,900 a year later, this time with
an interest rate of 371.82%. She has not repaid the second loan. To
receive their loans, Gingras and Given were required to sign loan
agreements. The loan agreements provided for arbitration in the
event of a dispute between the borrower and Plain Green. The loan
agreements also provide that Chippewa Cree tribal law governs the
loan agreement and any dispute arising under it. An arbitrator,
whom the borrower may select from the American Arbitration
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A ca
( AAA ) JAMS, ha a
T ba La
a da
ab a a ad
be
ed b
b a a e de ce a d
be c
e
h [ he a ag ee e ] a d T ba La . Ch e a
C ee ba c
e ee
e ed
e a de he a b a
a ad
if it does not comply with tribal law. Gingras and Given alleged that
the loan agreements violated Vermont and federal law. The loans
g a ed f
P a G ee , LLC. P a G ee
Ch ef E ec
e
Off ce
Defe da J e R e e;
e be
f P a G ee
Board of Directors, Ted Whitford and Tim McInerney, were also
defendants. Gingras and Given brought this class action in the
District of Vermont, seeking, among other relief, an order barring
Defendants from continuing their current lending practices. Tribal
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they are entitled to tribal
sovereign immunity. The district court disagreed and denied their
motion. It concluded that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suit
against the Tribal Defendants in their official capacities for
prospective, injunctive relief under a theory analogous to Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
S ec f ca , he d
c c
ead he S e e C
dec
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 134 S.Ct.
2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014), to condone that form of action to
vindicate violations of state law. All Defendants also moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the loan agreements. The district
court denied those motions. It concluded that the arbitration
agreements are unconscionable and unenforceable because they
insulate Defendants from claims that they have violated state and
federal laws. In particular, it held that because the agreements apply
tribal law exclusively and restrict all arbitral awards review solely
by a tribal court, the neutral arbitral forum is illusory. All
Defendants timely appealed. First, the court concluded that the
arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they were
designed to avoid federal and state consumer protection laws.
Similar to the agreement in Hayes, P a ff ag ee e
e
ed
the application of tribal law only and disclaimed the application of
state and federal law.4 See J. App. 116 17. The arbitration
mechanism in the agreements purported to offer neutral dispute
resolution but appears to disallow claims brought under federal and
state law. The Supreme Court has made clear that arbitration
ag ee e
ha a e a a
gh o pursue federal statutory
remedies are prohibited. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
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570 U.S. 228, 235 36, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013).. By
applying tribal law only, arbitration for the Plain Green borrowers
appears wholly to foreclose them from vindicating rights granted by
fede a a d a e a . We ag ee
h he F
hC c
ha [ ]he
just and efficient system of arbitration intended by Congress when
a ed he FAA a
a h
h
f fa ce. P a
Green is a payday lending entity cleverly designed to enable
Defendants to skirt federal and state consumer protection laws under
the cloak of tribal sovereign immunity. That immunity is a shield,
however, not a sword. It poses no barrier to plaintiffs seeking
prospective equitable relief for violations of federal or state law.
Tribes and their officers are not free to operate outside of Indian
lands without conforming their conduct in these areas to federal and
state law. Attempts to disclaim application of federal and state law
in an arbitral forum subject to exclusive tribal court review fare no
better. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
107. Bell v. City of Lacey
No. 3:18-cv-05918-RBL, 2019 WL 2578582 (W.D. Wash. June 24,
2019). Defendants Nisqually Tribe, John Simmons and Elatta
Ta
(c ec e
he Tribe Defe da
)
ed f J dg e
on the Pleadings. After being arrested and charged with a crime in
the city of Lacey, Bell was held for 19 days at a detention facility
owned and operated by the Nisqually Tribe on Reservation land.
The facility detains non-tribal members pursuant to an Agreement
between the Tribe and the City of Lacey whereby the latter pays the
former for incarceration services. At the end of his time at the
facility, Bell suffered a stroke. He has now sued numerous parties
including the Nisqually T be a d he T be Ch ef E ec
e
Officer, John Simmons, and its Chief Financial Officer Eletta Tiam
(Bell also sued several Doe Defendants who allegedly failed to give
him medical treatment, but they are not the subject of this Order).
Bell alleged claims for false imprisonment, declaratory and
injunctive relief, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
negligence
against
all
three Tribe Defendants.
The Tribe Defe da
ed d
Be s claims against them,
arguing that the claims are barred by sovereign immunity and
because they are factually implausible and time-barred. However,
the Ninth Circuit has held that tribal officers allegedly violating
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federal law are not immune from suits seeking prospective relief
under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Burlington N.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.
1991) (overruled on other grounds)). In this case, no waiver or
abrogation had occurred. Consequently, the claims for monetary
relief against the Tribe Defendants were dismissed. However,
beca e Be
c
a c e Ex Parte Young, but the parties do
not address it in their briefs, the court found it lacked sufficient
ae a
dec de he he Be
ca
f dec a a
a d
injunctive relief against Simmons and Tiam could be dismissed.
That question was reserved pending f he b ef g. Be
a
argument was that he may sue the Tribe as a third-party beneficiary
of the T be Ag ee e
h he C . The Ag ee e
a ed
the T be
eeg
he f
g e e : the
Nisqually Indian Tribe is a Sovereign Nation with all immunities
attendant thereto with the following exception that the parties to this
agreement
have
specifically
negotiated:
The
Nisqually Indian Tribe does hereby expressly consent to venue in
the courts of the state of Washington for any legal dispute by and
between the parties to this agreement and further agrees that any
such dispute shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of the state of
Wa h g . Acc d g Be , he a c ded a a a
he
Agreement and can therefore sue the Tribe in a state or federal court.
U de Wa h g
a , [ ]he c ea
f a h d-party beneficiary
contract requires that the parties intend that the promisor assume a
direct obligation to the intended beneficiary at the time they enter
into the c
ac . Postlewait Const., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins.
Companies, 106 Wash. 2d 96, 99 (1986) (quoting Lonsdale v.
Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 361 (1983)). Here, the Agreement
expressly allocated mandatory responsibilities for medical treatment
and transportation to the City. While the Agreement stated that the
Tribe
de
a db ad
ae , h dd
h
that the parties intended to create a contractual obligation.
Furthermore, even if inmates could be considered third-party
beneficiaries under the Agreement, the waiver of sovereign
immunity did not clearly encompass claims brought by third parties.
The Agreement only waived sovereign immunity for disputes
be ee
he a e
h ag ee e , he a e a e
h
ag ee e
ha a e a
efe ed
a ha g
ec f ca
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eg

a ed he a e e ce
.C e e
, he Ag ee e d d
e
ca e e a
e
a e
e eg
for third-party beneficiaries. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at
58. The c
f
d ha Be
e a
gag e
a
ac ed
e . Be a g ed ha h c a
d
habea beca e he
alleged that the T be Ag ee ent to detain state prisoners is
illegal. However, as the Tribe Defendants correctly point out, Bell
could not maintain a habeas action when he was no longer being
detained. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). There
was no dispute that Bell has been released from Tribal custody and
there was no clear indication that he would be returned to it. Finally,
Bell contended that Simmons and Tiam cannot invoke sovereign
immunity because they were sued in their individual
capacities. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017).
H e e ,c
a
e
he cha ac e a
f he
a e
he c
a
he a e
g he he a c a
ac a
against an officer in their official capacity. Id. at 1290. He e, Be
claims against Simmons and Tiam stem from policy-level decisions
made as representatives of the Tribe and administrative conduct
undertaken as officers of the T be. N e f S
a dTa
actions were directed at Bell personally. Sovereign immunity thus
e e d
S
a d T a f Be
ca
ee g
ea
relief. For the above reasons, all claims against the Tribe were
dismissed and the false imprisonment, conspiracy, negligent and
reckless infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims
against Simmons and Tiam were dismissed. The court ordered
f he b ef g
he
e f he he Be
c a f dec a a
and injunctive relief against Simmons and Tiam should survive
under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
108. Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC
No. 18-1827, 929 F.3d 170, 2019 WL 2864341 (4th Cir. July 3,
2019). Borrowers brought putative class action against lending
entity, and related defendants, alleging that payday loans carried
unlawfully high interest rates. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, No. 3:17cv00461REPRCY, Robert
E. Payne, Senior District Judge, 329 F.Supp.3d 248, denied motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants filed
interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, Gregory, Chief Judge,
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held that: (1) burden of proof to demonstrate tribal immunity as an
arm of the tribe was on party seeking such immunity, and (2) entities
were entitled to sovereign tribal immunity. Reversed and remanded
with instructions.
109. Joan Wilson and Paul Franke, M.D., v. Alaska Native
Tribal Health Consortium
No. 3:16-cv-00195-TMB, 399 F.Supp.3d 926, 2019 WL 2870080
(D.
Alaska,
July
3,
2019).
Defendants
Alaska
Native Tribal Health C
' ( ANTHC ), A d e Te be '
( Te be ) a d R a d He ge e ' ( He ge e ) (c ec e
I d d a Defe da
)
ed
D
f Lac f S b ec
Matter Jurisdiction and to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
( M
D
). F
he ea
e a ed be ,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted. ANTHC is a
T ba Organization and inter-Tribal consortium of federally
recognized Alaska Tribes and Tribal O ga a
which comanages Alaska Native Med ca Ce e ( ANMC ), a e a -care
hospital that provides medical services in Anchorage, Alaska. From
2014 to 2016, ANTHC employed Wilson as Chief Ethics and
Compliance Officer. From 2013 to 2016, ANTHC employed Franke
by contract as the Chief Medical Officer of ANMC. Wilson and
F a e a e ed ha he ha e
ae
edge f he da -toda
ea
f ANTHC, c d g b
g ac ce f ANMC.
They repeatedly allege that Teuber, President of ANTHC, and
Helgesen, Chief Executive Officer of ANTHC and Hospital
Administrator of ANMC, e e
e -a a e ha ANMC a d
ANTHC's various billing practices were fraudulent. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that ANTHC engaged in the following fraudulent
practices: double billing for certain medical services; billing for
services performed by ineligible providers; billing for
unauthenticated services; and accepting incentive payments from
Medicaid and Medicare without satisfying program requirements.
Plaintiffs allege that Wilson e ea ed b gh he e
e
he
a e
f ANTHC a d He ge e ,
e ea ed a e
ed
e e e he e [ a
a e] ac ce . O Ma 6, 2016, He ge e
terminated Wilson's employment with approval from Teuber, his
direct supervisor. In June 2016, ANTHC notified Franke that his
contract, which was due to expire on June 7, 2016, would not be
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renewed. On August 29, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this action against
ANTHC as a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of the government and under
ea
a
he Fa e C a
Ac ( FCA ). On December 6,
2017, the United States declined to intervene in the action. On June
21, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint as a private action
on behalf of themselves against ANTHC. Plaintiffs alleged that their
employment at ANTHC was terminated as a result of Plaintiffs'
opposition to ANTHC's fraudulent billing practices in violation of
federal and state laws. Defendants moved for dismissal of each of
Plaintiffs' four claims. ANTHC contends that dismissal is
a
a e beca e ANTHC a a
f he be, h ch ea
it is both entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, which bars all claims
aga
,a d
a e
b ec
ab
de he FCA
retaliation provision. The quasi-jurisdictional nature of sovereign
immunity means that if ANTHC is found to maintain such
immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve this action as it
pertains to ANTHC. T ba sovereign immunity protects Indian
tribes from suit absent express authorization by Congress or clear
a e b
he
be. T ba sovereign immunity extends
to tribal g e
g b de
e
e ac g a a a
f he
be as well as organizations comprised of multiple tribes.
In White v. University of California, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals set forth the appropriate analysis to determine whether an
e
a a
f he be. If a c
finds that an entity is an
a
f he
be,
ha e
b h (1) e
ed
maintain tribal sovereign immunity, and (2) is not liable under the
FCA e a a
, beca e
a e
de he
FCA. White, established a five-factor analysis to determine if an
e
a a
f he be: (1) he e h d f c ea
f he
economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership,
and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over
the entities; (4) the tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its
sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the
tribe and he e
e . P a ff a g ed ha ANTHC
a a
f he be beca e
a c ea ed b C g e ,
d ec b
resolution of the tribes; and tribal status is not required in order to
obtain federal funding through the Indian Self-Determination and
Ed ca
A
a ce Ac ( ISDEAA ). The ISDEAA, in pertinent
a , de e
e ha a
e -tribal consortium ... shall have the
rights and responsibilities of the authorizing Indian tribe and §
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325(a) authorizes the fifteen tribes and tribal health organizations to
f
a c
,
h ch e e a
beca e ANTHC.
Furthermore, ANTHC was incorporated as a tribal non-profit
organization. Based on these facts, the Court found that ANTHC's
creation, authorized by Congress and formed by regional
health e
e a d be ,
a f d g ha
a a
f he
be. The C
f
d ha he be a d eg a health entities
identified in § 325(a) P.L. 105-83 intended to share their immunity
with ANTHC, which supports a f d g ha ANTHC
a a
f
he be. F
he f eg g ea
, h C
f
d ha a
analysis of the five factors articulated in White demonstrates that
ANTHC a a
f he be. Beca e ANTHC a a
f he
be,
a a tribal sovereign immunity, which deprives this
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims brought against
ANTHC and simultaneously establishes that ANTHC is not a
e
b ec
he FCA. Acc d g , Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss was granted with respect to the FCA claim against ANTHC
identified in Count I, which was dismissed with prejudice.
110. Ja

Ma a cik . A c ic Sl e Na i e A
L d.,
d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital

No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH, 2019 WL 3554687 (D. Alaska Aug. 5,
2019). Plaintiff is Jason Matyascik. Defendant is Arctic Slope
Native Association, Ltd., d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial
H
a . Defe da
he P.L. 93-638 regional health organization
f he A c c S e Reg
f A a a. P a ff a ege ha [ ]
or ab
Ma 14, 2018, he c
ac ed
h defe da
e e
h e
e c
ac a defe da ' h
a a a h ca ,
P a ff a ege ha defe da
ef ed
h
he c
ac ,
e
a g [h ] e
e
h
d g h
he h eemonth notice called for in the contract for early termination. Plaintiff
a a ege ha [d]
g he 2017-2018 term of [his] employment,
[defendant] promised to reimburse several unpaid sums to him yet
fa ed
f f
h e
e . Defe da
ed to dismiss
plaintiff's claims, arguing that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because it is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and
because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
T ba
eeg
ec tribes themselves, but
a e e d
a
f he be ac g beha f f he be. White
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v. Univ. of Calif., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). Defendant
argued that it is an arm of its member tribes. Defendant was entitled
to sovereign immunity because it is an arm of its member tribes.
And, if defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, defendant has
not waived that immunity as to plaintiff's contract and statutory
claims. As for plaintiff's conversion claim, plaintiff conceded that
he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff,
656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jerves v. United States,
966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992)) (FTCA
de ha bef e
an individual can file an action against the United States in district
c
, [he]
ee a ad
a e e
f [h ] c a
).
P a ff c e
ca
a d
ed. Defe da '
dismiss was granted. Plaintiff's contract and statutory claims were
dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiff's conversion claim was
dismissed without prejudice.
Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent
111. Gustafson v. Poitra
No. 20170423, 916 N.W.2d 804, 2018 WL 4087949 (N.D. Aug. 28,
2018). Non-Indian fee owner of two parcels of land located on
Indian reservation by virtue of a foreclosure judgment brought
action against claimants claiming an interest in the parcels.
Following a bench trial, the District Court, Rolette County,
Northeast Judicial District, Anthony S. Benson, J., entered judgment
quieting title to fee owner, finding claimants' lessor's lien to be void,
and awarding fee owner a money judgment in the amount of
$67,567.98 a d a
e
fee
he a
f $6,620. C a a
appealed. The Supreme Court, McEvers, J., held that: (1) an express
determination by the trial court in a prior foreclosure action, that it
had jurisdiction over non-Indian owned fee land located within
Indian reservation, had res judicata effect in fee owner's subsequent
action to quiet title to the land, and (2) the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over non-Indian fee owner's quiet title action. Affirmed.
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112. World Fuel Services, Inc. v. Nambe Pueblo
Development Corporation
No. CIV 18-0836 JB/SCY, 362 F.Supp.3d 1021, 2019 WL 293231
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2019). Petroleum fuel supplier brought action
against federally chartered tribal corporation seeking to compel
arbitration of contract dispute concerning unpaid federal excise
taxes allegedly owed to supplier pursuant to fuel supply agreement
with respect to fuel sales on tribal land. Tribal corporation moved to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative,
for failure to state a claim. The District Court, James O. Browning,
J., held that: (1) District Court had diversity jurisdiction; (2) District
Court would construe tribal corporation's motion to dismiss for
failure to exhaust tribal remedies as motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, rather than as motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction; (3) Indian tribe's sovereign immunity extended
to tribal corporation; (4) tribal corporation waived its sovereign
immunity for purposes of arbitration; (5) supplier was required to
exhaust tribal remedies; and (6) stay pending exhaustion of tribal
court remedies was warranted. Motion granted in part and denied in
part.
113. Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe
No. 17-3176, 916 F.3d 694, 2019 WL 846573 (8th Cir. Feb. 22,
2019). An arrestee, who was not a member of an Indian tribe,
brought §1983 action against a federally recognized tribe, the Oglala
Sioux Tribe, and various tribal officers, seeking damages for
violation of the plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights in
connection with allegations that the arrestee was traveling on a
federally-maintained highway on reservation land when he was
arrested, detained, assaulted, battered, and robbed. The United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Jeffrey L.
Viken,, Chief District Judge, 2017 WL 4217113, granted
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Arrestee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Loken, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
arrestee did not state an Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) claim, and
(2) arrestee failed to exhaust available tribal court remedies.
Affirmed.
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114. Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute
Indians
No. 17-15515, 922 F.3d 892, 2019 WL 1781404 (9th Cir. Apr. 24,
2019). Former tribal administrator sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against tribe, tribal court, and tribal court judge to avoid tribal
court jurisdiction over claims that she defrauded tribe and breached
her fiduciary duties to it. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California, William Horsley Orrick, J., 234
F.Supp.3d 1042, dismissed action. Former administrator appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Piersol, Senior Judge for the District of South
Dakota, sitting by designation, held that: (1) tribal court had subjectmatter
dc
e
be claims against administrator; (2)
administrator reasonably should have anticipated that her conduct
on tribal land would have fallen within tribes regulatory jurisdiction;
(3) conduct of administrator threatened or had some direct effect on
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of tribe;
a d (4) be adjudicatory authority did not exceed its regulatory
authority over conduct of administrator during her employment.
Affirmed.
115. Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Branch
No. CV-18-08110-PCT-DWL, 381 F.Supp.3d 1144, 2019 WL
1489121 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2019). This case involves an attempt by a
tribal court to assert jurisdiction over a party that never set foot
h
he be
ee a
, e e c
ac ed
h a
ba
members or organizations, and never expressly directed any activity
h
he e e a
c f e. E
e M a Ca a
C
a ( EMC ) a I a-based insurance company. In 2004,
EMC sold commercial general liability policies to Service Station
E
e
a d Sa e , I c. ( SSES ) a d M a
B d g
A c a e , I c. ( M a ). Ne he c
a
ha a
ba
affiliation. While these insurance policies were in place, SSES and
Milam were each hired to perform certain work on a gas station in
Chinle, Arizona. This gas station was situated on tribally-owned
land within the Navajo Nation reservation. In March 2005, an
employee of a subcontractor that had been hired by Milam
accidentally breached a fuel line. This breach, which went
undetected for five months, caused over 15,000 gallons of gasoline
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to leak into the ground. In response, the Navajo Nation sued an array
of parties, including SSES, Milam, and EMC, in Navajo tribal court.
EMC, in turn, moved to dismiss on the ground that it was not subject
to tribal jurisdiction. After the tribal courts rejected this argument,
EMC filed this action in federal court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Court holds that EMC is not subject to tribal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has never held that a tribal court
has jurisdiction over a non-member, and although the Ninth Circuit
has issued several decisions recognizing (or noting the possibility
of) such jurisdiction, those cases have almost exclusively involved
instances where a non-member was physically present on tribal land
and thereafter engaged in the conduct giving rise to liability.
Moreover, to the extent the Ninth Circuit has suggested an insurance
company may be sued in tribal court despite the absence of any
physical presence on tribal land, its decisions have been limited to
circumstances where the policyholder was a tribal member, and the
insurance company engaged in conduct specifically directed toward
the reservation. No court has ever recognized tribal jurisdiction
under the circumstances presented here, where an insurance
company simply sold a policy to a non-tribal member. The Court
thus concluded this case does not satisfy either of the jurisdictional
tests recognized by the Ninth Circuit: (1) EMC is not subject to
jurisdiction under he gh e c de e beca e EMC ha e e
done anything to enter tribal land (and thus cannot be excluded), and
(2) neither of the exceptions recognized in Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981), is applicable.
116. Hestand v. Gila River Indian Community
No. 17-16583, 765 Fed.Appx. 334, 2019 WL 1765219 (9th Cir. Apr.
19, 2019). Plaintiff-Appellant John Hestand filed a complaint in
tribal court against Defendants-Appellees Gila River Indian
Community and Linus Everling, in his official capacity,
(Defendants) alleging age discrimination. The tribal court dismissed
He a d c
a
he ba
f ba
e eg
. Af e
the tribal court of appeals affirmed, Hestand filed a complaint in the
d
c c
. He a ea ed he c
de g a
g Defe da
motion to dismiss with prejudice, and its conclusion that claim and
issue preclusion barred his claims. The court affirmed. Hestand
argued that federal questions involving sovereign immunity are
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always subject to de novo review. However, the court has previously
explained the genera
e ha fede a c
a
ead d ca e
questions whether of federal, state, or tribal law already resolved
in tribal court absent a finding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction
or that its judgment be denied comity for some other valid rea .
AT & T Corp. . Coe r d Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir.
2002).. While the court reviews de novo a dis ric co r s
determination whether sovereign immunity applies, Linneen v. Gila
River Indian Committee., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002), this
case involved a ribal co r s determination. Principles of comity
generally require the court to recognize and enforce tribal court
decisions. See AT & T Corp., 295 F.3d at 903.. There are, however,
[]
c c
a ce [ ha ] ec de ec g
: when the tribal
court either lacked jurisdiction or denied the losing party due
ce
f a . Id. Ne he a
ed he e. The
ba c
jurisdiction was never challenged Hestand himself brought the
claims to tribal court. For the first time on appeal, Hestand claimed
that violations of due process entitle him to de novo review. But the
district court did not consider this issue, and it was therefore waived.
See Tibble . Edison In l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016)..
Even if the court were to consider the claim, Hestand alleged no
actual due process violations by the tribal court; instead, he included
a ge e a acc a
ha he ac
f he Defe da a d ba
c
de ed P a ff d e
ce
gh . Th c c
a ega
dd
ec de ec g
f he ba c
dec
.
Moreover, Hestand did not appeal the factual and legal bases for the
d
c c
h d g ha c a a d
e ec
ba ed h
claims. Instead, he attempted to argue the merits of his suit, claiming
that the Indian Civil Rights Act somehow abrogates sovereign
immunity in suits involving tribal employees, and that sovereign
immunity was not a viable defense. Yet this is precisely what claim
preclusion seeks to prevent. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) ( Re d ca a ... ba
litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or
could have been raised in the
ac
. ) (
g W. Radio
Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Because the district court correctly held that claim and issue
ec
ba ed He a d c a , he c
dd
each their
merits. Affirmed.
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117. Muscogee Creek Indian Freedmen Band, Inc. v.
Bernhardt
No. 18-1705 (CKK), 385 F.Supp.3d 16, 2019 WL 1992787 (D.D.C.
May 6, 2019). Persons whose lineal ancestors were Creek Nation
Freedmen and citizens of Muscogee Creek Nation (MCN) brought
action against MCN's principal chief, Interior Secretary, and other
federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to secure
rights and privileges of MCN citizenship. Defendants moved to
dismiss. The District Court, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that: (1)
plaintiffs were required to exhaust their tribal remedies before
bringing action; (2) presence of federal defendants did not obviate
plaintiffs' obligation to first seek administrative and judicial
remedies in tribal forums; and (3) plaintiffs failed to establish that it
would be futile to require them to exhaust their tribal remedies.
Motions granted in part and denied in part.
118. State v. Thompson
No. A18-0545, 929 N.W.2d 21, 2019 WL 2079426 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 13, 2019). Defendant was convicted in the District Court,
Beltrami County, John G. Melbye, J., of first-degree driving while
impaired (DWI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Johnson, J., held that: (1) the fact that the tribal police officer who
initially observed defendant's impairment was not a peace officer for
purposes of impaired driving laws was irrelevant to defendant's
conviction; (2) as a matter of first impression, a state lawenforcement agency is authorized to enforce impaired-driving laws
on an Indian reservation to the extent that such an offense is
committed by a non-Indian; and (3) tribal officer did not unlawfully
detain or arrest defendant. Affirmed.
119. Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America v. Mazzetti
No. 09-cv-2330-WQH-JLB, 2019 WL 2341376 (S.D. Cal. June 3,
2019). The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Motion for an
Emergency Order Staying Enforcement of the Rincon Tribal Court
J dg e
Pe d g A ea
T ba C
f A ea f ed b
Plaintiff Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America. On October
20, 2009, Plaintiff Rincon Mushroom Corporation of America
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(RMCA) initiated this action by filing the Complaint. The action
concerns tribal regulation of non-Indian fee simple land (the
Property) located within the boundaries of the reservation of the
Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians (the Tribe). Defendants
Bo Mazzetti, John Currier, Vernon Wright, Gilbert Parada,
Stephanie Spencer, Charlies Kolb, and Dick Watenpaugh (the
Rincon Band Defendants) are tribal officials sued in their individual
and official capacities. The Complaint alleges the following ten
causes of action: (1) intentional interference with contract; (2)
intentional interference with advantageous economic relationship;
(3) conspiracy to intentionally interfere with contract; (4) conspiracy
to intentionally interfere with advantageous economic relationship;
(5) conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection and equal
privileges and immunities under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (6) civil
RICO; (7) civil RICO conspiracy; (8) negligent interference with
contract; (9) negligent interference with advantageous economic
relationship; and (10) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September
21, 2010, the Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the Rincon
Band Defendants. Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to
exhaust tribal court remedies. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that Plaintiff RMCA must exhaust tribal remedies
on the issue of tribal jurisdiction before bringing suit in federal
c
. The C
f A ea
a ed, We e ha e ha e a e
now deciding whether the tribe actually has jurisdiction under the
second Montana exception. We hold only that where, as here,
the be a e
f
dc
c
ab e
a b e, he
tribal courts get the first chance to decide whether tribal jurisdiction
is actually permitted. If the tribal courts sustain tribal jurisdiction
and Rincon Mushroom is unhappy with that determination, it may
then repair to federal court. However, the Court of Appeals held that
this Court abused discretion by dismissing the case rather than
staying it. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and
remanded with instructions to stay the case pending Plaintiff
RMCA e ha
f ba e ed e . In the years following the
Order staying the case, the Court ordered and the parties filed three
status reports as to the exhaustion of tribal remedies. On June 25,
2015, the Court issued an Order administratively closing the case
h
e d ce
a
a
e
e e , a d
h
prejudice to the resolution of any statute of limitations issue
a c a ed
h he f g f h c
a . O J
26, 2017, he
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C
de ed P a ff RMCA
e e he ca e. The
C
a ed, [T]he record reflects that RMCA has been afforded
multiple opportunities to challenge tribal jurisdiction through
motions for partial summary judgment and a trial on the issue of
jurisdiction. Finally, RMCA will also have the opportunity to seek
ba c
a e ae e e
f he
ba c
g
jurisdiction. The Court concluded that RMCA has failed to establish
that it lacks an adequate opportunity to challenge tribal court
jurisdiction. The Court reviewed the record, which established legal
and factual disputes between the Rincon Band Defendants and
Plaintiff RMCA but did not demonstrate that the assertion of tribal
jurisdiction was motivated by a desire to harass or was conducted in
bad faith. The Court concluded that the evidence in the record was
ff c e
e he e f ce e
f he a
che e a
the product of bad faith conduct or was perpetuated with a motive
ha a . A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
781 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). For the reasons stated in the
C
J
26, 2017 O de , he C
f
d ha
e ce
the exhaustion requirement applied in this case based on express
jurisdictional prohibition, lack of opportunity to challenge
jurisdiction, or a plain lack of jurisdiction.
120. C e

D Ale e T ibe . Ha k

No. 17-35755, 933 F.3d 1052, 2019 WL 3756886 (9th Cir. Aug. 9,
2019). The a e e e ed he d
c c
de d
gf
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction an action filed by
an Indian tribe seeking to enforce a tribal court judgment against
nonmembers. The panel held that inherent in the recognition of a
ba c
dg e aga
a
e be a e
ega d g
the extent of the powers reserved to the tribe under federal law.
Because the action presented a substantial issue of federal law, the
district court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. In 2016, the tribe ed he Ha
he C e d A e e T ba
C
( he T ba C
) f encroachment on submerged lands
without a permit in violation of tribal law. The Hawks were served
with notice but did not answer the complaint or otherwise contest
the allegations. The Tribal Court accordingly entered default
judgment against the Hawks in the form of a $3,900 civil penalty
and a declaration that the tribe was entitled to remove the
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encroachments. The tribe subsequently sought federal recognition
a d e f ce e
f he T ba C
dg e b f g a
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho.
A tribe a h
d e
g f
fede a a b
a he
de e f
he
he e
e
fa
ed
eeg
h ch
ha e e bee e
g hed. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 322 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Felix Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (ed. 1945)). Tribal
eeg
e e he e
e
a he ffe a ce f C g e
a d
b ec
c
e e defea a ce. Id. at 323. Thus, because
fede a a def e he
e b
da e f a Indian tribe
e
over non-Indians, Na l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851, the question of
he he a ba c
ha ad d ca e a h
e
e be
a fede a
e
. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land
& Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008).
Tax
121. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington
No. 15-CV-940 BJR, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 2018 WL 4811893
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2018). Indian tribe and municipality located on
Indian reservation brought action against state of Washington, its
governor, director of the Washington State Department of Revenue,
county, county treasurer, and county assessor, seeking declaration
and injunction prohibiting state and county from collecting retail
sales and use tax, business and occupation tax, and personal property
tax from non-Indian owned businesses located in the municipality,
arguing that the collection of taxes imposed on tribal sovereignty
and was preempted by operation of federal law. The District Court,
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, J., held that: (1) state and county's
collection of taxes from non-Indian owned businesses in
municipality located on Indian reservation was not preempted by
operation of federal law, and (2) state and county's collection of
taxes did not infringe on Indian tribe's tribal sovereignty. Ordered
accordingly.
122. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski
No. 18-12094, 757 Fed.Appx. 851, 2018 WL 6437564 (11th Cir.
Dec. 7, 2018). Indian tribe brought action against executive director
of State Department of Revenue for injunctive and declaratory relief
441

regarding state's imposition of tax on electricity delivered to tribe's
reservations. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cv-62775-RNS, Robert N.
Scola, Jr., 2017 WL 4570790, dismissed with prejudice based on
claim preclusion and later, 2018 WL 1902838, denied tribe's motion
for consideration. Tribe appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
action was barred, on claim preclusion grounds, by previous
judgment that tax was not preempted by federal law. Affirmed.
123. Everi Payments, Inc. v. Washington State Department
of Revenue
No. 50791-9-II, 6 Wash. App.2d 580, 432 P.3d 411 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2018). Taxpayer brought action seeking business and
occupational (B&O) tax refund. The Superior Court, James Dixon,
J., 2017 WL 3317325, granted summary judgment in favor of the
Department of Revenue, and taxpayer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Worswick, J., held that: (1) state was not categorically
barred from levying a B&O tax on taxpayer; (2) Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) did not expressly preempt B&O tax
imposed on taxpayer; (3) cash access services provided by taxpayer
at tribal casinos fell outside the realm of the IGRA, and were,
therefore, capable of being subject to generally-applicable state tax
laws, including a B&O tax; (4) Washington-Tribal Compacts did
not operate to preempt B&O tax imposed on taxpayer; (5) Indian
Trader Statutes did not apply, and thus, did not preempt imposition
of a B&O tax on taxpayer; (6) B&O tax was not preempted by
federal law; and (7) Department of Revenue rule governing taxation
of non-enrolled persons doing business in Indian county did not
apply to prevent the Department from assessing a B&O tax on
taxpayer. Affirmed.
124. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside
County
No. 17-56003, 749 Fed.Appx. 650 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019). Plaintiff
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians appeals the summary
judgment entered in favor of Defendant Riverside County and
Intervenor-Defendant Desert Water Agency, upholding the right of
he C
a e a d c ec a
e
e e a ( PIT )
from non-Indian lessees of Indian trust lands on the Agua Caliente
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Reservation. In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County
of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), we held that this very
tax is permissible. Plaintiff argues that our cursory preemption
analysis there is clearly irreconcilable with White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), and therefore not controlling.
In Bracker, he S e e C
ec g ed ha [ ] e d ff c
ee
e
a e
ca e
e h ,
h ch a S a e
asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in
ac
he e e a
. 448 U.S. a 144. I
ch ca e , Bracker
c
ha a c
h d
be de e de
echa ca
ab
e c ce
f ae
ba
eeg .
I ead, c
h d e gage
a a c a ed
he
a e f he a e, fede a , a d ba
e e a a e. I Agua
Caliente, decided nine years before Bracker, we did not expressly
engage in that particularized, interest-balancing inquiry. But we did
c
de he c g e
a
e beh d he eg a
dea g
h I d a a d I d a a d , he PIT ega c de ce, a d he
indirect economic effect of the PIT on the tribe and tribal members.
See Agua Caliente, 442 F.2d at 1186 87. A few years later, in Fort
Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1976), we again upheld the assessment and imposition of a PIT on
non-Indian lessees of land held in trust by the federal government
for an Indian tribe.1 In Fort Mojave, we engaged in a more extensive
a a
f he PIT effec
fede a a d
ba
ee ,
foreshadowing the later requirements of Bracker. Indeed, in
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County
Board of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013), we
observed that our PIT cases, including Fort Mojave, a
ed a
a
de f a a
Bracker. We conclude that our PIT
precedents are not clearly irreconcilable with Bracker. Additionally,
relying on Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145. Plaintiff
argues that 25 U.S.C. § 465 bars this tax. Once again, we already
add e ed h
e: I Agua Caliente, for example, we stressed
ha [ ]he Ca f
a a
e
ee d e
a he a d a
ch, h ch
d be ba ed b § 465, b a he
a e he f ca h a e f he e ee
ee
, h ch
covered by § 465. Chehalis, 724 F.3d at 1158 n.7 (alteration in
original) (quoting Agua Caliente, 442 F.2d at 1186). Affirmed.
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125. Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 16150-17L, 152 T.C. No. 5, 2019 WL 1077266 (T.C. Mar. 6,
2019). Corporation of federally recognized Indian tribe, and
corporation's division, petitioned separately for review of IRS
determinations to proceed with liens to collect unpaid employment
taxes arising from division's business operations. Actions were
consolidated. The Tax Court, Goeke, J., held that: (1) IRS notices of
determination to sustain tax liens were sufficient to provide Tax
Court with jurisdiction; (2) state law did not restrict Indian tribal
corporation's power, pursuant to charter issued by Department of
Interior (DOI) under Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), to create
legally distinct corporate division whose federal employment tax
liabilities were not collectible from corporation by IRS; (3) Indian
tribal corporation's power to create legally distinct corporate
division was within scope of IRA; and (4) Indian tribal corporation's
division acted as legally distinct entity, and thus IRS could not
collect division's employment tax liabilities from corporation.
Ordered accordingly.
126. Big Sandy Rancheria Enterprises v. Becerra
No. 1:18-cv-00958-DAD-EPG, 395 F.Supp.3d 1314, 2019 WL
3803627 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019). Plaintiff Big Sandy Rancheria
E e
e ( BSRE ) b gh h
ac
cha e g g he
a
ca
f Ca f
a c ga e e a a d ce
g a e.
BSRE is a tribal corporation incorporated under section 17 of the
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5124 ( IRA ), h ch
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue a charter of
incorporation to any Indian tribe upon petition by such tribe.
Although only BSRE, and not the tribe, was a plaintiff to the instant
action, BSRE alleged that corporations created pursuant to section
17 f he IRA e e e e a a e eg
f he ba g e
e .
Defendants did not dispute that Indian tribes are exempt from the
Ta I
c
Ac
( TIA )
hb
b dd d
e ha
plaintiff BSRE is equivalent to an Indian tribe. Defendants argued
that BSRE, as a corporation organized under section 17 of the IRA,
was a distinct entity from the Big Sandy Rancheria Band of Western
Mono Indians regardless of how the latter is constitutionally
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organized and that BSRE therefore cannot invoke the tribe
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 or its exemption from the TIA.
He e, BSRE e ha ed ha
e c
e d
b e
bacc
d c
I da
be a d I d a
ba e be
he a d
and does not make any sales to non-members or the general public.
Notably, tribe-to-tribe transactions involving the movement of
goods through a state, including outside of Indian country, are not
immune from state regulation. Indeed, many courts have affirmed
ae
ff-reservation authority to enforce state laws. See, e.g.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069 (1980) at 161 62 (authorizing offee a
e
e,
g []
g f ca ha he e e
e
take place outside the reservation, in locations where state power
over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is within
ee a
b
da e ); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode
Island, 449 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) ( I
be d e ad enture
that a state may seize contraband located outside Indian lands but in
a
a ba
e h . ). The c
f
d ha a ff
cha e ge
he a e licensing requirements failed as a matter of
a . F
he ea
e f h ab e, (1) he A
e Ge e a
motion to dismiss and CDTFA
d
f
ac f
dc
e e g a ed; (2) P a ff f f h ca e f ac
a
dismissed for lac f
dc
; (3) P a ff e a
g ca e f
action were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Trust Breach and Claims
127. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. v. United States
No. 15-342L, 140 Fed.Cl. 447, 2018 WL 5069161 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 17,
2018). Inter-tribal council representing Arizona Indian tribes sued
United States, claiming breach of tribal trust obligations under
Arizona-Florida Land Exchange Act (AFLEA) by failing to ensure
sufficient security for full payments to be made by landowner for
land exchange involving sale of land that was former site of Indian
boarding school, by failing to collect and deposit or make up trust
payments on which landowner defaulted, and by failing to prudently
invest trust funds. Government moved to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim. The Court of
Federal Claims, Firestone, Senior Judge, held that: (1) claim based
on insufficient initial security requirements was time barred; (2)
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government fulfilled its trust obligation to ensure adequate security;
(3) government was not required to make up defaulted payments;
(4) portion of prudent investment claim was time barred; and (5)
timely portion of prudent investment claim was sufficiently alleged.
Motion granted in part and denied in part.
128. Oneida Indian Nation v. Phillips
No. 5:17-CV-1035, 360 F.Supp.3d 122, 2018 WL 6001002
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2018). Oneida Nation of American Indians
brought action against trustee and trust, alleging that Oneida Nation
had right to possess 19.6 acres of land as part of Oneida reservation
under federal treaty, statutory and common law, and the federal
constitution, and that trustee's conduct in executing and recording
various documents in county land records was an unlawful attempt
to obtain possession and control over that land, seeking declaratory
judgment and permanent injunction. Trustee and trust
counterclaimed that trust had right to possess land under federal and
state treaty, statutory and common law, and the federal constitution,
and that trustee's conduct was lawful action to maintain possession
and control over land. Oneida Nation moved to dismiss
counterclaim for failure to state a claim. The District Court, Glenn
T. Suddaby, Chief District Judge, held that trust and trustee failed to
plausibly allege a claim to the disputed land. Motion granted.
129. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States
No. CIV 12-0800 JB\JHR, 366 F.Supp.3d 1234, 2018 WL 6002913
(D.N.M. Nov. 15, 2018). Pueblo of Jemez Indian Tribe brought
action under federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA),
seeking a judgment that the tribe had exclusive right to use, occupy,
and possess the lands of the Valles Caldera National Preserve
pursuant to its continuing aboriginal title to such lands. United
States objected to admission of hearsay contained in testimony of
tribe member and the tribe's memorandum of law. District Court,
James O. Browning, J., held that: (1) American Indian oral tradition
evidence was inadmissible hearsay; (2) oral tradition evidence was
admissible under enumerated exceptions to rule against hearsay; and
(3) oral tradition evidence was inadmissible under residual hearsay
exception. Requests granted in part and denied in part.
446

130. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States
No. CIV 12-0800 JB\JHR, 2019 WL 1139724 (D.N.M. Mar. 12,
2019). This matter came before the Court on: (i) the United States'
Motion on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment, filed August
17, 2018; and (ii) the United States' Motion on the Pleadings and for
Summary Judgment, filed August 17, 2018 (collectively the
M
). The
a
e e e: ( ) he he P a ff P eblo of
Jemez' admissions that other tribes used the Valles Caldera National
Preserve lands defeat its claim that it was the exclusive aboriginal
user of the lands; (ii) whether admissions that the third-party owners
e fe ed h Je e P eb
Va e Caldera use means that Jemez
Pueblo did not maintain any aboriginal title through continuous use;
(iii) whether any statutes of limitations accrued and expired in the
decade
eced g he U ed S a e
cha e f he Va e
Caldera; (iv) whether rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ba Je e P eb
c a , beca e he P eb
f Sa a C a a a
necessary and indispensable party; and (v) whether the laches
d c e ba Je e P eb
c a , beca e Je e P eb
supported the United States' acquisition of the Valles Caldera rather
than asserting its aboriginal title claim. First, the Court concludes
that whether other tribes used the Valles Caldera does not per se
defea Je e P eb
ca
ab g a
e e ha a d. The
Court concluded further that genuine issues of material fact remain
regarding the extent of other tribes' Valles Caldera use. The United
S a e a e ed ha [ ] ca
ea ab be d
ed ha he
be
ed he P e e e a d
a a e ha defea P a ff
abo g a
e c a . A h gh he U ed S a e C
f A ea
f he Te h C c
h ca e a ed ha ,
e ab h ab g a
e, a T be
h
ha
ed a d cc ed he a d
he
exclusion of other Indian groups, P eblo of Jeme . Uni ed S a es,
790 F.3d 1143, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted), the exclusive-use-andoccupancy rule is subject to exceptions for joint and amicable use,
dominant use, and permissive use, See Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of
Tex. v. United States, No. 3-83, 2000 WL 1013532, at *12 (Fed. Cl.
June 19, 2000). Hence, evidence of other Pueblos' Valles Caldera
e
ece a
defea Je e P eb
ab g a
ec a .
Je e P eb a e
ha
e f he Va e Ca de a a
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d
a . P a ff P eb
f Je e Re
e O
Defendant United States' Motion on the Pleadings and for Summary
J dg e a 19, f ed A g 31, 2018 ( Re
e ). The d
a
use exception to the exclusive use rule recognizes that, where
another tribe commonly uses the land with the claimant tribe, proof
f he c a a
be dominance over the other tribe preserves its
exclusive use of the land. See United States v. Seminole Indians of
Fla., 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 383-86 (1967). M e e , he c a a
be s
dominance illustrates its ability to exclude other tribes from the area,
even if it never chooses to exercise that ability. Second, the Court
c c ded ha Je e P eb
ad
ha h d-party owners
interfered with its Valles Caldera use does not defeat Jemez
P eb
ab g a
e c a . The U ed S a e a e
ha he
[ ]he Te h C c
e a ded h case so that the parties could
b
e de ce ab
he he he Baca g a
e f he a d b
he Baca he
he
cce
ac a
e fe ed
h he
Je e P eb
ad
a cc a c a d e f he a d
question here before or after 1946, (
g Pueblo of Jemez v.
United States, 790 F.3d at 1168), a d c e d ha [ ]he B d a d
Dunigan families exercised their ownership in a manner that defeats
Je e c a
ha
a a ed a
e
he P e e e, I deed,
the Tenth Circuit has directed the Court to determine whether there
a ac a
b a a
e fe e ce b
he
h Je e
P eb
ad
a e f he Va e Ca de a, Pueblo of Jemez v.
United States, 790 F.3d at 1166, and mentions that substantial
e fe e ce c d e
f
h e e e e a d e, a h
ed
b he fede a g e
e b h a
a d fac , 790 F.3d at
1166 (citing United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d
1383, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ). The Court, however, in accord with
controlling Supreme Court of the United States of America
precedent, interpreted this statement to indicate that aboriginal title
extinguishment could result only from Congressionally authorized
e fe e ce
h Je e P eb
ad
a Va e Ca de a e.
See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347
(1941)( E
g h e
f I da
e ba ed
ab g a
possession is of course a different matter. The power of Congress in
ha ega d
e e. ); Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985) ( [C] g e
a
e
e
g h
I da
e
be a a d a b g
, a d
be gh
ed. (
g United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314
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U.S. at 346, 354) ). Hence, based
he Te h C c
a da e
c
de e de ce f
b a a
e fe e ce b
he , Pueblo of
Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d at 1166, the Court has identified
five factors, none of which by itself is dispositive, that could support
a finding that non-Indians substantially interfered with aboriginal
title over time so as to effectuate a gradual taking absent express
Congressional intent: (i) the creation of an Indian reservation; (ii)
Congressionally authorized non-Indian settlement of historic tribal
lands; (iii) a Congressionally ratified Executive Order increasing the
size of reservation lands set aside for exclusive Indian use; (iv) a
cabinet-level order, pursuant to a Congressional act, imposing
restrictions on Indian use of their historic lands; and (v)
Congressional or executive action designating tribal land for
conservation, recreation, or commercial use, such as a forest reserve,
grazing district, or the like. Third, the Court concluded that the
statutes of limitations to which the United States directs the Court
d
ba Je e P eb
ab g a
e c a . The U ed S a e
c e ded ha Je e P eb
ca
e-barred if the United
Sae e
ed
e fe e ce h ab g a
e, M
a 27
(quoting Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d at 1147), then
a e
ha
he fac
a e c ea ha Baca he ' cce
ec ded ad
a I da
e a a e ha ca ed P a ff
cla
acc e b h bef e a d af e 1946, M
a 27. I
addressing the United States' argument that the Baca heirs' use of
the Valles Caldera is a cloud on title sufficient to trigger accrual
against the United States in 1860, the Tenth Circuit counters that
a e
cc a c a d e f a d
a
fee e, a d
aboriginal title, can occur, because the nature of Indian occupancy
differs significantly from non-I d a e e ' cc a c . Id. at
1165. The Tenth Circuit highlights such disparate use when it states
ha
... ea
ee h
a eacef a d
ae I da
eb
might have used portions of this large area of land for its traditional
purposes while one agreeable rancher was using portions of it for
ga g
e c . Id. Jemez Pueblo argued that Jemez people
a e d
g b h e d f B d a d D ga
e h
continued to access the Valles Caldera for traditional purposes, to
include hunting game, taking eagles, and conducting religious
pilgrimages to Redondo Peak, See Response at 22-23, a d ha
claim accrued only when the United States acquired an interest in
he Va e Ca de a 2000 a d bega
g he Je e P eb
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access to the la d a a e c
e
h ab g a
e,
Response at 27 (quoting Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d
at 1152). Based on the nature of aboriginal occupancy, the Court
was not convinced that, as a matter of law, a taking occurred
between 1860 and 2000, and, therefore, did not bar Je e P eb
claim based on the United States' theory that the statute of
a
acc ed. Defe da
de ed.
131. Goss v. Bonner
No. CV-18-08295-PCT-SMB, 2019 WL 2137266 (D. Ariz. May 16,
2019). Plaintiff Keith Goss is a podiatrist who previously worked
for T ba C
Reg a Hea h Ca e C
a
( TCRHCC ),
which is owned by the Navajo Nation and is operated under the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
( ISDEAA ), Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203. Plaintiff filed this
action in Coconino County Superior Court. The FAC brought
individual counts of defamation against the Individual Defendants.
Plaintiff allege that beginning around March 1, 2017 and continuing
throughout June, he became aware of statements made by each of
the Individual Defendants to people outside of official workplace
proceedings. He alleges that the statements were published to people
and impeached his honesty, integrity, or reputation. He also alleges
that the Individual Defendants knew that the statements were false.
In the alternative, Plaintiff brought a Bivens claim for violation of
right to privacy. On October 19, 2018, the United States
concurrently removed this action from the Superior Court to this
court a d f ed a N ce f S b
,
b
g he U ed
States for the Individual Defendants in each of the seven defamation
claims pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
C
e a
Ac f 1988, c
a he We fa
Ac , 28 U.S.C. § 2679. ( he Sc e Ce f ca
). The D ec
f
the Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, certified that the
I d d a Defe da
e e c e ed e
ac g
h
he
scope of their deemed federal employment as employees of the
Indian Health Service in carrying out functions authorized under the
Self-Governance Compact with TCRHCC at the time of the
c de
g
g e
. The U ed S a e he b gh a
motion to dismiss the Defamation Counts pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
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When a federal employee is sued for a wrongful or negligent act, the
We fa Ac a h
e he A
e Ge e a
ce f ha a
United States employee was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of an incident which gives rise to a civil
c a . Meridian International Logistics, Inc. v. United States 939
F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1991)1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)(2)). The action then proceeds under the Federal Tort Claims Act
( FTCA ). Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420,
115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995). H e e , [b]eca e he g e ment has not
waived its sovereign immunity under the ... FTCA ... for claims
a
g
f be
a de , he C
ac
b ec -matter
jurisdiction over a defamation claim against the United States, and
such claim must be dismissed. See Dora v. Achey, 300 Fed.Appx.
550, 551 (9th Cir. 2008). [T]he A
e Ge e a ce f ca
he f , b
he f a
d
he he he fede a ff ce
immune from suit and correlatively, whether the United States is
e
b
ed a defe da . Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225,
246 (2007) (quoting Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 432). The party
cha e g g he ce f ca
bea
he b de
f esenting
e de ce a d d
g he A
e Ge e a ce f ca
b a
e de a ce f he e de ce. Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729, 732
(9th Cir. 2011). The question of whether a federal employee is acting
within the course and scope of his employment is determined by
applying respondeat superior principles of the state in which the
alleged tort occurred. Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 99 (9th Cir.
1993). In cases where the United States is substituted for an
e
ee ha a a ba e
ee, [ ]he ba e
ee
also be deemed to have acted as a federal employee in carrying out
he a eged
ac
. Wilson . Hor on s Towing, 906 F.3d
773, 781 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, (2019 WL 825553, Apr. 22,
2019). The Ninth Circuit recently articulated that the test found in
Shirk v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't of Interior, 773 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014),
also applied to challenges to Attorney General Certifications.
Wilson, 906 F.3d at 781. The Wilson court found that the test had
two parts. First, the district court looks at whether the language of
he fede a c
ac e c
a ed he ac
ha he a ff
ascribes to the empl ee. Id. (quoting Shirk, 773 F.3d at 1007).
Sec d, he c
a he he he e
ee ac
fe
within the scope of employment as defined by state law. Id. In
A
a, [ ]he c d c f a e a
h n the scope of
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employment if it is of the kind the employee is employed to perform,
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limit,
a d
ac a ed a ea
a b a
e
e e he a e .
Smith v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 876 P.2d 1166,
1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). As to the first prong of the Shirk test
whether the language of the federal contract encompassed the
activity that the plaintiff ascribes to the employee Plaintiff only
a e h
e h Re
e he M
D
. P a ff
argument is somewhat circular, alleging that the statements were not
ade
he c e f e
e , a d h ca
be ca
g
he c
ac
ag ee e . I he FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the
Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of their employment
but does not specifically state how the allegations were not related
f c
f he h
a. I
he P a ff b de
de
evidence that disproves the Scope Certification, and Plaintiff has not
shown that the Individual Defendants were not acting pursuant to
the Self-Governance Compact. As to the second prong of the Shirk
test
he he he e
ee ac
fe
h
he c e f
employment Plaintiff argue that the Individual Defendants were
not acting in the scope of their employment. Plaintiff argues that
he e a
eg
ae
ac
he he Defe da
ff he
work site and in social settings made statements about Plaintiff
being dangerous and taking kick-bac . Ta e a
e, P a ff
a ega
d
e ab h ha he defe da
ac
e ceeded he
scope of his employment. Now that the court has determined that
the United States is the proper defendant for the Defamation Counts,
the court now considers the United States' motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The United
States argues that dismissal is warranted because the action is
covered under the FTCA, and the government has not waived its
sovereign immunity in defamation claims. The United States also
a g e ha d
a
a a ed d e
P a ff fa e
exhaust administrative remedies. Here, Plaintiff does not dispute
that the Defamation Claims cannot go forward under the FTCA.
Rather, Plaintiff argues that there are questions as to whether the
Individual Defendants are considered federal actors and whether
they were acting within the scope of employment. For the reasons
stated above, the court finds that the United States is the proper
Defendant. Accordingly, the Defamation Counts must be dismissed,
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and the court need not address the United States' additional
arguments.
132. Western Shoshone Identifiable Group by Yomba
Shoshone Tribe v. United States
No. 06-896L, 143 Fed.Cl. 545, 2019 WL 2480154 (Fed. Cl. June 13,
2019). Yomba Shoshone Tribe, Timbisha Shoshone Tribe,
Duckwater Shoshone Tribe, and individual enrolled tribal members
sued United States, asserting breach of trust claim due to federal
government, as trustee, allegedly breaching its fiduciary duty by
mismanaging three tribal trust funds due to imprudent investing in
securities that were too short-term, resulting in less than maximum
returns over thirty-three-year period, for which tribes sought to
recover $216,386,589.83 in damages. Bench trial was held. The
Court of Federal Claims, Marian Blank Horn, J., held that:
(1) tribes had standing to pursue breach of trust claim for all three
funds; (2) government had fiduciary duty to invest tribal trust funds;
(3) Department of Interior's (DOI) investment policies did not
warrant deference; (4) largest fund was prudently invested for
several time periods; (5) largest fund was imprudently invested for
other time periods; and (6) smaller two funds were imprudently
invested except during final year. Ordered accordingly.
133. Moody v. United States
No. 2018-2227, 931 F.3d 1136, 2019 WL 3309394 (Fed. Cir. July
24, 2019). Lessees, who had entered into five agricultural leases
with Indian tribe, brought action against United States, alleging that
government breached leases by terminating them and ordering
lessees to vacate land and that government's actions constituted
taking without just compensation under Fifth Amendment. The
United States Court of Federal Claims, No. 1:16-cv-00107-EJD,
Edward J. Damich, Senior Judge, 135 Fed.Cl. 39, dismissed
complaint, and lessees appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dyk, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) United States was not party to leases; (2) United
States' alleged revival of leases did not subject it to liability for
breach of implied-in-fact contracts; and (3) Bureau
of Indian Affairs' (BIA) alleged violation of regulations in canceling
leases did not give rise to takings claim. Affirmed.
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134. Bell v. City of Lacey
No. 3:18-cv-05918-RBL, 2019 WL 3412713 (W.D. Wash. July 29,
2019). On June 24, 2019, the Court issued an order dismissing the
Nisqually Tribe from the case and dismissing all claims for damages
against Nisqually CEO John Simmons and CFO Eletta Tiam.
However, the Court declined to dismiss the declaratory and
injunctive relief claim against Simmons and Tiam pending
additional briefing on whether that claim may proceed under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young. After reviewing the submissions from
b h a e , he C
he eb g a
he T be Defe da
M
for Judgment on the Pleadings in full and dismisses all claims
against Defendants Simmons and Tiam. Although a state official
acting within the scope of their valid authority normally enjoys
sovereign immunity, if the official is enforcing a law that conflicts
h fede a a h
he a e
ed f [ he ] ff c a
e e e a e cha ac e . Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.123, 159 60
(1908). A court may therefore issue declaratory judgment and enjoin
official conduct in conflict with the Constitution or congressional
statutes. Id. at 155-56; Na l Audubon Soc , Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d
835, 848 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Ex parte Young extends to
claims for declaratory relief). This doctrine applies equally to tribal
officials. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d
1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007). The tribe Defendants argue that Ex parte
Young d e
Be
ca f
c e a d dec a a
relief against Simmons and Tiam for several reasons. First, they
argue that Simmons and Tiam are not proper defendants for an Ex
parte Young action because they lack the requisite connection to
e f ce e . Sec d, he a e ha Be
e e ed e ef
d
require affirmative acts by the tribe itself, rather than just tribal
officials. Third, they contend that Bell lacks standing, and his claim
for declaratory and injunctive relief is not ripe. The Court agrees. If
a plaintiff wants to enjoin unlawful government action, Ex parte
Young does not permit them to sue just any official. Okpalobi v.
Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2001). Rather, the defendant
ha e
ec
ec
h he e f ce e
f he ac
avoid making that official a mere representative of the
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a e. Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d
614, 619 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157).
Th c
ec
be fa
d ec ; a ge e a ed d
e f ce
state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible
for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to
. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908,
919 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court cannot conclude that Simmons and
Tiam are proper defendants in an Ex parte Young action. Attempts
to assert a claim under Ex parte Young a a
a e d
a
d ba
e eg
f he tribe e f
he ea ,
b a a a
e e . Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project
Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir.
2002); Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). Th
a be he ca e f he
relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation
of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by
the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign
e . Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1320 (quoting State of
Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969)). Courts have
also addressed this issue by asking whether the judgment sought
de e d ef
he b c ea
d a ,
e fe e
with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would
be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to
ac . Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Shermoen, 982 F.2d
at 1320). The tribe Defe da
M
f J dg e
he
Pleadings is granted in full. Defendants Simmons and Tiam are
dismissed from the case.
135. Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians v. Whitmer
No. 1:15-cv-850, 398 F.Supp.3d 201, 2019 WL 3854299 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 15, 2019). Plaintiff, the Little Traverse Bay Band of
Odawa Indians ( he Tribe ) c a ed ha 1855, he U ed S a e
entered a treaty with its predecessors and created
an Indian reservation spanning more than 300 square miles in the
Northwest
portion
of
Michigan's
Lower
Peninsula.
The Tribe sought declaratory judgment from the court that the
claimed reservation has continued to exist to this day and has not
been diminished or disestablished by any government action.
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Defendant and Intervenor-Defendants' moved for summary
judgment. Collectively, the Defendants asserted that summary
judgment was warranted on the Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief because no Indian reservation was
ever created, or in the alternative, any reservation created was
subsequently diminished. Whether a reservation was created
depends upon the construction of an 1855 treaty between the United
States and the Tribe's political predecessors. But treaties
between Indian tribes and the United States are not interpreted like
other international compacts, other laws, or even other contracts.
Instead, when construing an Indian treaty, the court
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the
T ea , c d g he h
f he ea , he eg a
, a d he
ac ca c
c
ad ed b he a e . Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196, 119 S.Ct. 1187,
143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999) (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L .Ed. 877 (1943)). Once versed
he e e a h
, [c]
ca
g e a a g age ha ,
viewed in historical c e a d g e a fa a a a ,
c
e
to a tribe's a e c a . Or. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath
Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774, 105 S.Ct. 3420, 87 L.Ed.2d 542
(1985). Ultimately the court concluded that, after a review of the
entirety of the historical record, summary judgment was warranted
on the Tribe's claims because the 1855 treaty cannot plausibly be
read to create an Indian reservation, even when giving effect to the
terms as the Indian signatories would have understood them and
even when resolving any ambiguities in the Treaty text in favor of
the Indians. The 1855 Treaty simply cannot bear the construction
that the Tribe would place on it, especially considering the historical
context. The Tribe's predecessor bands bargained for and received
permanent homes in Michigan in the form of individual allotments.
They did not bargain for an Indian reservation, and no such
reservation was created by the unambiguous treaty terms because
the terms do not establish federally set-aside land
for Indian purposes or indefinite federal superintendence over the
land. See Oklahoma Ta Com n . Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511, 111 S.Ct. 905 (1991).). The Tribe asserted
that their predecessors understood that a treaty requiring the United
States to withdraw land from sale for their benefit created
an Indian reservation. But the court concluded that when the Treaty
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is placed in the relevant historical context, it cannot plausibly be
read to have created an Indian reservation, and the
Tribe's predecessors did not believe that it did so. Accordingly, the
court determined summary judgment was warranted on
the Tribe's claims. The Defendants' motions for summary judgment
were granted.
Miscellaneous
136. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v.
Whitmer
No. 1:15-cv-850, 365 F.Supp.3d 865, 2019 WL 687882 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 31, 2019). American Indian tribe brought action against
Michigan State and municipal officials for failure to recognize
reservation land. Government moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The District Court, Paul L. Maloney, J., held that: (1) tribe was not
judicially estopped from claiming interest in reservation land; (2)
prior proceeding before Indian Claims Commission did not
collaterally estop tribe from claiming interest in reservation land;
and (3) tribe's claims were not barred by Indian Claims Commission
Act. Motion denied.
137. Navajo Nation v. San Juan County
No. 18-4005, 929 F.3d 1270, 2019 WL 3121838 (10th Cir. July 16,
2019). Indian tribe and tribal members brought action alleging that
county commission and school board districts within county
violated Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court
for the District of Utah, No. 2:12-CV-00039-RJS, Robert J. Shelby,
J., denied county's motion to dismiss, 2015 WL 1137587, entered
summary judgment in tribe's favor, 150 F.Supp.3d 1253, 162
F.Supp.3d 1162, rejected county's proposed remedial plan, 266
F.Supp.3d 1341, and adopted special master's remedial election
districts, 2017 WL 6547635. County appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Moritz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) tribe was not
prohibited by consent decree and settlement order in Voting Rights
Act (VRA) litigation from bringing lawsuit; (2) United States'
approval of original district boundaries pursuant to consent decree
did not deprive district court of jurisdiction over tribe's action; (3)
county commission districts were unconstitutionally based on race;
457

(4) deviation of 38% in populations between school board districts
violated Equal Protection Clause's one-person, one-vote principle;
(5) district court did not clearly err in concluding that racial
c
de a
ed
a ed
c ea g c
ed
remedial redistricting plans; (6) county's drawing of race-based
boundaries for districts was not narrowly tailored to its compelling
interest in complying with VRA; (7) district court did not clearly err
in concluding that race was not predominate factor in its expert's
redistricting plans; and 8) district court did not abuse its discretion
when it prioritized compliance with one-person, one-vote principle
over c
ad
a e b de . Aff ed.
138. Brakebill v. Jaeger
No. 18-1725, 932 F.3d 671, 2019 WL 3432470 (8th Cir. July 31,
2019). This appeal arose from a challenge by six Native American
a ff
f N h Da a e ec
atutes. North
Dakota requires a voter to present a specific form of identification
at the polls before receiving a ballot. That identification must
de, a
g he h g , he
e c e e de a
ee
address. Six plaintiffs sued the North Dakota Secretary of State,
alleging that the provisions place an unconstitutional burden on the
right to vote of many Native Americans. The district court agreed
and enjoined the Secretary from enforcing certain statutory
requirements statewide. The Secretary appealed. The court
concluded that the alleged burdens did not justify a statewide
injunction a d aca e he d
c c
de . The c c ded f
ha he a ff fac a cha e ge
he e de a
ee add e
requirement likely failed and that the statewide injunction as to that
provision cannot be justified as a form of as-applied relief. The
district court thought the residential street address requirement
posed an impermissible legal obstacle because Native American
communities often lack residential street addresses. The Secretary
disputed whether street addresses are truly lacking in
these communities and complains the district court mistakenly
relied on outdated evidence about two counties that had not finished
assigning addresses as of 2011. But even assuming that a plaintiff
ca h
ha a e ec
a e
e e ce
e b de
e
e
e e
some voters, that showing did not justify broad
relief that invalidates the requirements on a statewide basis as
applied to all voters. Here, the plaintiffs have not presented evidence
458

that the residential street address requirement imposes a substantial
burden on most North Dakota voters. Even assuming that
some communities do not have residential street addresses, that fact
did not justify a statewide injunction that prevents the Secretary
from requiring a form of identification with a residential street
address from the vast majority of residents who have them. The
c
f he c c ded ha he a e e
e e
e ent an
enumerated form of identification did not impose a burden on voters
that justified a statewide injunction to accept additional forms of
identification. The district court found that 4,998 otherwise eligible
Native Americans and 64,618 non-Native voters lacked a qualifying
identification. The court also found that 65.6% of the Native
American group were missing at least one of the underlying
documents needed to obtain a valid identification from the State.
These data, however, leave 513,742 of 583,358 eligible voters in the
state, or 88 percent, as to whom the plaintiffs have not shown a lack
of qualifying identification. In short, the evidence is insufficient to
show that the valid form of identification requirement places a
substantial burden on mos N h Da a e . The d
c c
order of April 3, 2018, granting a preliminary injunction is vacated,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
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